Report on the
Review of New Zealand's Animal Health Statuses

United States Department of Agriculture
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Veterinary Services
February 2018

Executive Summary

The United States Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) considers New Zealand to be free of classical swine fever (CSF), foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), Newcastle disease (ND), rinderpest, scrapie, and swine vesicular disease (SVD). APHIS periodically conducts reviews of animal health statuses held by foreign regions in order to determine whether or not conditions in the region support maintenance, suspension, or revocation of these statuses.

In order to evaluate New Zealand's ability to maintain its animal health statuses, APHIS collected and analyzed information relevant to the factors used to conduct evaluations to establish initial animal health statuses. APHIS' review concluded that the disease agents under review are not present in New Zealand, the country has adequate infrastructure and controls to exclude importation of these agents into the United States, and maintains adequate programs for detection and control of the disease agents under review in the event that they did enter New Zealand. In addition, New Zealand has demonstrated a history of prompt reporting of disease events, taking appropriate measures to prevent their export to the United States.

Therefore, APHIS will maintain New Zealand's APHIS-granted animal health statuses for CSF, FMD, ND, rinderpest, scrapie, and SVD, and associated import requirements.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
AHL	New Zealand's Animal Health Laboratory
CSF	Classical swine fever
CFR	U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
FMD	Foot-and-mouth disease
IHS	Import Health Standard
IIV	Initial Investigating Veterinarian
MPI	Ministry for Primary Industries
NAIT	National Animal Identification and Tracing
NCBN	National Biosecurity Capability Network
ND	Newcastle disease
OAP	Official Assurance Program
OIE	World Organization for Animal Health
RMP	Risk management program
SVD	Swine vesicular disease

Background

A status review is an assessment of animal health conditions in a foreign region that currently has one or more animal health statuses recognized by APHIS. These reviews are conducted on a periodic basis in order to determine whether APHIS should maintain its recognition of the region's animal health status.

United States regulations stipulate in title 9 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (9 CFR) section 92.2(g) that regions granted animal health status under the provisions of those regulations may be required to submit additional information pertaining to their animal health status or allow APHIS to conduct additional information collection activities in order for the regions to maintain their APHIS-recognized animal health status [1]. This review process is applicable only for regions that have not reported outbreaks of the disease or pest occurrence, for which the region is recognized, since APHIS' most recent evaluation or review. This includes regions recognized as free, regions recognized as being low risk, and regions not recognized as disease- or pest-free but from which importation of certain products is allowed under specific conditions to mitigate certain risks.

In order to evaluate New Zealand's ability to maintain its APHIS-granted animal health statuses for classical swine fever (CSF), foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), Newcastle disease (ND), rinderpest, scrapie, and swine vesicular disease (SVD), APHIS collected and analyzed information relevant to the factors used to conduct evaluations to establish initial animal health statuses as described in 9 CFR section 92.2. These factors allow APHIS to establish a comprehensive representation of the region's veterinary infrastructure and services, livestock demographics, livestock movement and marketing patterns, surveillance programs, disease control capabilities, veterinary laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and emergency response systems for the specified hazards[1]. APHIS evaluated the information in order to determine that New Zealand meets the following overarching standards:

1. The hazard is not present in the region and/or the commodity under review;

2. The hazard is unlikely to infect or contaminate the commodity being exported to the United States because of measures that prevent the introduction of the hazard and/or epidemiological barriers (both natural and manmade) that separate the region from the hazard of concern; and

3. If the region has a hazard incursion, the region can rapidly detect the hazard; promptly notify the United States and/or the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)[2]; and respond to the outbreak sufficiently to prevent introduction of the hazard into the United States through the importation of commodities from the region.

[1] A hazard is a biological, chemical, or physical agent in, or a condition of, an animal or animal product with the potential to cause an adverse health event. For the purposes of this report, hazard refers to the causative agent of any of the six diseases under review.

[2] The OIE is a reference organization recognized by the Word Trade Organization as the standard-setting body for safe trade in animals and animal products. The OIE collects and disseminates information about the animal health status of its 181 member countries.

These elements will be addressed in the following sections.

The report will conclude with a determination regarding maintenance of New Zealand's animal health statuses. Based on the results of the review, APHIS will determine which of the following actions is appropriate for each status: (1) maintain the current status and import requirements; (2) continue the current recognition but with recommendation to strengthen the import requirements or mitigations; or (3) downgrade the current animal disease status recognition.

At the beginning of this review process, APHIS considered New Zealand to be free of all of the hazards under review with no additional import measures required.

1 Review

The sections below review New Zealand's APHIS-granted animal health statuses using the factors described above in order to determine whether to maintain the current statuses or change them as described above. Information collected from New Zealand and accessed from publicly available sources is used in the review.

1.1 Status of hazards under review in New Zealand

As an island nation, New Zealand is geographically isolated from the hazards under review, limiting opportunities for their incursion as reflected in its reporting history to the OIE [2]. Of the six hazards that are the subject of this review, four have never been known to occur in New Zealand: FMD, ND, rinderpest, and SVD. Vaccination for these diseases has never been permitted in New Zealand. Although strains of asymptomatic or mild ND do occur in New Zealand, reportable strains with higher pathogenicity (avian paramyxovirus serotype-1) have never been reported and vaccination for this strain is prohibited in New Zealand.

The two hazards on APHIS' review list that have been reported to occur in New Zealand, CSF and scrapie, have not been present in the country in over 50 years [NZVJ article – 2002 and submission]. The most recent case of CSF in New Zealand occurred in a single swine herd in Auckland in 1953 as a result of feeding ship waste. The outbreak was quickly eradicated through whole herd depopulation. Scrapie was detected in New Zealand for the first time in 1952, in sheep imported from the United Kingdom in 1950. The disease was eradicated from New Zealand in 1954. Scrapie was again detected in sheep imported into New Zealand from the United Kingdom in 1976 and 1977 as part of a research project; however, the sheep were still in quarantine on an off-shore island at the time of detection and all of the imported sheep were euthanized. Neither CSF nor scrapie has been detected since. Vaccination for CSF is prohibited in New Zealand and there is no vaccine for scrapie.

1.2 Likelihood of hazard entry into New Zealand

Despite New Zealand's geographic isolation and long history of absence of the hazards under review, entry of the hazards remains possible. Therefore, APHIS has requested information from New Zealand's animal health authority in order to determine the effectiveness of measures to prevent importation of the hazards into New Zealand. This discussion is preceded by a review of New Zealand's overarching veterinary infrastructure, which underpins import measures as well as other aspects of hazard mitigation, such as detection and control, which are discussed elsewhere in this document.

1.2.1 Veterinary infrastructure

New Zealand's government veterinary infrastructure is overseen by the central government agency, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) [3]. MPI has six branches (Operations, Regulation and Assurance, Policy and Trade, Sector Partnership and Programmes, Office of the Director-General, and Corporate Services) which enforce New Zealand's regulations pertaining to animal health and biosecurity **(Appendix 1).** MPI employs approximately 2,200 staff who serve as scientists, food safety and border clearance personnel, disease readiness and response coordinators, compliance officers, support staff etc. A portion of MPI employees are

veterinarians who monitor live animal quarantine facilities, certify live animal and fresh animal product exports, and verify imported animal products. MPI does not employ a field force of veterinarians and animal health professionals to carry out the operations of New Zealand's animal health program, rather they partner with several independent organizations empowered by New Zealand to conduct this work. A description of these private-public partnerships follows.

AsureQuality is a state-owned, ISO accredited[3] organization that works under the auspices of MPI to help perform some of New Zealand's animal health and food safety related tasks [4]. These services include meat inspection, disease surveillance, disease response, verification and audit of industry risk management programs, sampling services for residues, and laboratory testing services. The AsureQuality veterinary services is staffed by 15 registered veterinarians, 7 of whom are recognized by New Zealand to verify export requirements for live animal and germplasm shipments. In the event of a foreign or emerging animal disease outbreak, AsureQuality, under the direction of MPI, will help coordinate a veterinary response force through the National Biosecurity Capability Network (NBCN) [5]. NCBN is a group of 145 agriculture, veterinary and food-focused organizations encompassing 55,000 members. Those members include 839 private practice veterinarians who receive specialized training to respond during an animal disease event. AsureQuality also works with MPI Diagnostic and Surveillance Services to maintain a network of Initial Investigating Veterinarians (IIV) who are on call to investigate possible foreign animal disease events. Currently, there are 30 trained IIVs in New Zealand that receive training updates every 3 years.

