APHIS FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE FRAMEWORK
ROLES AND COORDINATION

FAD PReP

Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness & Response Plan

USDA **United States Department of Agriculture**

United States Department of Agriculture • Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service • Veterinary Services

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USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services
National Preparedness and Incident Coordination (NPIC)

From 2016-2017, the United States Department of Agriculture organized a unified Incident Command with the Florida State Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) to respond to and eradicate New World Screwworm (NWS); the success of the response was due in large part to the collaboration across Federal agencies and FDACS with over 530 rotations deployed to successfully eradicate NWS. Our most recent extended outbreak occurred from 2018 to 2020 with the detection of virulent Newcastle Disease in California; In June 2020, we were able to declare disease freedom and satisfy the World Organization of Animal Health's criteria for eradication. This version of the *USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework—Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0)* reflects the knowledge and lessons learned during these events to enhance collaboration and operational response among local, State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies and food and agriculture industries. This manual applies to all foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents and associated responses.

The following list highlights important changes that were completed in this **September 2022** version of the *Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0)*.

- Provided an update on 2017 publication of Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan and pending National List of Reportable Animal Diseases rule (Chapter 2).
- Updated Animal Health Protection Act Section with the 2018 Farm Bill Section 12101, National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program (Chapter 2)
- Updated Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 with foot-and-mouth disease production cycle timeframe (Chapter 2)
- Reflected changes to the updated 2019 FEMA National Response Framework (NRF).
  - Updated agency roles based off the Emergency Support Function Annexes (Chapter 3)
    - Updated ESF #8 and 15
    - Updated ESF #14 Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure to reflect new title and role
- Reflected changes to the updated 2017 FEMA National Incident Management System (NIMS) Doctrine (Chapter 4).
- Updated *Figure 4 4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure*
- *(for an FAD Incident)* with current existing structures (Chapter 4).
- Made consistent with other revised response plans and strategic documents.

We realize that preparing for and responding to an FAD outbreak remains a complex effort, requiring collaboration from all levels of government and industry stakeholders. This document is intended to further aid the whole community response by outlining the roles and responsibilities of USDA APHIS based on the principles of the NRF and National Incident Management System.

This document will be revised as needed. Please e-mail all comments to FAD.PReP.Comments@ usda.gov with the subject line, "Comments to Manual 1-0 Roles and Coordination."

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response.
For more information, please go to:
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep

Executive Summary

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is crucial to protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the environment, the food supply, and the economy. This document, the *Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Foreign Animal Disease Framework— Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0),* is part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP). It provides broad information about preparing for and responding to an FAD outbreak in the United States, based on the principles of the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS).

The *APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination* covers

◆ an introduction to APHIS FAD preparedness and response;

◆ AHPIS authorities and funding;

◆ Federal department roles, responsibilities, and planning assumptions;

◆ an overview of incident management; and

◆ APHIS communication strategy for FAD incidents.

An FAD response is a complex and challenging process, requiring careful planning and diligent preparedness. There are disruptions to both interstate commerce and international trade. As incidents evolve, resources, personnel, and countermeasures must be scalable and flexible to respond quickly. There will be conflicting interests and competing priorities that must be rapidly addressed in an outbreak. Effective coordination and cooperation between local, State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies, as well as between the government and industry stakeholders is necessary for effective planning and capable response. This document broadly discusses roles and coordination for APHIS FAD preparedness and response efforts.

As with any regulatory action, it is important to outline the statutes and regulations that delegate responsibility and authority to APHIS for FAD response. The Animal Health Protection Act is the key statute that delegates authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to respond to an animal health incident; it also provides information on the emergency transfer of funds for a disease incident. Under this authority, further specific responsibility is respectively delegated through the *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR). Title 7 and Title 9 of the CFR authority for the Secretary of Agriculture and APHIS Administrator, respectively, and provides specific regulations for the control and eradication of FADs in the United States.

During any FAD outbreak, the USDA leads overall response and incident management. However, USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support from other Federal departments and agencies. Chapter 3 reviews these NRF Emergency Support Functions. This chapter also provides information on the potential roles of other federal departments and agencies in an animal health incident.

APHIS has adopted NIMS and an Incident Command System (ICS) organizational approach to manage all animal health incidents. As confirmed in NIMS, all incidents begin and end locally. ICS enables efficient and effective management, by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication within a common organizational structure. The ICS structure is both flexible and scalable, so it can be adapted to any animal health incident—large or small—regardless of cause or source.

For effective preparedness and successful response, APHIS established internal and external communication processes to reduce the possibility of adverse public reaction and to mitigate the social and economic impact of an FAD outbreak. Both internal communication (between government authorities and within APHIS) and external communication (to the public, industry, and international partners) are critical to communicate procedures and protocols, achieve a coordinated response, gain public and our trading partners' trust, and raise awareness about preparedness and response activities.

FAD PReP aims to integrate and synchronize preparedness and response capabilities as much as possible before an outbreak by providing goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, comprehensive, easily updated, and that comply with NIMS. As State, Federal, and Tribal government agencies and industry groups develop their own preparedness and response plans, they must also coordinate incident goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures on a local, regional, and national basis.

This document has a companion document—*APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)*—which provides significant detail on response strategies for an FAD outbreak. This document, and the documents referenced within this document, are available at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive preparedness and response framework for an FAD outbreak.

Your comments on this document are welcomed, please send them to FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov; they will be considered in future revisions.

