UNITED STATES’ COMMENTS IN RED BELOW

Annex 41. Item 7.1. – Draft new Chapter 4.Y. ‘Disease outbreak management’

SECTION 4

DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 4.Y.

DISEASE OUTBREAK MANAGEMENT

**GENERAL COMMENTS**

Now that there are definitions for “Competent Authority” vs. “Veterinary Authority”, we feel there may be areas of this chapter where the authority currently referenced is not in alignment with the glossary definitions as we understand them.

We also emphasize the importance of working with industry to prepare for and during an outbreak, in addition to the roles of the Veterinary Authority, Competent Authorities, and Aquatic Animal Health Services.

Article 4.Y.1.

Purpose

To provide recommendations concerning the actions which should be taken by the *Veterinary Authority,* *Competent Authorities* and the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* including industry to manage the emergency response to suspicion or confirmation of the presence of an important *aquatic animal disease*, and activate its contingency plans as described in Chapter 4.X.

**RATIONAL**

The suggested edits are intended to clarify that all these roles should be coordinating during disease outbreak management.

Article 4.Y.2.

Scope

To provide recommendations concerning the actions to be taken by the *Veterinary Authority,* *Competent Authorities* and the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* including industry*,* from the point at which an important *disease*, as described in Article 4.X.6., is suspected in a *free country*, *free zone* or *free compartment*, or has been suspected or confirmed in an epidemiologically linked population, to the point at which the recovery phase begins. These actions operationalise the elements described in Chapter 4.X., which are required to manage the *disease outbreak*.

**RATIONAL**

The suggested edits are intended to clarify that all these roles should be coordinating during disease outbreak management.

Article 4.Y.3.

General Principles

The successful management of an emergency response should take the following principles into account:

1) the actions to be taken by the *Veterinary Authority,* *Competent Authorities* and the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* with industry, should be based on the emergency *disease* preparedness framework which has been developed in accordance with Chapter 4.X.;

**RATIONAL**

The suggested edits are intended to clarify that all these roles should be coordinating during disease outbreak management.

2) the operational elements of the emergency *disease* preparedness framework should be described in an Operations Manual. The Operations Manual may be a single document or a series of documents which together,~~The Competent Authority can rely on the Operations Manual to~~ provide guidance on all aspects of the emergency response, including actions to be taken during the alert, emergency, and recovery phases;

3) the initial response objective following a disease outbreak is to eradicate the disease, thereby allowing a country, zone or compartment to return to disease freedom. However, should the progression of the outbreak prevent this objective from being achieved, other actions should be described, which will assist the *Veterinary Authority and other relevant* Competent *Authorities* to pursue an alternative pathway to recovery;

**RATIONAL**

The suggested edits are intended to clarify that all these roles should be coordinating during disease outbreak management.

We also feel that prior to eradicating a disease, the first step should be to contain the disease outbreak before you can initiate eradication steps. We recommend inserting a step before #3 in this section to address the importance of disease containment during an outbreak response.

4) the actions described in the Operations Manual should be executed in a timely and co-ordinated fashion, by competent personnel, who have access to all the resources which are necessary to manage the disease outbreak, and support the continuity of business as much as possible.

**RATIONAL**

We feel supporting the continuity of business as much as possible during a disease outbreak is also an important general principle, which is similarly reflected in the WOAH terrestrial chapters on emergency disease response.

Article 4.Y.4.

Alert phase

The alert phase begins when there is suspicion of the presence of an important *disease* of *aquatic animals*, generally as a consequence of active or *passive surveillance* in the country, or in another country, which is a neighbour or a trading partner.

The main actions to be taken into account during the alert phase of an emergency should take the following factors into account:

~~1)~~ ~~the alert phase begins when there is suspicion of the presence of an important disease of aquatic animals, generally as a consequence of active or~~ *~~passive surveillance~~* ~~in the country, or in another country, which is a neighbour or a trading partner. During this phase, the~~ *~~Competent Authority~~* ~~will take steps to detect the presence of the~~ *~~disease~~* ~~and to prevent possible~~ *~~disease~~* ~~spread;~~

1~~2~~) following the commencement of this phase, an epidemiological investigation should be initiated in order to:

a) confirm or rule out the presence of the ~~disease~~pathogen, in the shortest possible time frame;

**RATIONAL**

We suggest changing “disease” to “pathogen” as the presence of a pathogen does not necessarily mean there are associated clinical signs/disease in a given population.