MPI partners with other non-government parties to further support New Zealand's animal health programs [6]. Currently, there are 1,900 veterinarians in the private sector that contribute to New Zealand's veterinary infrastructure. Their activities include reporting possible incidents of foreign animal disease, participating in the passive surveillance system and NBCN response corps, becoming trained as IIVs, and providing export certification documentation to MPI for approval. The Operational Solutions for Primary Industry (OSPRI) partnership coordinates with MPI to manage the National Animal Identification and Tracing (NAIT), a compulsory animal identification program for cattle and deer [7]. Other organizations that support New Zealand's veterinary infrastructure include Quality Consultants New Zealand Ltd, which provides independent verification of dairy risk management practices; and EpiCentre, an OIE-recognized Collaborating center for Veterinary Epidemiology and Public Health that provides MPI with epidemiological and food safety expertise.

As stipulated in New Zealand's Animal Products Act (1999), MPI is the competent authority responsible for providing official assurances[4] for live animal and animal product exports [8]. To provide these assurances to foreign regions, MPI retains oversight of the national monitoring programs for animal diseases, verifies industry compliance, and conducts audits and monitors

[3] The International Standard for Organization is an independent international entity that develops standards for businesses and provides evaluation and accreditation for those companies that meet or exceed the standards set by the governing body.

[4] MPI official assurances are provided in the form of a New Zealand export certificate that meets both New Zealand and foreign region requirements.

system performance for organizations empowered to conduct animal health and food safety tasks. Details for the Official Assurance Program are discussed further in **Export controls** [9].

APHIS concludes that MPI conducts effective oversight of a network of government partnerships that provide a sufficient veterinary field force capable of implementing New Zealand's complex animal health programs. MPI, AsureQuality and other partner agencies are capable of maintaining the health and safety of New Zealand's live animal population and animal products by controlling importation of animals and associated products, detecting and responding to possible disease incursions, and providing official assurance for exported animals and animal products to ensure those commodities meet U.S. certification requirements.

1.2.2 Importation of animals, animal products, and germplasm

Animals, animal products, and germplasm are considered by New Zealand to be risk goods[5]; thus their import is only permitted under an Import Health Standard (IHS) [6, 10, 11]. The IHS specifies the required measures for importation and is used to determine the requirements in the official veterinary certificate for import. The basis of an IHS is a risk assessment, which is conducted by the Chief Technical Officer of MPI for each new animal commodity proposed for import. The risk assessment follows OIE guidelines and encompasses the risk pathway for the commodity and the disease status of the exporting region in order to assess the risk of transmitting animal disease agents to the local livestock population and identify appropriate mitigations. Risk goods for which an applicable IHS is not available are not permitted to be imported into New Zealand.

Upon importation, a biosecurity inspector[6] reviews the import documentation and ensures that all requirements of the IHS have been met, including presence of the appropriate import permit, identification requirements, pre-export isolation, testing, and/or treatments, and food safety requirements for commodities intended for human consumption, etc. [6, 12]. In some cases the IHS may require that the inspector be a veterinarian. Livestock presented for importation are required to undergo veterinary inspection, which involves checking identification, verifying pre-export laboratory results, and conducting a physical inspection for health, welfare, and the presence of ectoparasites.

Post-arrival quarantine is not required for livestock imports into New Zealand [6, 12, 13]. The only livestock allowed to enter New Zealand are certain ruminants and camelids from Australia, which has the same animal health status as New Zealand, and camelids from the United States. Live swine and poultry are not imported into New Zealand. Additional requirements for importation, including pre-export quarantine and testing, treatment for parasites, application of MPI identification devices, etc. are contained in the individual IHS for each commodity. All imported ruminants are subject to registration and reporting requirements in the event of illness,

[5]Risk goods are any items that may (or may reasonably be suspected to) constitute, harbor, or contain organisms that may cause unwanted harm to natural and physical resources or human health in New Zealand. Animals and animal products are considered to be risk goods.

[6] Biosecurity inspectors are appointed by the Chief Technical Officer of MPI. Technical competence and appropriate experience and qualifications must be demonstrated prior to appointment. Veterinary biosecurity inspectors conduct inspections of imported live animals when required and receive additional, ongoing training.

death, escape, or change of ownership or location of the animal for the duration of its life [14]. Livestock are only permitted to transit New Zealand if a current IHS for general importation of that species exists and the livestock are in compliance with all of the requirements therein.

New Zealand requires post-arrival quarantine for poultry commodities such as hatching eggs and specific pathogen free chicken eggs [15]. Upon import, the eggs are transported to an approved avian transitional (quarantine) facility[7] in an approved and appropriately cleaned and disinfected vehicle [16]. The eggs are incubated and hatched at the facility and are subject to routine inspection, testing, and/or vaccination as specified in the relevant IHS. Specific pathogen free eggs that are not hatched must be used within either an avian or biological transitional facility.

As with other imported animal commodities, requirements for imported germplasm relate to the country of export and specific commodity as spelled out in the respective IHS. Specific requirements depend on the export country's disease status (or herd status) for certain diseases transmissible through semen and embryos and may include pre-import isolation and/or testing or treatment of donor animals. General requirements stipulate that collection, storage, and handling of specimens is consistent with OIE and International Embryo Technology Society standards. All progeny derived from imported ruminant embryos are subject to the same registration and reporting requirements as imported live ruminants [14].

Meat and meat products also must be imported under an IHS developed for the specific commodity and country of origin [12]. Additional food safety requirements apply for meat intended for human consumption. Shipments of pork may be required to be transported to transitional facilities upon entry to New Zealand for final processing in order to fulfill IHS requirements.

Additional inspections on goods that are not imported under an IHS are conducted to detect prohibited animal commodities using a targeted risk system based on risk profiles [6]. Risk profiles take into account the type of item being imported, the country of origin, and the compliance history of the importer. Items identified as high risk may be subject to 100% inspection.

Waste from international vessels must be securely transported to a transitional facility approved to treat refuse to remove biological hazards [10, 17].

APHIS concludes that New Zealand imposes a stringent system of import controls for animals and animal products. This system begins with a risk assessment to determine the likelihood of hazard entry and concludes with a system of import requirement verification and inspection. New Zealand also inspects other imported goods and passengers, and carries out measures to prevent the inadvertent introduction of hazards through international waste. These controls form an effective barrier to introduction of the hazards into New Zealand.

1.2.3 Hazard entry conclusions

New Zealand has demonstrated that the hazards under review are unlikely to enter New Zealand. The competent veterinary authority, which collaborates with public-private entities, provides

[7] Transitional facilities are licensed and approved according to New Zealand's Biosecurity Act and are used for the purpose of inspecting, testing, treatment, storing, or holding imported goods as required by their respective IHS.

sufficient oversight to ensure the health of the livestock population as well as the health status of imported animals and animal products. Appropriate risk mitigations, such as testing, quarantine, inspections etc., are applied to animal commodity imports to create an effective barrier to the introduction of the hazards under review. Therefore APHIS concludes that the likelihood of entry of CSF, FMD, ND, scrapie and rinderpest to New Zealand is negligible.

1.3 Hazard detection, response, and notification

APHIS requested additional information from New Zealand's animal health authority in order to review its ability to detect and respond to a potential hazard incursion. In order to determine New Zealand's ability to ensure that only eligible animals and animal products are exported to the United States, whether or not a disease incursion has occurred, APHIS also requested and evaluated information about New Zealand's export control measures. APHIS also reviewed New Zealand's history of notification. These factors are discussed below.

1.3.1 Surveillance

The hazards under consideration in this review are notifiable under New Zealand's Biosecurity Order 2016 [18]. As a member of the OIE, New Zealand has a history of surveillance for and reporting of these hazards and has never reported a case of FMD, ND (avian paramyxovirus serotype-1), rinderpest, or SVD and the last reported cases of CSF and scrapie occurred in 1953 and 1954, respectively. Due to historic freedom and the most appropriate allocation of resources, New Zealand conducts primarily passive surveillance for the hazards under review. MPI Diagnostic and Surveillance Services along with contracted AsureQuality veterinary field personnel conduct passive surveillance for notifiable diseases; it is incumbent on all veterinarians and producers to report suspect cases of disease. New Zealand publishes occurrences of foreign animal disease investigations and surveillance data in its *Surveillance* magazine [19, 20]. This quarterly publication is available online and is designed to increase awareness of disease prevalence and reporting among private veterinarians, producers, and the general public. It also demonstrates the capability of New Zealand's reporting and investigation system for the hazards under review. In the *Surveillance* magazine 2017 Annual Report, New Zealand published yearly and cumulative (since 2008) investigation data for all notifiable diseases including CSF, all transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents (TSEs) including scrapie, Newcastle disease, and viral vesicular diseases (**Appendix 2**). All investigations conducted to date have resulted in negative findings for these diseases.