Contents

Figures

Tables

Chapter 1
Introduction

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is crucial to effectively protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the food supply, the environment, and the economy. Collaboration among local, State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies and food and agriculture industries is necessary for achieving shared objectives in each phase of emergency management—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The success of preparedness and response efforts depends on the effectiveness of cooperation among stakeholders. It is critical that stakeholders coordinate incident goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures before an incident. Communication and collaboration before an FAD outbreak reduce the likelihood of conflicting priorities, unmet expectations, and improve the speed and effectiveness of response.

This Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) document provides an overview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) FAD preparedness and response framework for incident management, funding, communication strategies, relationships, and authorities during an FAD incident or outbreak. This manual is complemented by the *APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)*, which provides detail on response strategies for an FAD outbreak. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive preparedness and response foundation for FADs.

1.1 CHALLENGES OF FAD RESPONSE

FAD incidents may present many logistical, technical, and strategic challenges. For example, in an FAD incident, large, diverse, and often geographically dispersed teams are assembled quickly with an expectation to perform rapidly. However, not all emergency responders and stakeholders have prior livestock, poultry, and agriculture specific knowledge or know the activities required for a successful FAD response. Additionally, some veterinary activities and countermeasures are complex and require significant preparation prior to an outbreak to effectively mitigate its severity. Some of these activities include biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, epidemiological investigation and tracing, surveillance, diagnostic testing, cleaning and disinfection, depopulation, disposal, and possibly emergency vaccination. The complete list of critical activities can be found in Appendix A within the standard operating procedure (SOP) section.

Another challenge, especially for large-scale outbreaks, is the ability to rapidly scale up resources and trained personnel for veterinary activities and countermeasures, effectively manage scarce resources, and efficiently allocate resources. There are likely to be competing interests and different priorities; for example, the goal of containing and eradicating an FAD within a Control Area (CA) may be in conflict with the objectives of non-infected premises within the CA that seek to maintain or re-establish business by demonstrating freedom from infection and effective biosecurity.

While some competing priorities may be impossible to identify or resolve prior to an incident or outbreak, others can be resolved or mitigated by elevating the awareness of those competing priorities, identifying the resources needed to resolve these issues, and establishing commonly accepted and understood response objectives before an incident. Past outbreaks both in the United States and in other countries also offer important lessons that can be applied to preparedness and response planning. Effective FAD preparedness and response is based on the following:

- Providing processes for emergency planning that respect local knowledge.

- Integrating State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning processes.

- Ensuring that there are clearly defined, obtainable, unified goals for response.

- Having a Unified State-Federal Incident Command (IC) that can act with speed and certainty.

- Employing science- and risk-based management approaches to an FAD response.

- Ensuring that all guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated effectively to responders and stakeholders.

- Identifying resources and trained personnel required for an effective incident response.

- Trying to resolve competing interests prior to an outbreak and addressing them quickly during an outbreak.

- Achieving rapid FAD detection and tracing.

1.2 USDA APHIS FAD Preparedness and Response

USDA APHIS established FAD PReP to provide a framework for FAD preparedness and response. FAD PReP was developed to meet the recommendation of many stakeholders that FAD preparedness and response capabilities needed improvement. It is intended to integrate and synchronize the principles and applied systems of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by providing outbreak response goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures for local, State, Federal, and Tribal responders.

FAD PReP is intended to raise awareness of response activities and veterinary countermeasures, identify gaps or shortcomings in current preparedness planning, and provide a framework for States, Tribes, and other stakeholders to use in developing their own response plans.

1.2.1 Plan Development and Methodology

FAD PReP is developed iteratively by reviewing current local, State, Tribal, National, and international FAD policies and plans, conducting detailed literature reviews, and consulting a diverse range of subject matter experts (SMEs) from both the public and private sector. Appendix A contains a complete list of current FAD PReP documents, ranging from SOPs to concept of operations (strategic) plans.

To maintain the effectiveness of these planning documents and relationships, APHIS reviews the FAD PReP material at regular intervals. To provide easy access and facilitate the review process, APHIS does the following:

◆ Ensures that FAD PReP guidance is readily available to local, State, Federal, Tribal, and other stakeholders. FAD PReP documents can be found on the public APHIS FAD PReP website at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

◆ Encourages all interested and responsible parties to review documents and provide recommendations for improvements or updates. Comments and collaboration are always welcome (FAD.PReP.Comments@usda.gov).

◆ Provides additional, more detailed guidance for specific incidents or outbreaks, as required by the incident.

◆ Updates and revises FAD PReP documents by doing the following:

➤ Incorporates recommendations and comments from local, State, Tribal, Federal, and industry partners and stakeholders.

➤ Incorporates updates from the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and other international organizations.

➤ Revises the documents based on changes in policy, procedure, or organization.

➤ Revises the documents based on lessons learned and experiences from FAD outbreaks and emerging disease events.

➤ Distributes and publishes the updated document.

1.3 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AND FAD PREP INTEGRATION

Successful emergency preparedness and response requires integration between the National Preparedness System, NRF, NIMS, and FAD PReP (which includes the National Animal Health Emergency Management System [NAHEMS]). The National Preparedness System "outlines an organized process for the whole community to move forward with its preparedness activities and achieve the National Preparedness Goal which defines what it means for the whole community to be prepared for all types of disasters and emergencies."[1]

FAD PReP documents use the concepts, structures, and processes defined in the NRF and NIMS as a foundation to provide more detailed information, including disease-specific information and further direction on response requirements for FAD outbreaks. FAD PReP aims, consistent with the National Preparedness System, to prepare the United States for FAD incidents in the United States.

