

# **Avian Influenza: HPAI Outbreaks and Control Methods**

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# 26 HPAI Epizootics

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1. 1959-Scotland, H5N1
2. 1961-S. Africa, H5N3
3. 1963-England, H7N3
4. 1966-Canada, H5N9
5. 1975-Australia, H7N7
6. 1979 –Germany, H7N7
7. 1979-England, H7N7
- \*8. 1983-84 - USA, H5N2
9. 1983-Ireland, H5N8
10. 1985-Australia, H7N7
11. 1991-England, H5N1
12. 1992-Australia, H7N3
13. 1994-Australia, H7N3
- \*§14. 1994-95-Mexico, H5N2
- §15. 1995 & 2004 –  
Pakistan, H7N3
16. 1997-Australia, H7N4
17. 1997-Italy, H5N2
- \*\*§18. 1996-2008 – Asia/Europe/  
Africa, H5N1
- \*19. 1999-2000 - Italy, H7N1
- \*20. 2002 - Chile, H7N3
- \*21. 2003 – Netherlands, H7N7
- \*22. 2004 – USA, H5N2
- \*23. 2004 – Canada, H7N3
24. 2004, 2006 – S. Africa, H5N2
- §25. 2005? – N. Korea, H7N7 #
26. 2007 – Canada, H7N3
- \*LPAIV ⇒ HPAIV
- \*\*Largest epizootic in 50 yrs
- §Vaccine used in the control  
strategy

# Asian H5N1 HPAI Epizootic

## The Beginning, 1996



- Guangdong, China
- Geese with some mortality
- H5N1 AI virus – HP for chickens

- 1997, Hong Kong:
  - 18 human cases, 6 deaths
  - Depopulation of 1.4m poultry LPM and farms




# Asian H5N1 HPAI Epizootic


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- **2001 H5N1 isolated from duck meat exported to S. Korea**
  - Isolated from meat juice - thawed and refrozen meat
  - Meat from south China
- **AI virus:**
  - HP, chickens
  - NP, ducks
- **2003: H5N1 isolated in Japan from imported duck meat from China**



# Asian HPAI Epizootics




## H5N1 HPAI

- 1. Beginning - China: 1996-2006 (H5N1)**
- 2. Local extension - Hong Kong: 1997, 2001-3 (H5N1)**
- 3. SE Asian Regional Extension - Agriculture**
  - S. Korea: 2003-4 (H5N1)
  - Vietnam: 2004-6 (H5N1)
  - Japan: 2004 (H5N1)
  - Thailand: 2004-6 (H5N1)
  - Cambodia: 2004-6 (H5N1)
  - Laos: 2004-6 (H5N1)
  - Taiwan (smuggled ducks): 2003 & 5 (H5N1)
  - Indonesia: 2003-6 (H5N1)
  - Malaysia: 2004 (H5N1)
- 4. Central Asia & E. Europe, wild bird –**
  - Mid-2005: China (Qinghai Lake), Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan
  - Late-2005: Turkey, Romania, Kuwait, Croatia, Ukraine, Cyprus: (H5N1)

# Extension of H5N1 HPAIV: 2006

Areas reporting confirmed occurrence of H5N1\* avian influenza in poultry and wild birds since 2003

Status as of 28 April 2006



- 6. Africa –  
Feb 2006
- 7. Europe –  
Winter 2006
- 8. 28 countries  
2007




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Data Source: World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and national governments  
Map Production: Public Health Mapping and GIS  
Communicable Diseases (CDS) World Health Organization

- 60 countries with cases in wild birds and/or poultry
- Over 250 million birds dead or culled since Jan. 2004 (FAO)
- Eradicated of HPAI have occurred, but reintroductions have occurred in Japan, S. Korea, Malaysia and Thailand

# Summary of Status in 2008




of HPAI observed from 26 September 2006 to 26 March 2007. H5 cases are  
 H5N1 is shown to be endemic and where N-subtype characterization is not being  
 sources (FAO representatives or country missions, FAO reports, OIE, official  
 others) and produces these composite maps in a representative effort to provide  
 rs are regretted, but FAO welcomes messages to that effect with supporting  
 on FAO validation and verification procedures.