The passive surveillance program in New Zealand includes wildlife species susceptible to the hazards under review [21]. The majority (89%) of wildlife cases submitted in 2015 were wild birds submitted for testing for highly pathogenic avian influenza. Testing for Newcastle disease was also performed in these cases. Wild mammals made up less than 1% of submissions.

In addition to passive surveillance for scrapie, which targets sheep and goats 2 years and older with progressive neurological signs, New Zealand also conducts active surveillance for scrapie and other TSEs [10, 22-24]. The active surveillance program for scrapie began in 2010 and targets clinically normal sheep at slaughter from a geographically representative population. During 2016, 320 samples were tested for scrapie under this program, with all samples testing

negative. New Zealand has a ruminant feed ban in place and requires all agencies that render, use, or store protein or produce feed for ruminants to have a ruminant protein control plan.

New Zealand's national Animal Health Laboratory (AHL) is the only laboratory authorized to perform diagnostic tests for the hazards under review (except rinderpest, for which the AHL no longer maintains diagnostic tests or control materials) [6]. New Zealand's AHL is accredited to ISO17025 standards, and meets all accreditation and certification standards annually, through both internal and external audits. Additionally the AHL participates in internal and international proficiency testing schemes.

Information supplied by New Zealand and resources made publicly available by MPI demonstrate New Zealand's comprehensive surveillance program and capability to detect the hazards under review. New Zealand's surveillance system appears appropriate given disease history and expected prevalence, geographic considerations, and live animal and animal product import policies. New Zealand's AHL appears to have sufficient controls in place to adequately detect the hazards under review.

1.3.2 Animal disease investigation and response

Disease reporting is the responsibility of all veterinarians, livestock producers, and the general public in New Zealand [6, 10]. Animals demonstrating clinical signs suggestive of foreign animal diseases can be reported through MPI's pest and disease emergency hotline. As discussed previously, MPI relies on a contracted veterinary field force (AsureQuality; NBCN) to conduct disease investigations **(Veterinary infrastructure)**. AsureQuality trains a team of Initial Investigating Veterinarians (IIVs) to respond to suspected cases of animal disease. MPI reports there are currently 30 IIVs located throughout New Zealand that are capable of responding the same day a report is received (within 5 hours for vesicular disease reports). After visiting the premises, inspecting the animals, and acquiring samples, the IIV will call the duty incursion investigator[8] to discuss the case (this service is available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year). When warranted, the MPI incursion investigator will also visit the farm and inspect animals. Incidence of laboratory-confirmed notifiable diseases are reported to The New Zealand Disease Notification Focal Point which disseminates information to the OIE [6].

MPI has investigation and response protocols in place for the hazards under review [6]. The New Zealand Biosecurity Act of 1993 provides MPI with broad regulatory authority to respond to a potential incursion. Under the provisions of the Act, the IIV instructs the producer to quarantine their animals, to not share equipment with other producers, and to not visit other farms or areas where animals are housed until the investigation is completed. In the event that a foreign animal disease with significant impact (such as FMD) is confirmed by the diagnostic laboratory, New Zealand would issue a declaration of Biosecurity Emergency, which would permit containment of the outbreak through restriction of animal and product movements, destruction and disposal of animals, and appropriate cleaning and disinfection of property. MPI would form a task force to

[8] MPI incursion investigators are veterinary epidemiologists highly trained in detection of- and response to foreign animal diseases. Currently there are 5 MPI incursion investigators in New Zealand.

guide the response and would rely heavily on contracted NBCN veterinarians to implement field measures.

In order to reduce the risk of introduction of FMD and other hazards into its livestock population, New Zealand prohibits the feeding to pigs of untreated food waste that contains meat or has been in contact with meat through a series of regulations and educational materials [25]. Feeding of such waste to pigs is permitted only if it has been cooked at 100 ° C for at least one hour. Education and outreach is aimed at individuals who feed waste to pigs as well as those who supply waste for feeding and there are penalties in place for noncompliance. MPI visits farms and potential suppliers of food waste to ensure compliance with the feeding requirements and investigates reports of suspected violations.

New Zealand appears to manage its animal disease investigation, response, and control programs effectively using MPI staff as well as contracted agencies and individuals. Trained veterinarians with NBCN are available to respond to reports of suspicious disease in a timely manner and MPI veterinarians are on hand as needed. Adequate protocols and authority for control of potential occurrences of the hazards appear to be in place. In addition, New Zealand imposes controls on the feeding of waste to domestic pigs to reduce the potential spread of disease.

1.3.3 Reporting history

New Zealand has been an active member of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) since 1927 [6, 26]. As such, New Zealand is obligated to promptly report occurrences of all hazards described in this document to its trading partners as well as the OIE. Information available on the OIE website indicates that this has been the case since at least 1996, the earliest available date of online reporting information [2].

1.3.4 Export controls

New Zealand uses a multi-faceted system to ensure that importing country requirements for animals, animal products, and germplasm from New Zealand are met [27]. Any individual wishing to export animals or animal products must be registered as an exporter or working with a registered exporter, with some exceptions for non-commercial exports. MPI makes available commodity-specific overseas market access requirements that lay out import criteria for importing countries and provide template export certificates.

In order to ensure that live animal (including germplasm) exporters are meeting all requirements for export, New Zealand's MPI administers the Official Assurance Program (OAP) [9]. Official assurances, or export certificates, are the mechanism by which New Zealand verifies that all of the importing country's requirements have been met. The OAP comprises a system of laws, regulations, and standards, which are designed to oversee the granting of the official assurance for export and provide an internal system of standards and verification programs to substantiate the claims made on official assurances for live animals. In addition to MPI, the OAP includes agents such as facility auditing bodies, official export laboratories, registered exporters, approved semen and embryo centers, poultry hatcheries, quarantine facilities, transporters, and

veterinarians, among others. However, MPI is the definitive executor for the OAP, with the ultimate responsibility for substantiating claims made on the official assurances.

Preparation of live animals for export may only be conducted by agencies that are licensed by MPI under the OAP [27]. These agencies are responsible for overseeing and verifying that requirements of the OAP, such as pre-export quarantine, required testing and treatments, etc. have been fulfilled. Once these measures have been completed, a veterinarian with the MPI-licensed agency completes the preliminary export certificate and presents it to an official MPI veterinarian for approval and issuance. All associated transport regulations of the International Air Transport Association for live animals must also be fulfilled.

Animal products intended for export must be produced and processed under a risk management program (RMP) approved and registered with an MPI-approved verifying agency (such as AsureQuality) [27, 28]. The RMP identifies hazards that could be associated with the commodity through production, processing, transport, etc. and develops a plan to eliminate, control, or minimize the hazard. All operations associated with the exported product, including the farm of origin, primary and secondary processors, transporters, etc. must also operate under an RMP in order for the product to be eligible for export. Animal products (and all components thereof) intended for export are tracked from origin to export using official transfer documentation to ensure that only approved products are used in the export supply chain and support the official assurance specifications.

APHIS concludes that New Zealand's assurance verification systems ensure that all exported animals and animal products, beginning at the farm and extending through all components of production, meet importing country specifications and ineligible animals and animal products are not exported to the United States.

1.3.5 Hazard detection, response, and reporting conclusions

New Zealand has demonstrated that it can rapidly detect the hazards under review, promptly notify the United States and/or the OIE of hazard events, and respond to the outbreak event sufficiently to prevent introduction of the hazards into the United States through the importation of commodities from the region. The passive and active surveillance conducted for the hazards under review are appropriate given New Zealand's disease history, geographical location, and import practices. Animal disease events are investigated by a trained, contracted veterinary field force with ultimate oversight by the competent veterinary authority. Protocols for response to suspected animal disease events are comprehensive and demonstrate MPI's authority to contain disease spread. Historically, New Zealand has promptly reported disease occurrence to the OIE. Finally, the OAP demonstrates New Zealand's capability to prevent the export of infected animals or contaminated animal products to the United States. The central veterinary authority, MPI, retains exclusive right to issue assurances to the importing country thus providing a single, reliable mechanism to ensure the health of exported animal commodities.

1.4 Review conclusions

Based on documentation provided by New Zealand in its submissions to APHIS, information available on MPI's websites, and from the OIE and other publicly available information, APHIS

concludes that New Zealand is free of the hazards under review, conducts sufficient import measures to prevent their entry, and, in the event that the hazards did enter New Zealand, is capable of detecting the hazards and containing their spread, and will promptly report them to trading partners and the OIE, taking necessary measures to prevent their export to the United States.

