Annex 20

CHAPTER 5.7.  
  
**Border inspection posts  
and quarantine centres**

Article 5.7.1.

**Purpose and scope**

This chapter provides recommendations on *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* to support effective implementation of measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of *commodities,* in order to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents without creating unjustified trade restrictions.

*Quarantine centres* may be used for isolation of *animals* either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* orpost-arrival. The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the application of *biosecurity* at *quarantine centres* is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* (pre-export isolation) or via *risk analysis* (post-arrival quarantine).

Article 5.7.2.

**General considerations**

Appropriate legislation should be in place, in accordance with Chapter 3.4., to define the facilities, the resourcing and operation of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres,* and for their approval.

Material and financial resources should be available at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary to undertake the relevant functions of the facility while managing official controls, *biosecurity*, health and safety risks and *animal welfare* associated with the type and volume of *commodities* presented for inspection.

Appropriate administration systems should be available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary for the functions of the facility, including record keeping and information and communication technology, to support decision-making and communication.

*Biosecurity* consistent with Chapter 4.X. is critical to fulfil the functions of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres.*

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that:

‒ Operations at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are supported by sufficient authorised personnel who are operating under the principles of Chapter 3.2., appropriately qualified with access to regular training, consistent with the intended use and the type and quantity of *commodities* presented.

‒ Operational details for *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are made available to operators described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. or 5.6., including the intended use and the categories of *commodities* for which they are designated, exact locations, contact details, hours of operation, booking requirements and costs.

‒ Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* describing the procedures undertaken there. Auditable records documenting the performance of these procedures should be kept, including the maintenance of *biosecurity*. Records should include the results of official controls, regular *surveillance* and *monitoring* in the facilities and the surrounding areas.

‒ *Border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* have access to *laboratories* and other *approved* service providers with SOPs as necessary to support the implementation of official controls and the measures described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. and 5.6. consistent with Article 3.2.6.

Article 5.7.3.

**Cooperation with other agencies**

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should engage with other governmental authorities with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of *border inspection posts*, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder normal operations described in this chapter. Key principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of *commodities*.

Article 5.7.4.

**Requirements for a border inspection post**

Design and operation of a *border inspection post* should be based on *risk analysis* and *biosecurity* includingthefollowing:

1) Separation between public areas and restricted areas for inspection of consignments.

2) Perimeter security of restricted areas to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals, with access control for entry and exit of authorised personnel and *means of transport*.

3) Facilities and equipment suitable for thetype and volume of *commodities* presented, necessary for implementation of the official control procedures described in Article 5.6.3, including secure unloading and loading, inspection, sampling and storage or detention of *commodities*, including adequate lighting and temperature control with surfaces appropriate for cleaning and *disinfection*.

4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection* and elimination of arthropod *vectors* of *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of *commodities,* consistent with Article 5.6.6.

5) Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed,* rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.

Article 5.7.5.

**Additional requirements for a border inspection post for animals**

In addition to the principles described in Article 5.7.4.,a *border inspection post* for consignments of *animals* should be designed and operate in accordance with *animal welfare* principles in Section 7 and should specifically include the following:

1) Separate access to restricted animal inspection areas via road infrastructure, to minimise delays.

2) Facilities necessary for the management of consignments of *animals* according to Article 5.6.3, including containment, feeding, watering, restraint and inspection, consistent with the type and number of *animals* presented.

3) Facilities for temporarily holding *animals*, with adequate space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments and species.

Article 5.7.6.

**Facilities involved in official inspection other than border inspection post**

When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a *border inspection post*, the facilities involved should be *approved* following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance.

Article 5.7.7.

**Requirements for a quarantine centre**

Design and operation of a *quarantine centre* should be based on consideration of the following:

1) The disease situation of the country, *zone* or area surrounding the *quarantine centr*e.

2) Location of facilities at a distance from other *establishments*, sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern.

3) Site topography, to minimise disease risks associated with the flow of contaminated water.

4) Perimeter security to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport,* and unwanted animals.

5) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of authorised personnel, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls including changing rooms and showers. Controls for exit of authorised personnel may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation.

6) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of *means of transport* and equipment, including veterinary instruments and supplies, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls. Controls for exit of *means of transport* and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation.

7) Controls for entry of supplies, including the sources, sanitary status and entry process for *feed* and bedding, and facilities necessary to handle and store these supplies.

8) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection*, and removal of arthropod *vectors* including control of waste and effluent, for *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of import consignments of *animals*.

9) Waste management. In the case of isolation of *animals* after arrival, waste management should be in accordance with a *biosecurity plan* including storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.

10) Facilities for containment and management of consignments of *animals*, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, *unloading/loading*, housing, yards, restraint, isolation, *vector* control, and for undertaking interventions required by *risk analysis* and/or relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including sample collection, testing, *vaccination*, treatment and veterinary inspection.

11) Equipment for cleaning and *disinfection* and removal of arthropod *vectors* in the facility between consignments of *animals*.

A *quarantine centre* for isolation of *animals* before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. Unless specified in those chapters, isolation of *animals* before exportation may be performed in other facilities.

Article 5.7.8.

**Planning for unexpected events**

The management of consignments at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that have failed clearance and have thus been refused transit or import is covered in Chapters 5.4. to 5.6.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that plans are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The plans should address communication, *biosecurity*, health and safety, and *animal welfare* in each instance, and may cover:

‒ Unexpected arrival of *commodities*.

‒ Evidence of a *listed disease* or a disease included in the *transit* or *importing country* requirements in a consignment of imported or transiting *animals* at a *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.

‒ Veterinary emergency in *animals* at a *border inspection post* or undergoing post-arrival isolation in a *quarantine centre*.

‒ Escape of *animals*.

‒ Evidence of *animal* *products* presenting a risk to animal or public health.

‒ Natural disasters and interruption of critical services threatening the operation of the *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.

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