1.3.1 National Response Framework

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response, through a whole community approach. It describes core capabilities for response, defines specific authorities, and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to domestic incidents that range from serious but purely local events to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF is one of the five National Planning Frameworks in the National Preparedness System; it builds on NIMS, which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The NRF is available at www.fema.gov/national-response-framework.

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[1] Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2019). https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf.

1.3.2   National Incident Management System

NIMS supports the NRF and is the foundation of the National Preparedness System. It provides a systematic, nationwide, proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The goal of NIMS is to help these organizations work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, "…regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity—in order to reduce the loss of life, liberty, property, and harm to the environment."[2] NIMS provides a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, organizational processes, and standard requirements, including the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS offers standard terminology and common organizational structures. NIMS information is available at www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system.

NIMS focuses on three key components that work together:

1. Communications and information management (including, but not limited to, systems and methods that help to ensure that incident personnel and other decision makers have the means and information they need to make and communicate decision);

2. Resource management (including, but not limited to, resources, including personnel, equipment, supplies, teams, and facilities, both before and during incidents in order to allow organizations to more effectively share resources when needed); and

3. Command and management (including, but not limited to leadership roles, processes, and recommended organizational structures for incident management at the operational and incident support levels and explains how these structures interact to manage incidents effectively and efficiently).

1.3.3   FAD PReP

The precursor to FAD PReP was the NAHEMS, which offered a functional veterinary framework for responding to FADs. Now incorporated into FAD PReP, the NAHEMS Guidelines harmonizes strategic concept of operations documents, disease response plans, SOPs, and other materials to create a comprehensive approach to FADs consistent with NRF and NIMS. These documents aim to ensure a successful response which corresponds to the severity of the outbreak. Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal Nations, and other stakeholders involved in animal health emergency management activities should integrate the

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[2] FEMA. (2017). NIMS. Retrieved from
http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system

information found in these documents into their preparedness and response planning activities and processes.

FAD PReP offers:

◆ competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection, disposal, mass depopulation, and other critical activities;

◆ information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles;

◆ guidance on health, safety, and personal protective equipment (PPE);

◆ biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and

◆ training and educational resources.

These documents provide the foundation for coordinated National, regional, State, Tribal, and local activities in an emergency situation. They also serve as a practical guide and compliment non-Federal preparedness activities.

Appendix A provides more information on FAD PReP and associated materials. All documents are cleared by APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) and posted on the FAD PReP website: www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep. This website also offers critical policy updates relating to ongoing or recent FAD outbreaks.

Chapter 2
USDA APHIS Authorities
and FAD Emergency Funding

2.1 USDA APHIS Authorities for Foreign Animal and Emerging Diseases

The Code of Laws of the United States of America (U.S.C.) are the general and permanent Federal statutes of the United States, which are passed by Congress and signed by the President. The *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR) are the regulations that spell out in further detail how the executive branch agencies interpret the U.S.C.

The two authorities (U.S.C. and CFR) represent different stages in the legislative and regulatory process. The U.S.C. provides the general and permanent basis from which the executive branch agencies can develop detailed CFR regulations.

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the USDA develops detailed regulations in the CFR through a rulemaking process where the public is allowed to comment. The different stages of CFR rulemaking include proposed rules, final rules, and, if needed, interim rules. In the event of an outbreak or detection of an animal disease, interim rules and/or Federal Orders may be issued with immediate regulations to prevent the spread of disease.

Within USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture delegates authority for development of regulations to the Under Secretary of Marketing and Regulatory Programs, who then delegates authority to the Administrator of APHIS. The Administrator of APHIS delegates authority to the APHIS Associate Administrator and Deputy Administrators.

2.1.1 FAD, Emerging Diseases, and Wildlife

As defined in *Veterinary Services (VS) Guidance Document 12001.4: Policy for the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging. Disease Incidents (FAD/EDI)* (available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep), APHIS defines an FAD as a terrestrial animal disease or pest, or an aquatic animal disease or pest, not known to exist in the United States or its territories. An emerging animal disease may be defined as any terrestrial animal, aquatic animal, or zoonotic disease not yet known or characterized, or any known or characterized terrestrial animal or aquatic animal disease in the United States or its territories that changes or mutates in pathogenicity, communicability, or zoonotic potential to become a

threat to terrestrial animals, aquatic animals, or humans. An FAD or emerging animal disease may involve livestock, poultry, other animals, or wildlife.

In July 2014, APHIS published the *VS Proposed Framework for Response to Emerging Animal Diseases in the United States*. In July 2017, APHIS released the *Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan*. This document complements the National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD), which proposes a single, standardized list of reportable animal diseases and who will be responsible for reporting. In 2020, VS received public comments on the initial NLRAD Rule and began the process of developing answers to those comments—final review and publication pending. It is likely this list will be published in a proposed rule, establishing part 57 in Title 9 of the CFR. More information on these documents are available here: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/monitoring-and-surveillance/nlrad/ct_national_list_reportable_animal_diseases.

In the event that an FAD or emerging animal disease detection or outbreak in domestic livestock involves wildlife, USDA APHIS works in collaboration, communication, and coordination with State, Tribal, and Federal wildlife agencies that have primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife.

2.1.2   The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq.

APHIS (through the Secretary of Agriculture) receives its permanent and general regulatory authority from the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.