2 Recommendations

Based on the favorable conclusions of APHIS' review of New Zealand's animal health statuses, APHIS has determined that maintenance of the current conferred statuses and import mitigations for classical swine fever, foot-and-mouth disease, Newcastle disease, rinderpest, scrapie, and swine vesicular disease is appropriate. Recognition of these statuses will be maintained until the next APHIS review or until a change in New Zealand's animal health status is reported.

References

1. Code of Federal Regulations. *Title 9 Part 92 Section 92.2 Application for recognition of the animal health status of a region.* 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=ea5f269bd612737d9576e4fe7fa19df9&mc=true&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title09/9cfr92_main_02.tpl.
2. World Organization for Animal Health. *World Animal Health Information Database (WAHIS)* 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Wahidhome/Home.
3. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Governance and Structure*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/about-mpi/governance-and-structure/.
4. AsureQuality. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: https://www.asurequality.com/.
5. AsureQuality. *National Biosecurity Capability Network (NBCN)*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: https://www.asurequality.com/our-services/pest-and-disease-management-solutions/national-biosecurity-capability-network-nbcn/.
6. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries, *New Zealand's Techinal Submission: Animal Health Statuses for the diseases foot-and-mouth disease, rinderpest, classical swine fever, swine vesicular disease, scrapie and Newcastle disease.* . 2017.
7. Operational Solutions for Primary Industry. *National Animal Identification and Tracing*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: https://www.ospri.co.nz/our-programmes/nait/about-the-nait-programme/purpose/.
8. Government of New Zealand, *Animal Products Act Part 5 Export of animal materials and products*. 1999.
9. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Official assurance programme.* 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/exporting/animals/live-animals/official-assurance-programme/.
10. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries, *New Zealand animal health status review follow up questions*. 2018.
11. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Import Health Standards*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: https://www.mpi.govt.nz/law-and-policy/requirements/import-health-standards/.
12. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Importing*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/.
13. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Importing: Farm Animals*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/live-animals/farm-animals/.
14. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Importing: Reporting obligations for imported ruminant animals.* 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/live-animals/farm-animals/reporting-obligations-for-owners-of-imported-ruminant-animals/.
15. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Importing: Avian hatching eggs*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/live-animals/avian-hatching-eggs/.

16. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Importing: Transitional and containment facilities*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/border-clearance/transitional-and-containment-facilities/.
17. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Importing: Requirements*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/border-clearance/vessels/arrival-process-steps/requirements/.
18. Government of New Zealand, *Biosecurity (Notifiable Organisms) Order 2016*. 2018.
19. Watts, J., Jaramillo, D., Walker, K., *Animal Health Surveillance.* Surveillance, 2017. **44**(3): p. 13-17.
20. Mulqueen, K., *Poultry Health Surveillance.* Surveillance, 2017. **44**(3): p. 38.
21. Tana, T., Alley, M., Buckle, K., *Wildlife Disease Surveillance.* Surveillance, 2017. **44**(3): p. 21-15.
22. Vink, D., *Tranmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) surveillance programme.* Surveillance, 2017. **44**(3): p. 26-27.
23. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Processing: Ruminant feed regulations*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: https://www.mpi.govt.nz/processing/pet-food-inedibles-animal-feed-and-supplements/animal-feed-and-disease-prevention/ruminant-feed-regulations/.
24. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Protection and Response: Take part in TSE surveillance*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/protection-and-response/finding-and-reporting-pests-and-diseases/surveillance-programmes/take-part-in-tse-surveillance/.
25. Government of New Zealand, *Biosecurity (Meat and Food Waste for Pigs) Regulations*. 2005.
26. World Organization for Animal Health. *Regional Representation for Asia and the Pacific*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.rr-asia.oie.int/about-us/members/list-view/full-details/oie-member/new-zealand/.
27. Government of New Zealand Ministry for Primary Industries. *Exporting*. 2018 [cited 2018 February 9]; Available from: http://www.mpi.govt.nz/exporting/.
28. Government of New Zealand, *Animal Products Act Part 2 Risk Management programmes*. 1999.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Legal Acts and Regulations.

Disease under review: FMD, rinderpest, CSF, SVD, scrapie, and Newcastle disease			
Animal Health Activity	Description (description of the required or authorised activity) See www.legislation.govt.nz/	Authorising Legal Act(s) or Regulation(s)	Date(s) Authorising Legal Act(s) or Regulation(s) Last Amended
Disease notification	Purpose of Part 4 The purpose of this Part is to provide for the continuous monitoring of New Zealand's status in regard to pests and unwanted organisms— (a) to facilitate the provision of assurances and certificates in relation to exports of organisms and their products; and (b) as a basis for the proper administration of this Act, including the institution of precautionary actions, emergency and exigency arrangements, and pest management plans or pathway management plans; and (c) to monitor the effect of pest management plans or pathway management plans; and (d) otherwise to enable any of New Zealand's international reporting obligations and trading requirements to be met.	Section 42(d), Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
On-farm inspections	Power of inspection (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3),— (a) an inspector may, at any reasonable time or times, enter and inspect any place for the purpose of confirming the presence, former presence, or absence of— (i) any pest, pest agent, or unwanted organism; or (ii) any unauthorised goods; or (iii) any risk goods: (b) an inspector or authorised person may, at any reasonable time or times, enter and inspect any place for the purpose of— (i) confirming the presence, former presence, or absence, of any pest, pest agent, or unwanted organism; or (ii) eradicating or managing any pest, pest agent, or unwanted organism: (c) an inspector or authorised person may, at any reasonable time or times, enter and	Section 109, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	inspect any place for the purpose of determining whether or not any person is complying with biosecurity law. (2) An inspector or authorised person shall not enter and inspect a dwellinghouse, a marae, or a building associated with a marae, under subsection (1), except with— (a) the consent of an occupier; or (b) a warrant issued under section 110. (3) Where a warrant under section 110 has been issued to an inspector or authorised person subject to conditions, the inspector or authorised person— (a) shall not enter the dwellinghouse, marae, or building associated with a marae, specified in the warrant otherwise than in accordance with the conditions; and (b) shall in all other respects comply with the conditions. (4) Subject to subsection (3), an inspector or authorised person exercising the powers of entry and inspection conferred by subsection (1)(a) and (b) may use such force in going on, into, or under, the place concerned (whether by breaking down a door or otherwise), or in breaking open anything in the place, as is reasonable in the circumstances.		
Import, export, and internal movement controls	Issue import health standards (1) After receiving the officer's recommendation under section 23(5) and complying with section 24(4), if it applies, the Director-General must decide whether or not to issue a standard. (2) If the Director-General decides to issue a standard, he or she must—	Section 24A of the Biosecurity Act 1993	1 July 2017
	Duty of importers to comply with import health standards An importer of risk goods must— (a) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the goods comply with applicable import health standards; and (b) if required by an inspector, do the following: (i) provide the inspector with a declaration in an approved form setting out the steps	Section 16B, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Clearances by inspectors (1) An inspector must not give a clearance for the entry into New Zealand of goods contrary to section 27 but may give a clearance if satisfied as required by section 27. (2) An inspector must not give a clearance for the entry into New Zealand of goods contrary to section 28.	Section 26, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	Requirements for clearances (1) An inspector must not give a clearance for goods unless satisfied— (a) that the goods are not risk goods; or (b) that— (i) the goods are of a kind that would not usually be considered as risk goods; and (ii) on or after arrival in New Zealand, the goods may have harboured or contained a harmful organism; and (iii) a chief technical officer has issued guidelines, or given directions, on measures that may be applied to manage the risks from the organism effectively; and (iv) the measures have been properly applied; or (c) that— (i) the goods are goods to which an import health standard applies; and (ii) the goods comply with the requirements in the standard for receiving a clearance; or (d) that— (i) the goods are goods to which an import health standard applies; and (ii) the goods do not comply with the requirements in the standard for receiving a clearance; and (iii) a chief technical officer has issued guidelines, or given directions, on measures, different from those in the standard, that may be applied to manage effectively risks of the kind arising from the non-compliance; and (iv) the measures have been properly applied. (2) An inspector satisfied as required by subsection (1) must not give a clearance for goods if he or she is aware of any of the following that makes it unwise for them to be given a clearance: (a) circumstances or documents associated with the goods: (b) circumstances or documents associated with the importation of the goods: (c) on or after arrival in New Zealand, the goods may have harboured or contained a harmful organism; and (v) a chief technical officer has issued guidelines, or given directions, on measures that may be applied to manage the risks from the organism effectively; and (vi) the measures have been properly applied; or (c) that— (iii) the goods are goods to which an import health standard applies; and (iv) the goods comply with the requirements in the standard for receiving a clearance; or (d) that— (v) the goods are goods to which an import health standard applies; and (vi) the goods do not comply with the requirements in the standard for receiving a clearance; and (vii) a chief technical officer has issued guidelines, or given directions, on measures,	Section 27, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	different from those in the standard, that may be applied to manage effectively risks of the kind arising from the non-compliance; and (viii) the measures have been properly applied. (3) An inspector satisfied as required by subsection (1) must not give a clearance for goods if he or she is aware of any of the following that makes it unwise for them to be given a clearance: (a) circumstances or documents associated with the goods: (b) circumstances or documents associated with the importation of the goods: (c) circumstances or documents associated with the craft on which the goods were imported. (3) The Director-General must ensure that the following information is available on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Ministry: (a) the guidelines and directions referred to in subsection (1)(b)(iii) and (d)(iii): (b) the following details about decisions to give a clearance to goods under subsection (1)(d): (i) the goods given clearance; and (ii) the nature of the non-compliance with the requirements in an applicable import health standard; and (iii) the reasons for giving the clearance.		
	Restrictions on giving clearances (1) An inspector must not give a biosecurity clearance for goods that are or contain an organism specified in Schedule 2 of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 or for a new organism. (1A) However, subsection (1) does not prohibit an inspector from giving a biosecurity clearance for goods the importation of which involves, or might involve, an incidentally imported new organism. (2) Where any new organism is an organism for which— (a) the Authority has given approval for importation into containment in accordance with sections 42 or 45 of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996: and (b) there is in existence a containment facility approved as meeting the standard set by the Authority; and (c) the organism is able to go to that facility,— any inspector may authorise that organism to go to that containment facility.	Section 28, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Notification requirements in respect of imported specified animal The owner or person in charge of an imported specified animal must, within the time required by regulation 4, notify the Director-General of the following: (a) the date that ownership of that animal is transferred, and the name and address of the new owner: (b) if that animal dies: (c) the date that animal is slaughtered or consigned for slaughter, and the name and address of the place of slaughter: (d) if that animal cannot be located:	Regulation 3, Biosecurity (Imported Animals, Embryos, and Semen Information) Regulations 1999. See also, Regulations 4 - 8.	1 July 2013