~~b) establish a working case definition for outbreak investigation where this is necessary (e.g. in the case of a disease which is not listed in Chapter 1.3., or of an emerging disease);~~

**RATIONAL**

It is preferable to develop case definitions prior to a disease outbreak (not in the middle of one). We recommend removing statement 1)b) from Chapter 4.Y. and instead include it in the draft Chapter 4.X.

c~~b~~) determine if the ~~disease~~pathogen has spread from or to aquaculture establishments or waterbodies other than the one in which the original suspicion was raised.

**RATIONAL**

We suggest changing “disease” to “pathogen” since the pathogen may have spread outside the establishment but may not be causing signs of disease.

2~~3~~) during the alert phase, taking into account Chapter 4.1., the Veterinary Authority, *Competent Authorities* in partnership with aquatic animal health services and industry, should take steps to prevent *disease* spread by implementing *biosecurity* measures in the *aquaculture establishment* or waterbody in question. Additional specific *disease* control measures should also be considered, such as:

a) prohibiting the movement of *aquatic animals* and *aquatic animal products* as well as equipment, *vehicles*, *feed*, contaminated water and *aquatic animal waste* to or from the *aquaculture establishment* or waterbody, unless authorised by the *Competent Authority* based on a *risk assessment*;

b) extending the measures described above to other *aquaculture establishments* or waterbodies that have an epidemiological link with the *aquaculture establishment* or waterbody in which the suspicion arose.

3) during the epidemiological investigation:

a) *risk*-based *surveillance* is used to prioritise which *aquatic animal* populations, identified through tracing, should be prioritised for sampling. For example, *aquaculture establishments* which are highly connected to the *aquaculture establishment* or waterbody in which the suspicion arose, through movements of live *aquatic animals* and other transmission pathways, as described in Article 4.1.7., should be considered~~prioritised~~ for clinical inspection and sampling;

b) the samples should be submitted to laboratories identified in the *Contingency Plan,* as described in Chapter 4.X., as being suitably equipped and staffed to produce reliable results in the shortest possible timeframe.

~~34) during the alert phase, taking into account Chapter 4.1., the~~ *~~Competent Authority~~* ~~should take steps to prevent~~ *~~disease~~* ~~spread by implementing~~ *~~biosecurity~~* ~~measures in the~~ *~~aquaculture establishment~~* ~~or waterbody in question. Additional specific~~ *~~disease~~* ~~control measures should also be considered, such as:~~

~~a) prohibiting the movement of~~ *~~aquatic animals~~* ~~and~~ *~~aquatic animal products~~* ~~as well as equipment,~~ *~~vehicles~~*~~,~~ *~~feed~~*~~, contaminated water and~~ *~~aquatic animal waste~~* ~~to or from the~~ *~~aquaculture establishment~~* ~~or waterbody, unless authorised by the~~ *~~Competent Authority~~* ~~based on a~~ *~~risk assessment~~*~~;~~

~~b) extending the measures described above to other~~ *~~aquaculture establishments~~* ~~or waterbodies that have an epidemiological link with the~~ *~~aquaculture establishment~~* ~~or waterbody in which the suspicion arose.~~

**RATIONAL**

We suggest moving the “…during the alert phase…” step before “…during the epidemiological investigation…” because control measures should be in place before the commencement of the epidemiological investigation.

4~~5~~) whilst awaiting the outcome of the epidemiological investigation referred to in point 1 a)~~described~~ above, in the case of suspicion of a *disease* outbreak in a previously *free country* or *free zone*, the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority* should inform ~~communicate~~ ~~with~~ the emergency management group, as described in Chapter 4.X., and where necessary, convene a meeting to advise them of developments and review the *Contingency Plan*. The objectives of this review are to:

a) reinforce the structure of the chain of command and the framework for cooperation which are described in Article 4.X.6.;

b) ensure the *Contingency Plan*, as described in Chapter 4.X., is ready to be fully activated should the presence of the *disease* in question be confirmed in the country, *zone*, *compartment*; and

c) make any updates which are necessary to ensure the *Contingency Plan* is ready for immediate activation.