The AHPA enables the Secretary of Agriculture to prevent, detect, control, and eradicate diseases and pests of animals, including foreign animal and emerging diseases, in order to protect animal health, the health and welfare of people, economic interests of livestock and related industries, the environment, and interstate and foreign commerce in animals and other articles. The term "animal" means any member of the animal kingdom (except a human), 7 U.S.C. 8301-8302.

The AHPA provides a broad range of authorities to use in the event of animal disease outbreaks in the United States and to prevent the introduction of FADs or emerging animal diseases into the United States. The Secretary is specifically authorized to carry out operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of livestock, which includes poultry, 7 U.S.C. 8308, and to promulgate regulations and issue orders to carry out the AHPA (see 7 U.S.C. 8315). It authorizes related activities respecting exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles for movement into the United States.

To address the increasing risks of disease introduction, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary to establish the National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program (NADPRP). (see 7 U.S.C. 8308), a program established in 2018 and supported by Farm Bill Section 12101, Animal Disease Prevention and Management Program. Through this program, the Secretary is authorized to fund animal disease prevention and preparedness projects with State, industry, university partners and tribal stakeholders.

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. 231, transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or restrictions imposed by USDA.

2.1.2.1 RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORT, EXPORT, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to prohibit or restrict the importation or entry into the United States or interstate movement of any animal, article, or means of conveyance, or use of any means of conveyance or facility, if the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303 and 8305). Livestock is defined as "all farm raised animals" (7 U.S.C. 8302). The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations requiring that any animal imported or entered be quarantined under supervision of the Secretary for the purpose of determining whether the animal is or may be affected by any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303(b)(2)).

2.1.2.2 REMEDIAL MEASURES

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to order the destruction or removal from the United States of

- ◆ any animal, article, or means of conveyance that has been imported but has not entered the United States, if necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock;

- ◆ any animal or progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance that has been imported or entered in violation of the AHPA; or

- ◆ any animal that has strayed into the United States, if necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(1)).

If an owner fails to comply with an order of the Secretary, the Secretary may take remedial action, destroy, or remove from the United States the animal, progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance and may recover from the owner the

costs of any care, handling, disposal, or other action incurred by the Secretary in connection with the action (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(2)(B)). The AHPA authorizes similar actions with respect to exports (7 U.S.C. 8304).

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to hold, seize, quarantine, treat, destroy, dispose, or take other remedial action with respect to any animal or progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance that

- ◆ is moving or has been moved interstate or has been imported and entered and the Secretary has reason to believe may carry, may have carried, or may have been affected with or exposed to any pest or disease of livestock at the time of the movement or that is otherwise in violation of the AHPA;

- ◆ is moving, is being handled, has moved, or has been handled in interstate commerce in violation of the AHPA;

- ◆ has been imported and is moving or being handled, or has moved or been handled, in violation of the AHPA; or

- ◆ the Secretary finds it is not being maintained, or has not been maintained, in accordance with any post-importation quarantine, post-importation condition, post-movement quarantine, or post-movement condition (7 U.S.C. 8306(a)).

2.1.2.3 DISINFECTION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to require the disinfection of (1) articles or any means of conveyance used in connection with the importation of an animal and (2) an individual involved in the importation of an animal and personal articles of the individual (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(2)(A)). The AHPA authorizes similar actions with respect to exports (7 U.S.C. 8304).

2.1.2.4 EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY

If measures taken by a State or Tribal Nation to control or eradicate a pest or disease of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture—after notice to and review and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials—to declare that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the United States of a pest or disease of livestock and because the presence of the pest or disease threatens the livestock of the United States (7 U.S.C. 8306). If an extraordinary emergency is declared and it is necessary to prevent the dissemination of the pest or disease of livestock, the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to

- ◆ hold, seize, treat, apply other remedial actions to, destroy (including preventively slaughter), or otherwise dispose of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance; and

◆ prohibit or restrict the movement or use within a State, or any portion of a State, of any animal or article, means of conveyance, or facility.

Upon a declaration of extraordinary emergency, the Secretary of Agriculture may, in writing, order the owner of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance to maintain in quarantine, dispose of, or take other remedial action with respect to the animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance. If the owner fails to comply with such an order, the Secretary may take similar action and recover from the owner the costs of such action (7 U.S.C. 8306(c)).

2.1.2.5 72-HOUR NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL

Depending upon the livestock or poultry disease, USDA may need to implement a National Movement Standstill. Upon a declaration of an extraordinary emergency, the Secretary of Agriculture may simultaneously issue a 72-hour National Movement Standstill via a Federal Register Order or similar regulatory mechanism prohibiting interstate and intrastate movement for susceptible animal species; other items may also be included in a National Movement Standstill dependent upon each disease response plan. This 72-hour Standstill allows USDA, States, and the private sector the opportunity to evaluate the extent of the outbreak, implement control measures, and widely communicate to stakeholders..

The 72-hour Standstill ensures that livestock are managed under a consistent framework and allow responders to begin the following activities:

♦ Communicate outbreak and immediate actions needed;

♦ Establish initial Control Areas;

♦ Communicate location of initial Control Areas;

♦ Communicate where movement controls and permits are required when the standstill ends;

♦ Conduct initial high priority contact tracing from infected premises;

♦ Increase biosecurity and passive surveillance nationally;

♦ Increase active surveillance nationally with available capabilities;

♦ Halt international trade of impacted products as necessary.