# Status in 2008

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## 1. Sector 1 – Industrial Sector

- a. Concentrated production – high populations
- b. Vaccination and biosecurity practices vary
- c. Best control and even eradication from compartment



# **Poultry Production Features**

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- 2. Sectors 2 and 3 – commercial but not integrated industrial**
  - a. Biosecurity is limited**
  - b. Movement controls and veterinary care variable to minimal**
  - c. Re-infections are common place**



# Poultry Production Features

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## 3. Sector 4: Native Chickens

- Lack of movement controls
- “Syndromic surveillance”
- Adequate vaccination coverage is a challenge
- Illegal production





# Poultry Production Features

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## 4. Sector 4 - Fighting cocks

- a. Movement over great distances
- b. Variable biosecurity
- c. Minimal movement controls



# Poultry Production Features

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## 5. Sector 4 – Domestic Ducks and Geese

- 1° Outdoor reared
- Asymptomatic infection
- Major reservoir and biomass issue



# Role of Free-Living Aquatic Birds


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## 6. Infected free-living aquatic birds

- Major outbreaks in 2005 and 2006
- Fewer infections and disease in 2007
  - Swans, geese and ducks
- Reservoir verses re-infection from infected domestic poultry?



# Sources for Poultry



# Disease Control Basics

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- **Strategies for dealing with poultry disease are developed to achieve one of 3 goals or outcomes:**
  - Prevention: preventing introduction
  - Management (Control): reducing losses by minimizing negative economic impact through management practices
  - Eradication: total elimination
- **These goals are achieved through various strategies developed using universal components:**
  - Biosecurity (exclusion and inclusion) including quarantine
  - Diagnostics and surveillance
  - Elimination of AI virus infected poultry
  - Decreasing host susceptibility to the virus (vaccines and host genetics)
  - Education

# Avian Influenza Vaccines: Poultry

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- **Protection: Humoral Immunity**
  - Anti-hemagglutinin antibodies are protective
  - Anti-neuraminidase also protective, less effective
- **No single universal vaccine for AI viruses**
- **The practice of vaccination varies**
  - Not routine in developed countries – targeted vaccination
  - Maybe routine in parts of developing countries; e.g. H5N1 HPAI and H9N2 LPAI
- **Issue: Reports of inconsistent field protection by AI vaccines usually related to vaccine quality and application**



# Avian Influenza Vaccines: Poultry

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## Categories of Vaccine Technologies

1. **Inactivated whole AI virus (C,E)**
2. ***In vitro* expressed HA protein: (E)**
  - Eukaryotic tissue cultures (plant and animal), plants, yeast, bacteria and viruses (e.g. baculovirus (E), vaccinia (E), adenovirus (E))
3. ***In vivo* expressed HA protein:**
  - Viruses and bacterial vectors
  - **Fowl Poxvirus (C)**, Adenovirus (E), VEE (E), ALV (E), ILT (E), **NDV (C,E)**, AI-NDV chimera (E),  $\Delta$ aroA Salmonella (E)
4. **Naked Nucleic acids – cDNA HA gene (E)**

# Avian Influenza Vaccines: Past

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## ▪ LPAI -

### • Waterfowl - origin viruses:

- Meat turkeys, MN USA: 22 million doses over 20 years, 1978-1997
- Turkeys & chickens, Italy (2002-2006) - 202 million doses (Marangon, 2007)

### • H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 swine influenza: turkey breeders, ex. 2.6 million doses USA 2001