5~~6~~) whilst confirmation of the presence of the ~~disease~~pathogen in question is ongoing, the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority* should communicate with relevant personnel, industry stakeholders, diagnostic laboratories, and contractors, putting them on alert to ensure they review their readiness to act quickly in compliance with the *Contingency Plan*, should the *disease* be confirmed. Such communications are made using the contact details which are kept in accordance with Chapter 4.X.;

6~~7~~) the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority* should endeavour to ensure that the alert phase is short enough to minimise ~~disease~~pathogen spread, and long enough to ensure the suspicion has been accurately confirmed or ruled out;

7~~8~~) should the suspicion not be confirmed, the alert phase is terminated, and any outcomes which warrant review of the *Contingency Plan*, are made;

8~~9~~) the alert phase ends when the presence of an important ~~disease~~pathogen is either confirmed or ruled out by the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority.* Relevant actors in the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* and industry should be communicated with to advise them that the alert phase is being terminated, and that the situation is either moving back to peacetime or forward to the emergency phase as described in Article 4.Y.5.

**RATIONAL**

The “Veterinary Authority” should be the lead for the activities described above instead of the “Competent Authority”.

We suggest changing “disease” to “pathogen” as the presence of a pathogen does not necessarily mean there are associated clinical signs/disease in a given population.

Communication plans should include pertinent industry members in addition to aquatic animal health services personnel.

Article 4.Y.5.

Emergency Phase

The emergency phase of *disease outbreak* management commences when the presence of an important ~~disease~~pathogen has been confirmed. The steps which should be taken during the emergency phase are set out in the *Contingency Plan*, and the associated detailed actions are set out in the Operations Manual, taking the following factors into account:

1) the chain of command as described in Article 4.Y.6.;

2) the appropriate facilities, ~~skills,~~ resources, personnel and skills as described in Article 4.Y.7.;

3) the *Biosecurity* and other *disease* control measures as described in Article 4.Y.8.

**RATIONAL**

We suggest changing “disease” to “pathogen” as the presence of a pathogen does not necessarily mean there are associated clinical signs/disease in a given population.

Article 4.Y.6

Chain of command

As soon as the *disease outbreak* has been confirmed, the *Veterinary Authority,* *Competent Authorities, Aquatic Animal Health Services, including industry,* convene~~s~~ a meeting of the emergency management group as described in Chapter 4.X., and the activation of all elements of the *contingency plan* commences.

**RATIONAL**

The suggested edits are intended to clarify that all these roles should be coordinating during disease outbreak management.

The ~~first meeting of the emergency management group considers at least the~~ following issues should be considered, with the assistance of relevant specialist sub-groups:

1) the most up-to-date epidemiological information available concerning the *disease* emergency, including:

a) location of confirmed case(s) including grid references and maps;

b) inventory (e.g., animal counts, species, life stages) of species kept in the infected *aquaculture establishment(s)* ~~and the numbers and weights of the~~ *~~aquatic animals~~*;

**RATIONAL**

The suggested edits are intended to provide examples of “inventory” information that should be collected. We agree that the weight of animals is not essential information, and the number of animals or life stages are part of the inventory so does not need to be listed separately.

c) clinical situation including description of clinical signs and estimates of morbidity and mortality;

d) identification of the index *case*;

e) details of *susceptible species* in the vicinity of the confirmed case(s);

f) outcomes from preliminary tracing and *surveillance*;

g) outcome from preliminary *risk assessment*.

2) immediate response objectives and options, taking into account the available epidemiological information referred to above, including:

a) official confirmation of the *disease outbreak* to the operators concerned;

b) international notification in accordance with Chapter 1.1.;

c) the reinforcement of the preliminary *biosecurity* measures described in point 4 of Article 4.Y.4. which were put in place during the ‘alert phase’, the imposition of new biosecurity and other *disease* control measures described in Article 4.Y.8., or both.

3) trade issues which are likely to arise, both within the country and with trading partners elsewhere;

4) review of appropriate facilities, skills and resources, as well as the legal, administrative and financial arrangements which are in place to ~~ensure all relevant enablers are in place~~ enable the Competent Authority to immediately manage the disease emergency. This review should include:

a) details of the infrastructure, skill sets and other necessary resources which are available to support the effective management of the *disease* emergency;

b~~a~~) details of the legal instrument which supports the provision of funding for the management of disease emergencies concerning *aquatic animals*;

c~~b~~) contact details for the relevant department which will process the request for funds, and which ensure that payments are executed smoothly once the *contingency* *plan* has been activated;

~~c) details concerning the mechanisms by which the funds will be transferred, in addition to the frequency of transfer and the personnel who are authorised to draw down the funding~~.