For a period of 72 hours, the Federal Order (or similar regulatory mechanism) requires the following:

♦ A complete stop to interstate/intrastate movement of susceptible animal species across the contiguous United States (other items may also be included depending on the disease response plan);

♦ All susceptible animal species already en route via intrastate and/or interstate commerce at the start of the movement standstill must reach a destination and not be stopped on the road;

- ♦ All susceptible animal species in transport to Canada will not be permitted to cross the border and are to return to the point of origin.
- ♦ FSIS-inspected meat or other animal products already in interstate commerce will not be affected; and,
- ♦ Any producers or transporters who disregard the order may be subject to civil penalties and held to additional requirements placed on their premises by State or Federal animal health officials.

During the 72-hour period, the USDA will collaborate with States and industry on identification of Control Areas, which will subsequently require permits for any movements, and on plans for resumption of movement in the Free Area. USDA will also collaborate with States to identify critical low risk movements necessary to respond to animal welfare concerns. Prior to the end of the 72-hour period, USDA will confirm the end or extension of the standstill order and provide notification through the State animal health officials and on the APHIS website.

2.1.2.6 COMPENSATION

The AHPA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to compensate the owner, based on the fair market value, of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance that the Secretary requires to be destroyed, *unless* the animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance destroyed meets certain conditions set forth in 7 U.S.C. 8306(d)(3).

2.1.2.7 INSPECTION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to stop and inspect, without a warrant, any person or means of conveyance moving

- ◆ into the United States, to determine whether the person or means of conveyance is carrying any animal or article regulated under the AHPA;

- ◆ in interstate commerce, on probable cause to believe that the person or means of conveyance is carrying any animal or article regulated under the AHPA; or

- ◆ in intrastate commerce from any State, or any portion of any State, quarantined under a declaration of extraordinary emergency, on probable cause to believe that the person or means of conveyance is carrying any quarantined animal or article (7 U.S.C. 8307).

2.1.2.8 WARRANTS

The Secretary of Agriculture may obtain a warrant and enter, with a warrant, any premises in the United States for the purpose of making inspections and seizures under the AHPA (7 U.S.C. 8307(c)).

2.1.2.9 VETERINARY ACCREDITATION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a veterinary accreditation program, including the establishment of standards of conduct for accredited veterinarians. The Secretary is authorized, after notice and opportunity for a hearing on the record, to suspend or revoke accreditation of any veterinarian who violates the AHPA or the regulations (7 U.S.C. 8309).

2.1.2.10 COOPERATION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate with other Federal agencies, States or political subdivision of States, national or local governments of foreign countries, domestic or international organizations, domestic or international associations, Indian Tribes, and other persons to prevent, detect, or control animal diseases (7 U.S.C. 8310).

2.1.2.11 PAYMENT OF OVERTIME

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to pay overtime for an employee performing services under the act related to imports and exports (7 U.S.C. 8311(c)).

2.1.2.12 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES

The AHPA authorizes civil penalties for violations of the AHPA and criminal penalties for those who knowingly violate it (7 U.S.C. 8313). The Secretary may also request the Department of Justice (DOJ) to initiate an injunction action (7 U.S.C. 8314).

2.1.2.13 INVESTIGATIONS AND SUBPOENAS

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to gather and compile information and conduct any inspection or investigation that is necessary for the administration of the AHPA. It authorizes the Secretary to issue administrative subpoenas to compel the attendance and testimony of any witness and the production of any documents relating to the administration or enforcement of the AHPA or any matter under investigation under the AHPA (7 U.S.C. 8314).

2.1.2.14 EMERGENCY TRANSFER OF FUNDS

In connection with an emergency, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to transfer from other appropriations or funds available to the agencies or corporations of the USDA such funds that the Secretary deems necessary for the arrest, control, eradication, or prevention of the spread of a pest or disease of livestock that threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States and for related expenses (7 U.S.C. 8316).

2.2 USDA APHIS EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR FAD

Additional funding may be made available for an FAD emergency response. The Secretary of Agriculture *may* also declare an agricultural emergency or an extraordinary emergency when additional Federal assistance is needed to protect U.S. agriculture. However, in the 2014–2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak, the Secretary of Agriculture requested over $900 million in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds without any type of emergency declaration.

There are three typical sources of funds for FAD response: contingency fund (CF), CCC, and supplemental appropriations from Congress. Funding requests start with the VS Executive Team (VSET), and work their way up through the APHIS Administrator and APHIS Management Team (AMT). CCC requests also go to the level of the Department of Agriculture. The type of request and amount of the request dictate who must review and approve the request, and what is required. In general, if the VS request is for less than $1 million, it is a CF request. For requests greater than $1 million, it is usually a CCC request. VS may be required to supply performance management measures for either type of funding request. CF funds may be available more quickly than CCC funding, because CCC funding also requires Office of Management and Budget approval. Depending on the outbreak, supplemental appropriations may also be requested from Congress for large response efforts.

2.3 TRIGGERING EVENTS FOR USDA APHIS EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR FADS

To transfer funds from appropriations or funds available to other agencies or corporations of USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture must find that an emergency exists under which a pest or disease of livestock threatens any segment of the agricultural production of the United States. However under the AHPA, the USDA may also support a State incident response in the absence of an emergency declaration (7 U.S.C. 8306); for example, $44.9 million was requested in CCC funding during the 2018-2020 virulent Newcastle disease outbreak in California..