	(e) if ear tags issued in respect of the importation of that animal are lost or become illegible.		
	Export requirements (1) The Director-General may, by notice issued under this section, specify requirements in relation to all or any class or description of animal material or animal product intended for export, if the Director-General is satisfied that the setting of the requirements— (a) is necessary or desirable for the purpose of facilitating access to overseas markets; or (b) is in accordance with the requirements of the relevant authority of the importing country, or can reasonably be expected to satisfy the requirements of the relevant authority of the importing country; or (c) is necessary or desirable to safeguard assurances provided by New Zealand. (2) In specifying requirements under subsection (1) the Director-General may, where he or she considers it necessary or desirable, specify the manner in which the export requirements may or must be met, when this may or must occur, who is responsible for ensuring the requirements are met, and any recording requirements that are to be complied with. (3) Requirements specified under subsection (1) may include requirements that the Director-General is satisfied are necessary or desirable for the purpose of maintaining consistency with any standards, requirements, or recommended practices that apply or are accepted internationally.	Section 60, Animal Products Act 1999.	1 March 2017
Quarantine of animals or farms	Designation of quarantine area (1) The Director-General may by notice in the Gazette designate any place to be a quarantine area, and may at any time revoke or vary such a designation. (2) An inspector may, by the display of a clearly visible notice within a biosecurity control area, designate any place within that biosecurity control area to be a quarantine area. (3) A designation under subsection (2) shall ordinarily expire after 48 hours, or when sooner revoked; but it may be extended once by an inspector for a further period of not more than 48 hours. (4) Every quarantine area shall be under the direct control of an inspector. (5) No person shall, knowing that an area is a quarantine area, enter, leave, or use the area for any purpose, without the permission of the inspector who has control of the area.	Section 41, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Establishment of public pounds Every local authority shall provide and maintain a public pound, which shall be properly fenced and enclosed and so adapted as to keep stock infected with any contagious disease separate and apart from other stock: provided that— (a) any 2 or more local authorities may jointly provide and maintain a public pound upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon: (b) any local authority may, if it so desires, provide and maintain more than 1 public	Section 3, Impounding Act 1955. This Act is administered by the Department of Internal Affairs.	1 March 2017

	pound: (c) if a Minister of the Crown is the local authority, nothing in this section imposes on that Minister any obligation to provide and maintain a public pound.		
Vaccination for the disease(s) under review	Power to vaccinate, etc An inspector or authorised person may apply any procedure to organisms (such as medication or vaccination) therapeutically or prophylactically for the purposes of this Act.	Section 123, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
Surveillance for the disease(s) under review	Purpose of Part 4 The purpose of this Part is to provide for the continuous monitoring of New Zealand's status in regard to pests and unwanted organisms— (a) to facilitate the provision of assurances and certificates in relation to exports of organisms and their products; and (b) as a basis for the proper administration of this Act, including the institution of precautionary actions, emergency and exigency arrangements, and pest management plans or pathway management plans; and (c) to monitor the effect of pest management plans or pathway management plans; and (d) otherwise to enable any of New Zealand's international reporting obligations and trading requirements to be met.	Part 4 of the Biosecurity Act 1993 (surveillance and prevention).	1 July 2017
	Duty to provide information (1) For the purposes of this Part, an inspector or authorised person may require any person referred to in subsection (2)— (a) to provide any information held by the person concerning pests, pest agents, unwanted organisms, or risk goods that the inspector or authorised person believes on reasonable grounds is necessary to ascertain the presence or distribution in New Zealand of pests, pest agents, or unwanted organisms (or pests or unwanted organisms of a particular kind or description); and (b) to provide such assistance as the inspector or authorised person reasonably requests to enable or facilitate the acquisition, collection, and recording of any such information ascertained. (2) The persons referred to for the purposes of subsection (1) are— (a) every person who owns, manages, or otherwise controls the means by which and the sources from which information required under subsection (1) may be generated; and (b) every person who owns, manages, or otherwise controls any organism, organic material, or risk goods that may be monitored for the purposes of this Part.	Section 43, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	General duty to inform (1) Every person is under a duty to inform the Ministry, as soon as practicable in the circumstances, of the presence of what appears to be an organism not normally seen or otherwise detected in New Zealand.	Section 44, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	(2) The duty to inform does not apply in relation to an organism that is seen or otherwise detected in a place where it may lawfully be present in accordance with an approval given under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996.		
	Power to require information A chief technical officer may, by notice in writing, require the person in charge of premises used for investigating organisms or organic material, or any person employed in a professional or technical capacity in any area of biological science, to— (a) supply the chief technical officer with information held by that person on the incidence, prevalence, or distribution of specified organisms; or (b) permit the chief technical officer, or a person authorised in writing by that officer, to have access to, inspect, and test or sample specimens of any organism or tissues or parts of an organism or organic material held by that person or on those premises. (1A) A chief technical officer may, by notice in writing, require any person who has expertise or knowledge in an area of biological science to supply the chief technical officer with information held by that person on the incidence, prevalence, or distribution of specified organisms. (2) Except in relation to circumstances concerning which a regulation makes contrary provision, the reasonable expenses of a person who supplies information to a chief technical officer in response to a requirement under this section will be reimbursed out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose if those expenses would not have been incurred but for the requirement.	Section 48, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Power to examine organisms (1) An inspector or authorised person may exercise any or all of the powers in subsection (1B) on— (a) organisms: (b) organic material: (c) any other goods or material. (1A) The purposes for which the inspector or authorised person may exercise the powers are— (a) taxonomical identification of an organism: (b) diagnosing a disease: (c) determining whether imported goods may be given a biosecurity clearance: (d) ascertaining the presence or absence of any pest or unwanted organism: (e) making an assessment of measures taken to eradicate or manage any pest or unwanted organism. (1B) The powers are to— (a) autopsy: (b) destroy: (c) examine: (d) inspect: (e) sample: (f) section:	Section 121, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	(g) take specimens: (h) test: (i) apply any other treatment or procedure. (2) Every owner or person in control of any organism, and every occupier of a place in which any organism is present, shall, whenever required by an inspector or authorised person by written notice to do so, submit the organism specified in the notice for the purposes of subsection (1A). (3) Where an inspector or authorised person has under subsection (2) required the submission of any organism an inspector or authorised person may direct the owner or person in control of the organism, or the occupier of any place where it is present, to bring it— (a) in a specified manner: (b) to a specified place: (c) on a specified day: (d) for a specified purpose. (4) If the owner or person in control of any animal or the occupier of any place in which an animal is present fails to comply with a direction under this section, an inspector or authorised person may— (a) exercise any or all of the powers in subsection (1B); and (b) in the case of any animal or animals,— (i) to the extent that it is necessary to enable those powers to be exercised (or exercised efficiently), capture, pen, or muster it or them or any of them; or (ii) if for any reason it is not practicable to capture, pen, or muster it or them or any of them, kill or destroy it or them or any of them if the inspector or authorised person believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of controlling pests or unwanted organisms. (5) Costs and expenses reasonably incurred by an inspector or authorised person in taking any action under subsection (4) may be recovered as a debt due from the person who failed to comply with the direction concerned.		
	Registration of unwanted organisms (1) Where a chief technical officer has formed the belief that makes an organism an unwanted organism, that chief technical officer must notify the Director-General that the organism is an unwanted organism. (2) The Director-General must keep a register of all organisms notified to the Director-General in accordance with subsection (1). (3) The register must be available for public information and inspection at the office of the Director-General during normal office hours. (4) Where a chief technical officer fails to notify the Director-General in accordance with this section, that failure does not invalidate the chief technical officer's belief that makes the organism an unwanted organism.	Section 164C, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
Control and	General powers An inspector or authorised person who has lawfully entered a place under section 109 or	Section 114, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