5) agreed messages, format ~~for~~, and timing of, communications with the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* including industry who are responding to the emergency, relevant trading partners, and the public. Communications may be based on generic templates which have been prepared in peacetime and are adapted as appropriate to the circumstances~~Those communications are based on generic draft press releases and letters to the~~ *~~Aquatic Animal Health Services~~* ~~which have been prepared in peacetime, and which are appropriately fine-tuned to meet the current circumstances~~;

**RATIONAL**

Communication should also include pertinent industry personnel.

6) a schedule for future meetings throughout the emergency phase of the response, as well as a distribution list for the minutes of those meetings. Flexibility should be introduced to allow~~allowing for flexibility to schedule~~ meetings to be scheduled at short notice, should this be required.

Article 4.Y.7.

Appropriate facilities, skills, resources

1) Disease control centres

a) The *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority* establishes a central *disease* control centre and where necessary, an appropriate number of local *disease* control centres. Those centres, identified in the *Contingency Plan,* should be capable of providing at least the following:

**RATIONAL**

The “Veterinary Authority” should oversee the establishment of a central disease control center.

i) appropriate information technology and telecommunication infrastructure;

ii) information systems to manage data collection concerning *aquaculture establishments*, details of sample collection and associated laboratory results, as well as the imposition of *disease* control measures on affected *aquaculture establishments* and other relevant stakeholders~~transporters~~;

iii) space for preparing and storing sampling kits for dispatch to the field;

iv) disinfection points for staff who are involved in sampling and inspection of *aquaculture establishments*, *vehicles* and other premises;

v) storage area for fields kits, personal protective equipment, cleaning and disinfection materials;

vi) *biosecurity* measures which are appropriate for the specific facilities and the purpose for which they are used.

b) The personnel from the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* who staff the central and local *disease* control centres have been identified in the *Contingency Plan.* Operationally, this group includes technical, administrative and legal personnel, as necessary, who are fully trained to complete the following tasks in accordance with detailed standard procedures which are set out in the Operations Manual:

i) clinical inspections of aquaculture establishments, other establishments and wild aquatic animals ~~and wild aquatic habitats,~~ as relevant;

ii) sample collection and transportation;

iii) preparation and issuance of legal notices;

iv) management of general biosecurity measures and other specific disease control measures;

v) communications with relevant personnel and stakeholders;

vi) data and record management;

vii) human resources management including workplace health and safety.

2) Laboratories

a) During the emergency, the *Aquatic Animal Health Services including industry* should submit samples to the laboratories which have been identified in the *Contingency Plan.* Those laboratories provide rapid and accurate testing and reporting, which is dependent on the following resources:

**RATIONAL**

Communication should also include pertinent industry personnel.

i) appropriately trained and competent staff;

ii) appropriate equipment, which has been suitably serviced and is fit-for-purpose;

iii) a sufficient range and quantity of consumables;

iv) appropriate informationsystems to ensure sample traceability and reporting of laboratory results;

v) *biosecurity* measures which are suitable to contain the *pathogenic agent* in question.

Contact details of the staff which are referred to in point (i) and the companies which provide the services and goods, which are referred to in points (ii), (iii) and (iv), are detailed in the Operations Manual.

b) For *listed diseases*, laboratory methods should follow the relevant chapter of the ~~WOAH~~ Aquatic *Manual as well as the drafted case definitions for the pathogen.* For diseases other than *listed diseases*, a procedure identified in the Operations Manual should be utilised, or another method which has been validated for the purpose of use.

**RATIONAL**

Laboratory testing methods should be in alignment with both the WOAH and case definitions for the disease of concern.

3) Service Providers

The availability of relevant service providers during the emergency phase is of crucial importance, in particular, considering that a *disease outbreak* may extend to multiple *aquaculture establishments* in dispersed locations, and potentially to wild *aquatic animals and vice versa*. Action should, therefore, be taken to ensure the availability of:

**RATIONAL**

We suggest inserting “and vice versa” because disease outbreaks have the potential to spread from farmed to wild populations, as well as from wild to farmed populations.