To take actions specified under 7 U.S.C. 8306, the Secretary of Agriculture must decide that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or disease of livestock and that the pest or disease of livestock threatens livestock in the United States. The Secretary may take action in a State under this section only upon finding, after review and consultation with the Governor or other appropriate official of the State affected, that the measures being taken by the State are inadequate to control or eradicate the pest or disease.

In the event of a highly contagious FAD incident or outbreak, APHIS responds rapidly in field operations, logistical operations (including the National Veterinary Stockpile), and planning functions before the emergency funding processes are completed. Immediate action is required to control and contain FAD outbreaks.

2.3.1 Limitations on Preventive or Preparatory Measures Created by Triggering Event

Before taking action in a State under 7 U.S.C. 8306, the Secretary of Agriculture must notify the Governor or an appropriate animal health official of the State, issue a public announcement of the proposed action, and publish a statement in the *Federal Register* (can be published as soon as possible if prior publication is not possible). However, States can request USDA assistance immediately upon notification of an FAD. Typically, such a request leads to Unified State-Federal management of the incident.

2.3.2 Coordination

APHIS closely coordinates with other Federal agencies and State and Tribal governments.

NOTE: See section 321(a) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1961(a)), which allows emergency loans resulting from a quarantine imposed by the Secretary under the Plant Protection Act or animal quarantine laws.

2.4 ADDITIONAL USDA APHIS AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FAD

Additional APHIS authorities come from the CFR, [Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9](#) (HSPD-9), and the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, all of which are discussed in this section.

2.4.1 Code of Federal Regulations

Below are several of the regulations to safeguard public health, animal health, animal products, interstate commerce, and international trade.

2.4.1.1 [TITLE 7 OF THE CFR](#)

Title 7 of the CFR provides regulations for the delegations of authority for the Secretary of Agriculture, Under Secretary for Agriculture, and the APHIS Administrator (7 CFR Parts 1, 2, 15, 15f, and 371).

2.4.1.2 Title 9 of the CFR

2.4.1.2.1 Secretary of Agriculture to Issue Rule Governing Quarantine and Interstate Movement of Diseased Animals, Including Poultry (9 CFR 71.2)

> When the Secretary of Agriculture shall determine the fact that poultry or other animals in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia are affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease of livestock or poultry for which, in his opinion, a quarantine should be established or that other basis for a quarantine exists, notice will be given of that fact, and a rule will be issued accordingly, placing in quarantine such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or specified portion thereof. This rule will either absolutely forbid the interstate movement of the quarantined animals from the quarantined area or will indicate the regulations under which interstate movements may be made.

2.4.1.2.2 Interstate Movement of Diseased Animals and Poultry Generally Prohibited (9 CFR 71.3)

Title 9 of the CFR provides detailed USDA APHIS administrative regulations for the control and eradication of animal diseases, including FADs and emerging animal diseases. For example, animals or poultry affected with any of the following diseases, or any other communicable foreign disease not known to exist in the United States, shall not be moved interstate, which is defined as from one State into or through any other State (9 CFR 71.3 (b)):

- ◆ African swine fever
- ◆ Classical swine fever (hog cholera)
- ◆ Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
- ◆ Contagious equine metritis
- ◆ Dourine
- ◆ Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
- ◆ Glanders
- ◆ HPAI (European fowl pest)
- ◆ Rinderpest
- ◆ Scabies—sheep
- ◆ Teschen disease

◆ Screwworms

◆ Vesicular exanthema.

Please see Section 2.4.1.2.4 for the requirements and standards for accredited veterinarians.

2.4.1.2.3 Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Pleuropneumonia, Rinderpest, and Certain Other Communicable Diseases of Livestock or Poultry (9 CFR 53)

This CFR covers the following:

◆ determination of the existence of disease;

◆ agreements with States;

◆ appraisals of animals or materials;

◆ destruction of animals;

◆ disinfection or destruction of materials;

◆ disinfection of animals;

◆ disinfection of premises, conveyances, and materials;

◆ presentation of claims;

◆ mortgage against animals or materials; and

◆ claims not allowed.

2.4.1.2.4 Requirements and Standards for Accredited Veterinarians and Suspension or Revocation of Such Accreditation (9 CFR 161.4, 9 CFR 161.6)

An accredited veterinarian shall immediately report to the Veterinarian-in-Charge and the State Animal Health Official all diagnosed or suspected cases of a communicable animal disease for which APHIS has a control or eradication program in 9 CFR Chapter I, and all diagnosed or suspected cases of any animal disease not known to exist in the United States as provided by §71.3(b) of this chapter.

The Administrator is authorized to suspend for a given period of time, or to revoke, the accreditation of a veterinarian when he or she determines that the accredited veterinarian has not complied with the "Standards for Accredited Veterinarian Duties", set forth in §161.4 of this part or with any of the other regulations in this subchapter, or is otherwise found to be unfit to be accredited.

2.4.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9

HSPD-9 establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 states the Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), shall work with State and local governments and the private sector to develop a veterinary stockpile. In the event of a threat, USDA works closely with CDC to protect the United States agriculture and food system against human health risk and economic impacts.

The National Veterinary Stockpile is to contain sufficient amounts of animal vaccine and antiviral or therapeutic products

◆ for responders to respond appropriately to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the economy and

◆ that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak.