eradication of the disease(s) under review	111 may do anything in, on, or in relation to the place that the inspector or authorised person considers necessary or expedient to— (a) eradicate or manage a pest or unwanted organism on the place: (b) prevent the spread of a pest or unwanted organism from or to the place: (c) avoid, remedy, or mitigate any effect on the place of non-compliance with a pathway management plan.		
	Power to give directions (1) An inspector or authorised person may, whenever that inspector or authorised person considers it to be necessary, direct the occupier of any place or the owner or person in charge of any organism or risk goods— (a) to treat any goods, water, place, equipment, fitting, or other thing that may be contaminated with pests or unwanted organisms; or (b) to destroy any pest or unwanted organism or any organism or organic material or thing that there are reasonable grounds to believe harbours a pest or unwanted organism; or (c) to take steps to prevent the spread of any pest or unwanted organism. (2) An inspector or authorised person may, by notice in writing, direct any person who has failed to comply with a rule included in a pest management strategy to comply with that rule. (3) An inspector or authorised person may direct the owner or person in charge of risk goods or a craft to take steps to avoid, remedy, or mitigate an effect of non- compliance with a pathway management plan.	Section 122, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Destruction of imported organisms (1) A chief technical officer may by notice in writing given to the operator of a transitional facility direct that any imported organism that has been placed in that facility, and any organism or goods at any time associated with that organism, shall be destroyed or treated or subjected to a specified procedure if the chief technical officer believes on reasonable grounds— (a) that the imported organism is affected by or harbours a pest or unwanted organism of a kind or to a degree that, even when the organism is in the transitional facility, constitutes an unacceptable risk to the health of organisms in New Zealand; or (b) the organism is, is affected by, or harbours, a pest under active control in New Zealand; or (c) that the health of the organism has not been and cannot be satisfactorily established within a reasonable time. (2) If the operator of a transitional facility fails to comply with a direction under this section, an inspector may seize and destroy the organism concerned. (3)[Repealed] (4) The costs and expenses of seizure and destruction of an organism under subsection (2) shall be the responsibility of the owner of the organism and may be recovered as a debt due to the Crown.	Section 127, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Power to act on default	Section 128,	1 July 2017

	Definition for this section (1) In this section, enforcement document means— (a) a notice given to a person under this Act lawfully directing or requiring the person to carry out works or measures, or take some other action, specified in the notice: (b) a compliance order that is not stayed under section 154E. (1A) Subsection (1B) applies when an enforcement document has not been complied with in— (a) the time specified in it for compliance; or (b) if no time was specified in it, a reasonable time. (1B) A chief technical officer, a principal officer, or a management agency may bring about the implementation of the enforcement document in a way that is reasonably necessary and appropriate to achieve the document's purpose. (2) Where specified works or measures are to be carried out on Maori land, any notice given to the owners shall be given in accordance with section 181 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. (3) The chief technical officer, a principal officer or management agency may recover the costs and expenses reasonably incurred under this section as a debt due from the person to whom the notice was given.	Biosecurity Act 1993.	
	Declaration of restricted place (1) If an inspector or authorised person believes or suspects on reasonable grounds that a pest or unwanted organism is or has been in a place, the inspector or authorised person may, by notice given in accordance with subsections (2) and (3), declare that place and any other place in the neighbourhood the inspector or authorised person considers necessary to be a restricted place. (2) A notice shall be in a form approved for the purpose by a chief technical officer, a principal officer, or a management agency. (3) A notice shall be given by serving a copy on the occupier of each place included in the area of the restricted place except that— (a) a copy need not be served on the occupier of any part of the place if the inspector or authorised person cannot with reasonable diligence discover an occupier of that place who can be found quickly; and (b) notice may be given publicly if it is impractical to give notice in accordance with the preceding provisions of this subsection. (4) While a notice under subsection (1) is in force, no person shall, without the permission of an inspector or authorised person,— (a) remove— (i) any organism, organic material, or risk goods; or (ii) any other goods that may have been in contact with any organism, organic material, or risk goods,— from the place to which the notice relates; or (b) introduce any goods of any kind to the place. (4A) Where the agent or employee of an occupier to whom a notice has been given under	Section 130, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	subsection (1) acts in breach of subsection (4), that action is deemed to be an action of the occupier unless the occupier had given a copy of the notice under subsection (1) to that agent or employee before the agent or employee breached subsection (4). (5) An inspector or authorised person may, at any time while the declaration of a restricted place is in force, direct that specified organisms, risk goods, or other goods in the restricted place must be— (a) isolated, confined, or stored in such manner as the inspector or authorised person directs: (b) identified in a manner specified in the direction, or with an identification applied by the inspector or authorised person.		
	Declaration of controlled area (1) The purpose of this section is to enable the institution of movement and other controls in order to— (a) enable the limitation of the spread of any pest or unwanted organism; or (b) minimise the damage caused by any pest or unwanted organism; or (c) protect any area from the incursion of pests or unwanted organisms; or (d) facilitate the access of New Zealand products to overseas markets; or (e) monitor risks associated with the movement of organisms from parts of New Zealand the pest status of which is unknown. (2) A chief technical officer or a management agency may, by public notice in a newspaper, or by radio or television announcement, or otherwise as the chief technical officer or management agency considers effective and appropriate, declare any specified area (which may be the whole or any specified part or parts of New Zealand) to be an area that is controlled for the purposes of this section. (3) At any time while the declaration of a controlled area is in force, the chief technical officer or management agency, as the case may require, may, by public notice in a newspaper, or by radio or television announcement, or otherwise as the chief technical officer or management agency considers effective and appropriate, give notice of either or both of the following matters: (a) the movement into, within, or from the controlled area of such organisms, organic material, risk goods or other goods as are specified in the notice is restricted, regulated, or prohibited in the manner, to the extent and subject to the conditions specified in the notice: (b) the organisms, organic material, risk goods, or other goods within the controlled area that are specified in the notice, must be subject to such treatment and procedures as are specified in the notice. (4) A notice given under subsection (3) may be revoked or may from time to time be replaced or amended.	Section 131, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Purpose The purpose of these regulations is to reduce the risk to New Zealand and its livestock industries of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and other diseases— (a) by prohibiting the feeding to pigs of untreated meat or food waste containing	Regulation 3, Biosecurity (Meat and Food Waste for Pigs) Regulations 2005.	1 March 2016

	untreated meat; and (b) by regulating the collection and distribution of, and trade in, meat and food waste for feeding to pigs.		
	Destruction of impounded animals that are diseased, injured, or sick Despite section 138, if— (a) an inspector, auxiliary officer, or veterinarian certifies in writing that an animal impounded in a pound under the Impounding Act 1955 or the Dog Control Act 1996 is so diseased, injured, or sick that it is in a state of continual suffering; and) the territorial authority having jurisdiction over the pound is unable to find the owner of that animal within a reasonable time after the inspector, auxiliary officer, or veterinarian has given such a certificate,— the territorial authority must, without delay, destroy that animal or cause it to be destroyed.	Section 139, Animal Welfare Act 1999.	1 March 2017
	Power to condemn and require disposal of animal products that are diseased, contaminated, etc (1) An animal product officer may condemn, and require the owner or person in control to destroy, dispose of, or otherwise rectify,— (a) any animal product which in the opinion of the officer, reasonably formed in the light of any relevant standards and specifications for the time being in force, is not fit for intended purpose: (b) any animal material, or other input, substance, or thing which in the reasonable opinion of the officer has contributed to, or may have contributed to, any animal product not being fit for intended purpose: (c) any animal material or animal product which in the opinion of the officer, reasonably formed in the light of any relevant standards and specifications for the time being in force, is contaminated or diseased or otherwise not in compliance with this Act. (2) An animal product officer may seize and detain, and if necessary dispose of or arrange for the disposal of or otherwise rectify,— (a) any product, material, input, substance, or thing of a kind referred to in subsection (1)(a) to (c): (b) any animal material or animal product which appears to the officer, after making such enquiries as are reasonable in the circumstances, to have been abandoned or to have no apparent or readily identifiable owner. (2A) An animal product officer may require the reclassification of any animal product of a kind referred to in subsection (1)(a), if satisfied that the product meets the requirements of the reclassification, and may require the owner or person in control of the product to either— (a) take all appropriate steps to give effect to the reclassification; or (b) destroy or otherwise dispose of or rectify the product to the satisfaction of the officer, if the owner or person does not take those appropriate steps. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1), where—	Section 90, Animal Products Act 1999.	1 March 2017