a) mortality management providers involved in retrieval and/or transport, who have capacity for the required daily tonnage;

b) sanitary slaughter facilities, which can cater for the required daily tonnage;

c) predatory animal and bird control specialists;

d) telecommunications providers;

e) communication specials or journalist for media liaison;

f~~c~~) telecommunications providers;

g~~d~~) providers of laboratory equipment and consumables who have an acceptable lead-in time for delivery of new and replacement items;

h~~e~~) companies which service relevant laboratory equipment and which have an acceptable response time for critical pieces of equipment;

i~~f~~) providers of vaccines/ veterinary medicines, who can supply an appropriate number of doses and have a suitable lead-in time for delivery;

j~~g~~) experts in areas which are relevant to the successful management of the emergency, and who have appropriate skills (e.g. in the areas of logistics, fisheries management, environmental protection, vaccination or treatment of *aquatic animals*), and who are available to deal with emergency situations;

k~~h~~) back-up providers for each type of service, should they be required for an extensive *disease outbreak*.

Subject to the relevant regulatory requirements which apply in a country, contact~~Contact~~ details of the providers referred to in points a) to k~~h~~) above are detailed in the Operations Manual.

Article 4.Y.8.

Biosecurity and other disease control measures

The actions which the *Veterinary Authority and Competent Authorit~~y~~ies* should take~~s~~ concerning *biosecurity* and other *disease* control measures during the emergency phase, are described in the Operations Manual and may include:

**RATIONAL**

Both the “Veterinary Authority” and Competent Authorities may have roles in biosecurity and other disease control measures.

1) defining the *infected zone* and *protection zones* which apply in freshwater or marine environments, as relevant, following confirmation of a *disease outbreak*, and taking into account the recommendations of Chapter 4.2.;

2) appropriate classification of the health status of *aquaculture establishments* to define their *disease* status or *risk* of infection;

3~~2~~) providing maps which will demonstrate the *infected zone* and the surrounding *protection zone*, as well as the *aquaculture establishments* which are located within those *zones*;

4~~3~~) coordinating actions concerning *biosecurity* and other *disease* control measures with other *Competent Authorities*, when the establishment of such *infected zone* or *protection zones* impacts neighbouring countries;

5~~4~~) specifying relevant *biosecurity* and other specific *disease* control measures including:

a) controlling the movement of aquatic animals, *aquatic animal products*, *feed*,~~and~~ equipment, *vehicles*, waste, fomites and *vectors* to or from the infected establishment(s) or *infected zone*, unless authorised by the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority* following *risk assessment*;

**RATIONAL**

The “Veterinary Authority” should authorize the movements described in 5)a).

b) extending the movement controls referred to above, to other *aquaculture establishments* or waterbodies which have an epidemiological link with the *aquaculture establishment* in which the suspicion arose;

c) exemptions from the movement prohibitions described above, should *risk assessment* have indicated that these represent an acceptable *risk* (e.g. emergency harvesting, on-site processing, cooking for human consumption), or alternatively that more stringent movement measures are required due to the developing disease situation;

d) specifying the procedures to be used when *aquatic animals* are slaughtered or killed, depending on their species, size and the number of *aquatic animals* involved, including:

i) details of the equipment and where relevant, veterinary products to be used, and their suppliers;

ii) the appointment of a named Welfare Officer to ensure that procedures are carried out to the highest possible standards, and in the case of fish, to ensure that slaughtering or killing is carried out in accordance with Chapter 7.4.;

iii) details of the *biosecurity* measures required to ensure the slaughter or killing process does not cause *disease* spread. This includes measures for the containment and safe disposal of dead or destroyed stock. Also measures which apply to *vehicles* which are authorised to move animals or products from the infected establishments (or from additional establishments, as directed by the *Competent Authority*), to processing factories or animal by product establishments;

e~~iv~~) the vaccination options that may be employed, depending on the circumstances of the *disease* *outbreak*, including:

i) no vaccination;

ii) vaccination which is implemented in aquaculture establishments within the infected zone i.e. suppressive vaccination, the aim of which is to reduce the spread of disease from the infected zone;

iii) vaccination which is implemented outside the infected zone where the disease has not been suspected or confirmed i.e. protective vaccination, the aim of which is to prevent the spread of the disease in populations of aquatic animals which are at risk of infection;

iv) a combination of suppressive and protective vaccination.

f~~e~~) the decontamination options which are available, taking into account the recommendations of Chapter 4.4.. A list of the cleaning agents, *disinfectants* and equipment that are appropriate to use, are commercially available, authorised for use by the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority*, and which meet the decontamination requirements concerning the pathogenic agent in question~~,~~ should also be specified;

**RATIONAL**

The “Veterinary Authority” should authorize appropriate decontamination options for the disease response.

g~~f~~) procedures for the containment of wastewaters which are produced following equipment, facility and *vehicle* *disinfection* activities, which have been drawn up in accordance with the instructions of the *Competent Authorities* with responsibility for discharges to the environment;

h) where relevant, specifying the procedures to be used for the containment, *disinfection* and disposal of *disease* contaminated water used for *aquatic animal* production.