Not all FADs have vaccines or enough vaccines in the stockpile. For example, the most used FMD vaccine is inactivated or killed. Manufacturing it requires a live virus; however, per 21 CFR Part 133a, no live FMDV may be introduced for any purpose into any part of the mainland of the United States by commercial manufacturers or Federal entities. Therefore, conventional inactivated vaccine must be manufactured abroad then shipped to the United States for use. This production cycle takes 14 weeks to complete.

In the event FMD is introduced to the United States, the vaccine would likely be requested by USDA APHIS after confirmatory testing, approximately 24-48 hours after sample submission. It would not be received until 10-14 days post order (which is beyond the 24 hours indicated in the directive).

2.4.3 The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002

The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 and the Federal implementing regulations under "Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins" (7 CFR Part 331 and 9 CFR Part 121) mandate that the United States prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies that could threaten public health and safety or American agriculture. The act requires that individuals possessing, using, or transferring agents or toxins that are deemed a severe threat to public, animal, or plant health, or to animal or plant products, notify either the Secretary of HHS or the Secretary of USDA. 9 CFR Parts 121.3 and 121.4 list the VS select agents and toxins and the overlap select agents and toxins, respectively. 9 CFR 121 provides further detail on the safeguarding and restrictions for the possession, use, and transfer, of select agents.

Chapter 3
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

3.1 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS—OVERVIEW

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments and agencies involved in responding to a domestic incident of an FAD, promotes an effective and coordinated emergency response. The information below provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the Federal departments and agencies that may be involved in an FAD response; these roles and responsibilities are consistent with those outlined in the National Response Framework (NRF).

The NRF is one of the five National Planning Frameworks in the National Preparedness System. The NRF presents a whole community approach to guide the Nation during a disaster of any type, including FAD incidents. The NRF specifies that all incidents begin and end locally. Effective response, coordination, and communication in an incident requires a whole community approach; this includes emergency management practitioners, community leaders, and government officials from local to Federal who must collaboratively determine how to respond to any incident.[1] A response to an FAD incident is based on the concepts and principles in both the NRF and NIMS, which is the key foundation to the National Preparedness System.

During the course of an FAD outbreak response, the USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support (FFS) from other Federal departments and agencies; FFS may not necessarily be requested in an FAD incident. FFS refers to the circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another policy mechanism. This support is coordinated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as specified in the NRF, and leverages the multiagency coordination (MAC) structures for communication and implementation. Federal agencies can request and provide FFS by executing interagency or intra-agency reimbursable agreements, in accordance with the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) or other applicable authorities. Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures.

During the course of an FAD outbreak response, under specific conditions, the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS may assume the lead for the coordination of Federal *resources* utilized in response to or recovery from an

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[1] FEMA. (2019). NRF. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework.

incident. USDA maintains the lead for overall incident management. These conditions are as follows:

- The Secretary of Agriculture requests assistance from DHS.

- The President directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to assume responsibility for managing the incident.[2]

- More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in the incident response.

3.2 EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

Part of the NRF's approach is to define the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that provide the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for incidents of National significance. The ESF structure assigns responsibilities and authority, and includes the mechanisms used to provide Federal support to States and FFS for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act[3] and for non-Stafford Act incidents. The National Response Coordination Center, a component of the National Operations Center (NOC), develops and issues operation orders to activate individual ESFs on the basis of the scope and magnitude of the threat or incident.

The ESFs, as categorized in the NRF, are displayed in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. Primary Responsibilities of Each Emergency Support Function	
ESF	Scope
ESF #1– Transportation	Transportation modes management and control
	Transportation safety
	Stabilization and reestablishment of transportation infrastructure
	Movement restrictions
	Damage and impact assessment

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[2] U.S. Government Publishing Office. 2003. *Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5—Management of Domestic Incidents.* Retrieved from GPO website http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book1/pdf/PPP-2003-book1-doc-pg229.pdf.

[3] A Stafford Act declaration is highly unlikely in an FAD outbreak; in 2014–2015, a State requested a Stafford Act declaration for HPAI—the largest animal health incident in U.S. history—and it was rejected.

ESF #2– Communications	Coordination with telecommunications and information technology (IT) industries
	Coordination of the reestablishment and provision of critical communications infrastructure
	Protection, reestablishment, and sustainment of national cyber and IT resources
	Oversight of communications within the Federal response structures
	Facilitation of the stabilization of systems and applications from cyber events
ESF #3–Public Works and Engineering	Infrastructure protection and emergency repair
	Critical infrastructure reestablishment
	Engineering services and construction management
	Emergency contracting support for life-saving and life-sustaining services
ESF #4–Firefighting	Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations
ESF #5–Information and Planning	Incident action planning
	Information collection, analysis, and dissemination
ESF #6–Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services	Mass care
	Emergency assistance
	Temporary housing
	Human services
ESF #7–Logistics	Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability
	Resource support (e.g., facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services)
ESF #8–Public Health and Medical Services	Public health
	Medical surge support including patient movement
	Behavioral health services
	Mass fatality management
	Veterinary, medical, and public health services
ESF #9–Search and Rescue	Structural collapse (urban) search and rescue
	Maritime/coastal/waterborne search and rescue
	Land search and rescue
ESF #10–Oil and Hazardous Materials	Environmental assessment of the nature and extent of oil and hazardous materials contamination
	Environmental decontamination and cleanup, including buildings/structures and management of contaminated waste