	(a) a random sample of any animal material or product has been taken and tested or examined; and) an animal product officer has formed the opinion that, for any reason, the particular animal material or product sampled is not fit for intended purpose, or is contaminated, diseased, or otherwise not in compliance with this Act; and (c) the officer has also formed the opinion that any other animal material or product is likely to be unfit for intended purpose or is contaminated, diseased, or otherwise not in compliance with this Act, for a similar reason, by reason of— (i) having probably come from the same place as the animal material or product sampled; or (ii) having probably been raised, treated, exposed, transported, killed, dressed, processed, stored, or otherwise dealt with in the same way as the animal material or product sampled,— the officer is entitled, without sampling and testing or examining the other animal material or product, to form that opinion in respect of that other animal material or product. (4) Where a sample of animal material or product is found to be contaminated, diseased, or otherwise not in compliance with this Act then, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the live animal concerned was similarly contaminated or diseased or otherwise not in compliance with this Act. (5) Any destruction, disposal, or rectification required under subsection (1) is at the cost of the owner or person in control, and any expenses reasonably incurred by an officer in the exercise of his or her powers under subsection (2) or subsection (2A) may be recovered from that owner or person.		
	Powers of warranted officers (1) Every warranted officer holding a warrant for the purposes of this Act may in the exercise of his duty,— (a) at all times without let or hindrance,— (i) where he has good reason to believe that an offence is about to be or is being or has been committed, enter upon, pass through, or remain on any land (including any yard and enclosure), shed, barn, hut, tent, and other erection, and any other premises of any description for the purpose of preventing or detecting offences against this Act: (ii) enter any vehicle, vessel, or aircraft that is about to be used or is being used or has been used in contravention of this Act or that he has good reason to believe is about to be or is being or has been so used: ii) where he has good reason to believe that any offence has been committed against this Act, search any land, or any hut, tent, caravan, bach, or other erection, or any barn, storehouse, or other premises of any description, or any trailer, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft to which paragraph (e) applies, or any riding or pack animal, or any other device for transportation or carriage found on any premises or on any water: provided that nothing in this paragraph shall apply to any dwellinghouse or other permanent residence or to the enclosed garden or curtilage of any dwellinghouse or other permanent residence:	Section 13(1)(h), Wild Animal Control Act 1977. Administered by the Department of Conservation.	28 November 2013

	(b) seize any wild animal unlawfully taken or had in possession or that he has good reason to believe to be unlawfully taken or had in possession: (c) seize all nets, traps, snares, tranquillising drugs, ammunition, firearms, poisons, vessels, horses, dogs, aircraft, vehicles, and devices that are about to be used or are being used or have been used in contravention of this Act, or that he has good reason to believe are about to be so used or are being so used or have been so used: (d) seize any bag, container, refrigerator, portable chiller or safe or similar structure, crate, trailer, vehicle, or other thing, that is being used for the purpose of conveying or holding any wild animal or the carcass thereof unlawfully taken or had in possession or that he has good reason to believe is being so used: (e) stop any vehicle, or any riding or pack animal, or any vessel, or any aircraft while on the ground or on the water, or any other device for carriage or transportation, or stop in transit any case or crate or other container that is, or that he has good reason to believe to be, in the possession of the owner or of any other person (including any carrier or forwarding agent, whether by land or sea or air), if he has good reason to believe that any contravention of this Act or of any regulations under this Act has been committed by the owner or by the person in possession thereof or by any other person, and, in the presence of the owner or other person as aforesaid or of any servant of any of them, search any such vehicle, riding or pack animal, vessel, aircraft, or other device for carriage or transportation, and in such presence as aforesaid open and search any such case or crate or other container: (f) hunt or kill any wild animal: (g) remove or sell or otherwise dispose of any wild animal or its carcass or part thereof where the animal is taken or killed by employees or agents or officers of the Department on any occupied or unoccupied Crown-owned land, or any national park land, or any other land, and pay any money received from any such transaction into a Crown Bank Account: (h) require, by notice in writing, the owner or manager of any domestic animals, or any wild animals held under permit issued under this Act or regulations made under this Act, to remove any such domestic or wild animals from the land where they are normally held or are present, as the case may be, for a specified period and from a specified date where: the domestic animals are trespassing on Crown-owned land over which wild animal control operations are planned or are under way; or (ii) the wild animals are causing or are liable to cause damage to the land, soils, vegetation, natural water, or wildlife on the land, or are liable to encourage the spread of any animal disease: provided that, where any domestic animals may be affected by any requirement under this paragraph, notice in writing in respect thereof shall be given, at least 10 days before the requirement is to take effect, to the owner and manager of any animal to which the requirement relates and (if applicable) every owner or occupier of the land where the animals are normally held or are present, as the case may be.		

	Purposes of holding core data Core data is held in the NAIT information system for the following purposes: (a) to enable the NAIT organisation, a NAIT officer, or a NAIT authorised person to exercise their powers and carry out their functions and duties: (b) to assist other persons with duties under this Act to carry out their duties: (c) to facilitate the purposes of the Animal Products Act 1999, Biosecurity Act 1993, Commodity Levies Act 1990, Primary Products Marketing Act 1953, and any other enactment relating to animals or animal health: (d) to respond to the following human health issues: (i) food residues associated with animals: (ii) food-borne diseases associated with animals: (iii) diseases transferable between animals and humans: (e) to provide data supporting productivity, market assurance, and trading requirements: (f) to respond to natural disasters or requests from emergency services when rapid access to data on animals and people is needed to manage risks to life and welfare: (g) to provide statistical data for policy development and related advice about the industries to which this Act applies: (h) to enable the NAIT organisation to publish general agricultural statistics under section 49: (i) to provide data to enable a potential purchaser of a NAIT animal to trace the history of the animal over its life.	Section 40, National Animal Identification and Tracing Act 2012 (only applicable to cattle and deer).	1 March 2016
	Destruction of worthless or suffering animals (1) Notwithstanding section 46, but subject to subsection (2), if— (a) any Justice, constable, Inspector of Stock, or registered veterinarian (being a person not interested in the matter) certifies in writing that an impounded animal— (i) is so diseased, injured, or sick that it is in a state of continual suffering; or i) is of insufficient value to defray the poundage and sustenance fees of keeping the animal during the time prescribed by this Act; and (b) the local authority having jurisdiction over the pound is unable to find the owner of the animal within a reasonable time after the Justice, constable, Inspector of Stock, or registered veterinarian has given such a certificate,— the local authority may arrange for the destruction of the animal and the disposal of the carcass in such manner as it thinks fit. (2) The local authority may not destroy an impounded animal to which subsection (1)(a)(ii) relates, unless— (a) the local authority has given written notice to the owner of its intention to destroy the animal; and (b) the owner of the animal has not, within 48 hours after the giving of the notice, paid to that local authority all fees, trespass rates, and charges necessary to secure the release of the animal from the pound. (3) Any proceeds from the sale of a carcass of an animal destroyed under subsection	Section 52, Impounding Act 1955. This Act is administered by the Department of Internal Affairs.	1 March 2017