Article 4.Y.9.

Recovery phase

The recovery phase of *disease outbreak* management is activated when the end of the emergency has been declared by the *Veterinary ~~Competent~~ Authority*. This phase takes into consideration the recovery plan described in Chapter 4.X., and the associated detailed actions which are set out in the Operations Manual.

**RATIONAL**

The “Veterinary Authority” should declare and authorize the commencement of the recovery phase.

1. Return to freedom.

In cases where the recovery phase includes the intention~~ambition~~ to return to ~~disease~~pathogen freedom in accordance with ~~Pathway 4 as referred to in~~ Chapter 1.4. (Pathway 4), either for:

a) the entity (country, *zone* or *compartment*), which was previously *disease* free; or ~~to make a~~ *~~self-declaration of freedom from disease~~* ~~for~~

b) a smaller entity or entities (*zone*(s) or *compartment*(s));

this phase should begin with a review of the basic biosecurity conditions which applied before the disease outbreak occurred. This review will determine if additional sanitary measures are required to strengthen the basic biosecurity conditions which will apply in the entity for which the new declaration of freedom will be made.

This step will be followed in due course, by the re-population of *aquatic animals*, the required surveillance (as per Chapter 1.4.) and the re-commencement of trade. The ultimate aims of the recovery phase are to successfully return to peacetime operations.

2. In cases where the recovery phase does not include the ambition to return to disease-freedom, the actions which are necessary to either contain the ~~disease~~pathogen, or to mitigate the impacts of the disease, should be identified and set out in the Operations Manual.

a) Containment. Where the aim of the recovery plan is to contain the ~~disease~~pathogen, the following measures may be described:

i) zoning and movement controls;

ii) biosecurity measures, as described in Chapter 4.1.;

iii) disinfection of *aquaculture establishments* and equipment, as described in Chapter 4.4.;

iv) periodic *fallowing*, as described in Chapter 4.7.;

v) handling, disposal and treatment of *aquatic animal waste*, as described in Chapter 4.8.

b) Mitigation. Where the aim of the recovery plan is to mitigate the impact of the *disease*, the following measures may be described:

i) vaccination, using one or more of the strategies, which are referred to in Article 4.Y.5.;

ii) the possibility to change to the production of a species of aquatic animals, which are not susceptible to the disease which caused the emergency;

iii) the possibility to change production and husbandry practices, so that risk factors which are known to result in morbidity or mortality of *susceptible species* are minimised as far as possible;

iv) training which may be provided to operators to create improved awareness of the *disease* in question, as well as the steps that can be taken at establishment level to mitigate its impact.

**RATIONAL**

We suggest changing “disease” to “pathogen” in parts 1 and 2 of the “Return to freedom” section to more accurately reflect that fact that our goals include containing the pathogen (as the presence of a pathogen does not necessarily mean there are associated clinical signs/disease in a given population), and restoring freedom from the pathogen.

3. In addition, the recovery plan may include details of:

a) the steps that are necessary to:

i) allow relevant movement controls to be partially or completely lifted (including permitting arrangements), so that affected trade may recommence within the country;

ii) start communications with producers and international partners, with a view to supporting an early recommencement of *international trade*, or to seek alternative trading partners.

b) any increased *surveillance* or *biosecurity* measures which may apply to facilitate resumption of trade, and that is undertaken once~~as~~ trade recommences within the country and with international partners;

c) any resources that the *Competent Authority* intends to provide including research, monetary, technical, or other relevant supports;

d) any review of national legislation and disease outbreak management procedures that may be required to underpin the recovery plan that has been developed concerning the *disease outbreak* in question;

e) ongoing communication with *Aquatic Animal Health Services including industry* to explain relevant details of the recovery plan and to reinforce the role the *Aquatic Animal Health Services* and industry play in future *disease* prevention and control.

**RATIONAL**

Communication should also include pertinent industry personnel.

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