### • H9N2 Middle East and Asia (late 1990s-present): billions? doses

## ▪ HPAI -

### • Mexico, Guatemala & El Salvador (1995-2006) - H5N2: 1.8b doses inactivated & 2b doses Fowlpox recombinant

### • Pakistan (1995-07) – Trivalent H7, H5 and H9 inactivated

### • North Korea (2005) – H7N7 inactivated - layers

### • H5 inactivated (2002-7); usage in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Russia, Egypt & Indonesia; limited Holland and France

### • China (2004-2006) – 22.7 billion doses

# Example: AI Vaccines in Asia

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## 1. Inactivated vaccine strains:

- **A/turkey/England/N28/73 (H5N2) LPAIV**
- **A/chicken/Mexico/232/94 (H5N2) LPAIV**
- **A/chicken/Legok-Indonesia/03 (H5N1) HPAIV**
- **A/turkey/Wisconsin/68 (H5N9) LPAIV**
- **A/chicken/Italy/22A/1998 (H5N9) LPAIV**
- **Two reverse genetic strains: H5 & N1 genes of A/goose/Guangdong/96 or Shanxi strain, 6 I. genes from PR8**
- **Reverse genetic strains: H5 gene from A/chicken/Vietnam/C58/04 (H5N1), N3 gene from A/Duck/Germany/1215/73 (H2N3), & 6 internal genes of PR8**

## 2. Recombinant fowlpox with cDNA inserts of AI viral genes: 1) H5 gene - A/turkey/Ireland/83, 2) H5 & N1 genes - A/goose/Guangdong/96

## 3. Recombinant Newcastle disease virus with H5 AI gene insert from A/BHG/Qinghai/3/2005 (H5N1)

# Laboratory Protection

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- **Increased Resistance to AIV Infection**
  - **Requires  $10^2$  EID<sub>50</sub> higher dose to infect vaccinated compared to non-vaccinated turkeys**
  - **Requires  $>10^5$  EID<sub>50</sub> higher dose to infect recombinant fowlpox vaccinated compared to non-vaccinated chickens**

# Laboratory Protection


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- Prevent illness and death in birds
- Reduced replication of challenge virus in respiratory and intestinal tracts
  - Minimum –  $10^2$  EID<sub>50</sub> reduction
  - Typical –  $10^{3-5}$  EID<sub>50</sub> reduction
- Prevents infection of meat, blood and bone
- Best vaccines protect from high challenge doses ( $10^{6-8}$  EID<sub>50</sub>)
- Translation:
  - Reduced environmental contamination
  - Reduced transmission

# Needs in the Next Generation of AI Vaccines

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- **Mass immunization methods: water, feed, spray and *in ovo* administration**
- **Increase use of biotechnology to address genetic drift and antigen content of vaccines**
- **Vaccine combinations and protocols – e.g. AI and vector maternal antibody impact on immunization**
- **Improved adjuvants for inactivated AI vaccines in waterfowl**
- **Longer, enhanced immunity with few vaccinations**
- **Consistent quality for inactivated vaccines – including purity, safety, efficacy and potency**



# Conclusions

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- 1. 26 HPAI epizootics in last 50 years**
- 2. Current H5N1 HPAI epizootic is the largest and larger than the other 25 combined**
- 3. H5N1 epizootic began in China, spread to Hong Kong and other SE Asian countries by agricultural and trade practices**
- 4. Less clear as to how it spread to eastern Asia, Middle East and Africa**
- 5. Wild bird involvement with spread to Europe**
- 6. Domestic ducks have emerged as the primary reservoir in developing countries**

# Conclusions

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- 7. Humoral immunity to HA is the primary protective response**
- 8. Three vaccine technologies used in the field: inactivated AIV, rFPV-AIV-H5 and rNDV-AIV-H5**
- 9. Protection related to:**
  - 1. Prevention of disease and death**
  - 2. Reduced virus replication and shedding**
  - 3. Prevention or reduction in transmission**

# Thank You For Your Attention!

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