	(1) must be dealt with in the same manner as is provided in sections 54, 55, and 65 in respect of the proceeds of the sale of impounded stock.		
Animal identification and farm registration	Establishment (1) The Director-General may establish and maintain a biosecurity database containing information about land for the purposes of this Act. (2) The database may be in any form that the Director-General thinks fit, including an electronic form that— (a) records or stores information electronically; and (b) permits the information to be readily inspected; and (c) permits the information to be readily reproduced; and (d) permits the information to be accessed by remote log-on access or any other electronic means. (3) The database may record all or some of the following information about land: (a) legal description: (b) valuation: (c) land use: (d) the name and contact details of the owner: (e) the name and contact details of the occupier. (4) The database may contain any other information about land that the Director-General considers useful. (5) The information in the database may come from any source, such as— (a) information that is publicly available, as defined in section 142C(7):) information provided voluntarily for inclusion in the database by a person to whom the information relates or by the person's agent: (c) information provided or made available to the Director-General or the Ministry under this Act or any other enactment. (6) The fact that information is in the biosecurity database because it is provided or made available to the Director-General or the Ministry under another enactment does not affect any provisions in the other enactment relating to the handling of the information.	Section 142A, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Purpose The purpose of this Act is to establish an animal identification and tracing system that— (a) provides for the rapid and accurate tracing of individual, or groups of, NAIT animals from birth to death or live export; and (b) provides information on the current location and movement history of individual, or groups of, NAIT animals; and (c) improves biosecurity management; and (d) manages risks to human health arising from residues in food, food-borne diseases, and diseases that are transmissible between animals and humans; and (e) supports improved animal productivity, market assurances, and trading requirements.	Section 3, National Animal Identification and Tracing Act 2012 (only applicable to cattle and deer).	1 March 2016
Emergency	Purpose of Part 7 The purpose of this Part is to provide for the effective prevention, eradication, or	Part 7, Biosecurity Act 1993 (Exigency actions).	1 July 2017

response activities	management of unwanted organisms if emergencies or other exigencies occur.		
	Declaration of biosecurity emergency (1) On the recommendation of a Minister, the Governor-General may, by Proclamation, declare a biosecurity emergency if satisfied on reasonable grounds after having regard to all available information that— (a) it is likely that— (i) there has been an outbreak or occurrence in New Zealand of an organism (being an organism not previously known to be established in New Zealand) that has the potential to cause significant economic loss, significant environmental loss, or both, if it becomes established in New Zealand; or (ii) there is established in part of New Zealand an organism (being an organism not previously known to be established in New Zealand) that has the potential to cause significant economic loss, significant environmental loss, or both, if it becomes established in other parts of New Zealand; or ii) an organism previously thought to be of restricted distribution or abundance (or both) in New Zealand is becoming or has become so distributed and abundant in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand that it has the potential to cause significant economic loss, significant environmental loss, or both; or (iv) a pest is, or threatens to be, beyond control by the application of the national pest management plan for that pest; and (b) it is in the public interest that action be taken immediately to eradicate or manage the organism and sufficient powers are not otherwise available to enable the organism to be eradicated or effectively managed. (2) The Minister shall, to the extent that is practical in the circumstances, consult such persons as the Minister believes on reasonable grounds are representative of interests involved in the emergency before recommending that the Governor-General declare a biosecurity emergency. (3) A declaration of a biosecurity emergency shall state the area or areas to which it applies and specify the nature of the emergency. (4) A declaration of a biosecurity emergency comes into force when it is declared or at any later time stipulated in the Proclamation declaring it. (5) The Minister shall publish notice of the declaration not later than 24 hours after it is made by such means as the Minister considers practical and appropriate and shall cause the Proclamation to be published in the Gazette without delay. (6) On the recommendation of the Minister, the Governor-General may by further Proclamation amend, extend, or revoke a Proclamation under this section and the Minister must publish notice of the amendment, extension, or revocation in the manner provided by subsection (5).	Section 144, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017
	Emergency powers (1) The Minister may, in the area or areas in which a declaration of biosecurity emergency is in force, take such measures, and do all such acts and things and give all such directions, and require all such acts to be done or not to be done, as the Minister	Section 145, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of eradicating or managing the organism in respect of which the emergency has been declared. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), the Minister, or any person authorised by the Minister for the purpose, may require the owner of any goods or premises or craft (being a craft registered in New Zealand, or chartered by a company (within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Companies Act 1993)) that is anywhere in New Zealand and that the Minister or person authorised by the Minister believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary or would be of assistance in eradicating or limiting the spread of the organism to transfer the goods to or permit the premises or craft to be used for a specified period by the Minister or any other person.		
Seizure, depopulation, and compensation	Power to seize and dispose of unauthorised goods (1) Any inspector lawfully exercising a power under any of sections 19(2), 30A, 31, 34(5), 109, 111, 113, 114, or 120 may seize— (a) any unauthorised goods: (b) any goods where an inspector has reasonable grounds to suspect— (i) those goods are in contact with, or have been in contact with, unauthorised goods; and (ii) pests or unwanted organisms could have been transmitted from the unauthorised goods to those goods. (2) A chief technical officer may, either generally or in any particular case, give any reasonable directions as to the disposal of, the treatment of, or any other dealing with, any goods seized in accordance with subsection (1); and any person may dispose of, treat, or otherwise deal with any such goods accordingly. (3) A chief technical officer may offer the importer or owner of any goods imported into New Zealand and seized under subsection (1) the option of exporting or returning the goods to their place of origin provided that the importer or owner undertakes the payment of any costs associated with the export or return of the goods. (4) A chief technical officer may permit goods seized under this section to be held in the custody of the Director-General for so long as is necessary for the importer to obtain a biosecurity clearance and in such a case the estimated costs and expenses of the custody and maintenance of the goods must be paid in advance to the Director-General. (5) If an organism seized in accordance with subsection (1) is an endangered species, as defined in section 3 of the Trade in Endangered Species Act 1989, a chief technical officer must, after consulting the Director-General of Conservation concerning the disposal of the organism, dispose of it as he or she thinks fit. (6) In exercising the powers of a chief technical officer in accordance with subsections (2), (3), and (4), a chief technical officer must, so far as is practicable while achieving the purpose of Part 3, act in a manner that is consistent with avoiding or minimising loss to	Section 116, Biosecurity Act 1993.	1 July 2017

	the importer or owner of goods seized in accordance with subsection (1).		
	Depopulation The purpose of this Part is to provide for the effective prevention, eradication, or management of unwanted organisms if emergencies or other exigencies occur.	Part 7, Biosecurity Act 1993 (Exigency actions).	1 July 2017
	Compensation (1) This section applies when— (a) powers under this Act are exercised for the purpose of eradicating or managing an organism; and) the powers are not exercised to implement a pest management plan or pathway management plan; and (c) the exercise of the powers causes loss to a person as a result of— (i) damage to or destruction of the person's property; or (ii) restrictions imposed under Part 6 or 7 on the movement or disposal of the person's goods; and (d) there is no agreement under Part 5A that applies to the loss and whose provisions on compensation are expressed to take priority over this section. (2) The person is entitled to compensation under this section for loss that— (a) is verifiable; and (b) is loss that the person has been unable to mitigate by taking every step that is reasonable in the circumstances. (3) Compensation must not be paid if— (a) the person's loss relates to unauthorised goods or uncleared goods; or (b) the person suffered the loss before the time at which the exercise of the powers began; or (c) the person failed to comply with biosecurity law— (i) in a serious or significant way; or (ii) in a way that contributed to the presence of the organism; or (iii) in a way that contributed to the spread of the organism. (4) The amount of compensation paid must put the person to whom it is paid in no better or worse position than a person whose property or goods are not directly affected by the exercise of the powers. (5) The period for making a claim for compensation after the date on which the loss suffered by the person ought reasonably to have been verifiable is— (a) within 1 year from the date; or (b) after 1 year from the date, if the person was unable to make a claim within 1 year because of circumstances beyond the person's control. (6) If there is a dispute about eligibility for, or the amount of, compensation,— (a) the dispute must be submitted to arbitration; and (b) the arbitration must be conducted under the Arbitration Act 1996. (7) Compensation payable by a Minister or a chief executive is payable from money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose.	Section 162A, Biosecurity Act 1993. See also, Part 5A, Biosecurity Act 1993 (Government/industry agreement for readiness or response).	1 July 2017

Appendix 2

Summary of disease investigations for hazards under review.

Disease agents investigated and confirmed negative	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**
Rinderpest		1	2				
Classical swine fever	1	1					1
Viral vesicular disease	6	12	7	5	4	9	16
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents (scrapie; BSE; chronic wasting disease; FSE)*			3	4	3	5	1
Avian influenza: highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza & Newcastle disease **	10	7	8	4	3	5	3

* Viral vesicular diseases include foot-and-mouth disease and swine vesicular disease.

**Investigations reported are in addition to the testing in the MPI active surveillance programmes for these disease agents.