

United States Department of Agriculture

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Response Ready Reference Guide— Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

Quarantine and Movement Control

Quarantine and movement control (QMC) activities are fundamental to rapidly contain an HPAI outbreak. Movement control is accomplished through a permit system that allows for necessary permitted movements without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread. The Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) is the system of record for permits and permitted movements made into, within, and out of the HPAI Control Area(s).

Continuity of Business

Continuity of business (COB) is the managed movement of non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal products during an outbreak; it is essential to mitigating the economic consequences of an HPAI outbreak. All movement is based on science- and risk-based approaches to allow normal business operations while minimizing the risk of animal and product movements.

How Does Continuity of Business Work with Quarantine and Movement Control?

QMC and COB have the **same ultimate goal**: to prevent the transmission of HPAI to non-infected premises, particularly those outside the Control Area. QMC is highly effective at limiting the spread of disease, but it impedes typical business operations—this is when COB plans enter response efforts to effectively manage movement.

- Quarantines and movement controls are applied to premises in a regulatory Control Area to ensure infected animals and contaminated fomites and products do not leave premises. Quarantines apply to Infected Premises (IP), Contact Premises (CP), and Suspect Premises (SP). Movement controls apply to At-Risk Premises (ARP) or Monitored Premises (MP). Consideration will be given to critical movements (i.e., feed trucks).
- Continuity of business is intended to permit movement for non-infected premises (ARP and MP) in a Control Area.

Implementation of Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business in an HPAI Outbreak

In an HPAI outbreak, a unified State-Federal Incident Command will be established to manage the incident. A regulatory Control Area, made up of an Infected (IZ) and Buffer Zone (BZ), will be designated immediately upon detection of HPAI. Once the Control Area is established, quarantine and movement controls are implemented as rapidly as possible. The animal health emergency response plan of every State and Tribal Nation should describe the implementation of quarantine and movement controls, including a permit system. In some cases, USDA may also impose a Federal quarantine for the management of interstate commerce from infected States.

COB plans—ideally developed in advance—will be implemented to facilitate the permitted movement of commodities and animals from ARP and MP within the regulatory Control Area, helping these premises continue business operations. In implementing these measures, the unified Incident Command must weigh the risk of disease transmission against the need for critical movement and business continuity.

Critical Activities Implemented as HPAI Outbreak Response Progresses



HPAI Specific Challenges

The HPAI virus is highly contagious and can spread easily through fomites and animal to animal contact. An outbreak of HPAI has significant economic implications in terms of direct costs, such as incident response, and the consequences of trade bans from countries that import animals and animal products from the United States.

Because avian influenza viruses can be zoonotic, swift response and permitted movement of all potentially infected animals or contaminated items is especially important. In the 2014–2015, 2016, and 2017 HPAI outbreaks in the United States, there was no evidence that the respective circulating strain posed any zoonotic threat; no human infection was ever reported.



Continuity of Business is a Public, Private, and Academic Partnership

COB planning requires active collaboration among public officials, private industry, and academia/extension to help to minimize unintended consequences on producers and consumers impacted by HPAI. Prior to an outbreak, these groups work together to develop the processes by which non-infected premises can move non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products. Collaboratively, proactive risk assessments will be used to develop the requirements for movement of commodities out of a regulatory Control Area. These requirements can include biosecurity measures, cleaning and disinfection procedures, and surveillance sampling prior to a permitted movement.

The <u>Secure Poultry Supply Plan</u> is underway for COB in an HPAI outbreak. This plan offers guidance on the movement of eggs, egg products, turkeys, and broilers, including surveillance, biosecurity, cleaning and disinfection, and other criteria for movement. This guidance can help inform decisions made by the Unified State-Federal Incident Command during an HPAI outbreak.

Preparedness and Response Goals for Continuity of Business

Preparedness

- Work with industry stakeholders and experts to prioritize animal or commodity movements that have the potential to be affected by disease or the disease response.
- Establish a transparent and effective system for risk assessments, surveillance requirements, biosecurity procedures, and permitting processes for the affected industry to promote stakeholder acceptance and compliance with regulatory interventions by State, Federal, and Tribal authorities.


Response

- ◆ Implement an appropriate COB plan for the industries or industry segments affected by the outbreak.
- Work with industry and Incident Command to facilitate and permit movement of non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products from non-infected premises throughout the outbreak.
- ◆ Enter permits and movements in EMRS2 in a timely fashion, in at least 24-hour intervals.

What Are Key Elements of Continuity of Business Plans for Managed Movement?

Every COB plan will be unique. Commonalities include the following:


- Risk Assessments: Proactive risk assessments help determine the transmission risk of product movement, particularly from an infected but undetected premises or flock.
- ◆ **Surveillance Requirements:** How frequently samples will be collected, from what populations, and for how long.
- Biosecurity guidance: Appropriate precautions, personal protective equipment, and specific steps for various fomites and equipment.
- Cleaning and disinfection (virus elimination) procedures:
 Cleaning requirements for various fomites and equipment, including information on appropriate disinfectants.
- Epidemiological information: Information on movement to and from premises, as well as information on the number of animals, species, age, and geographic location of the premises.
- Permitting guidance: Transparent, explicit guidance for Incident Command regarding movement requirements for various commodities.
- Information Management: Effective, scalable, and flexible information systems that facilitate situational awareness and data sharing among all partners in a COB plan.





Premises Designation in Relation to Permitting and Movement Control

For movement of susceptible poultry and poultry products out of the Control Area to a Free Area, the permit process must consider national standards, any OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) standards, and conditions for movement such as biosecurity procedures and risk assessment recommendations. In addition, commodity-specific proactive risk assessments, COB plans, movement and marketability plans, and compartmentalization plans will also be considered. The figure below illustrates premises designations in relation to permitting and movement control.



^aContinuity of business plans may apply.