ESF #11–Agriculture and Natural Resources	Nutrition assistance
	Animal and agricultural health issue response
	Technical expertise, coordination, and support of animal and agricultural emergency management
	Meat, poultry, and processed egg products safety and defense
	Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection
ESF #12–Energy	Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and reestablishment
	Energy industry utilities coordination
	Energy forecast
ESF #13–Public Safety and Security	Facility and resource security
	Security planning and technical resource assistance
	Public safety and security support
	Support to access, traffic, and crowd control
ESF #14–Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure	Assessment, analysis, and situational awareness of cross-sector challenges
	Facilitates operational coordination with critical infrastructure sectors
ESF #15–External Affairs and SOPs	Public affairs and the Joint Information Center (JIC)
	Intergovernmental (local, State, Tribal, and territorial) affairs
	Congressional affairs

ESF designates agencies and departments as either "coordinator," "primary agency," or "support agency." An ESF coordinator is an entity with management oversight for that particular ESF. An ESF primary agency is a Federal agency with significant authorities, roles, resources, or capabilities for a particular function. A single ESF may have multiple primary agencies. An ESF support agency is an agency with specific capabilities or resources that support the primary agency or agencies.

Agency roles are available in the NRF ESF Annexes based on broad agency designation, Federal or non-Federal, and their sub agencies if indicated by the ESF. Further descriptions are available in the individual ESF annexes: https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response#support

3.3 FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FAD PREPAREDNESS, AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS FOR FAD RESPONSE

A macro-level overview of agency responsibilities in the event of an FAD outbreak is provided throughout the remainder of this chapter.

3.3.1 USDA Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

USDA is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) (primary and coordination roles) for incident management during an FAD incident affecting domestic livestock or poultry. As such, USDA does the following:

- Coordinates with State Animal Health Officials (SAHOs) and Incident Management Teams, manages incident response, manages public messages, and takes measures to control and eradicate the disease.

  - Some measures used to control and eradicate an FAD include quarantine and movement control, epidemiological investigation, appraisal and compensation, depopulation of affected animals, carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, disease surveillance, diagnostics, and, potentially, emergency vaccination.

- Acts as the primary interface between Federal, State, Tribal, and local partners; provides interagency coordination necessary to respond to and control an animal disease event.

- Acts as the primary Federal liaison to the animal industry.

- Provides on-scene support and response capability in collaboration with State, Tribal, and industry partners.

- Maintains surveillance for animal health anomalies that may indicate the presence of foreign or emerging animal diseases.

- In close cooperation with SAHOs, assigns FAD Diagnosticians to investigate possible cases of foreign or emerging animal diseases.

- Operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, the national reference laboratories for many FADs, which are WOAH Reference Laboratories for identifying and confirming FADs.

- After diagnosis of a disease, circulates warning notices to appropriate Federal and State officials in order to facilitate a more timely and efficient response.

- Assesses, with HHS, whether animals and animal product processors, distributors, and importers in the affected area are able to provide safe and secure food and feed.

- Works to identify and mitigate transmission risks in FAD outbreaks with zoonotic potential; coordinates with the HHS on zoonotic disease issues.

- Works to prevent the introduction and transmission of disease from domestic animals to wildlife.

- Administers a National Wildlife Disease Surveillance and Emergency Response System that is responsible for conducting coordinated disease surveillance on the wildlife diseases it manages and responding to a variety of emergencies, including natural disasters and animal disease outbreaks.

- Evaluates and modifies, if necessary, regulations regarding inspection and quarantine of animals and animal products at ports of entry (AHPA, 7 *U.S.C.* 8301).

- Maintains the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance database that documents imports of animal products, allowing for more targeted inspections at ports of entry and tracing the disposition of products.

- Requires quarantine and diagnostic testing of imported animals. For example, quarantine is required for birds imported from Canada and returning pet birds of U.S. origin; prohibits the importation of live birds and bird products from countries or regions affected by HPAI, with the exception of returning U.S. origin pet birds, which must go through USDA quarantine and avian influenza (AI) testing.

- Gathers intelligence for emerging issues, including electronic scanning of current open-source information and text mining. Information gleaned from these processes may, upon filtering and analysis, indicate the emergence and/or spread of animal diseases in the United States or abroad. Potential and confirmed disease outbreaks identified via electronic scanning are verified, tracked, and prioritized for further action, including follow-up, assessment, analysis, and communications.

- Conducts pathway analyses and risk assessment methodologies, focusing on predicting the likelihood of movement of known diseases to new locations.

- USDA and its sub agencies perform the primary and coordination roles in ESF #4 and #11 and support roles in ESFs #1–12, and 14.

3.3.2   USDA Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

USDA APHIS is the LFA (primary and coordination roles) with responsibility and authority for animal disease control and coordinates Federal, State, Tribal, and local eradication efforts. Accordingly, USDA APHIS planning assumptions include the following:

◆ USDA is responsible for coordinating the response to livestock or poultry diseases and can request support as necessary from other Federal agencies under its own authorities to control a livestock or poultry disease. In situations where a declaration of emergency or major disaster[4] is issued by the President, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests DHS lead coordination, then the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS can lead the coordination of Federal resources. USDA maintains the lead of overall incident management.

◆ An FAD outbreak in the United States has international trade ramifications; it is automatically a primary Federal responsibility of the USDA and is handled in cooperation with State, Tribal, and local governments.

◆ For an animal health event in the United States, USDA determines the timing and content of all public message releases, press releases, and fact sheets related to the event, except for the occurrence of human cases, for which human health authorities have the lead on communications.

◆ USDA determines at what point to stand up a JIC to manage communication and messaging; it may include representatives from other federal agencies or industry, depending on the scope of the incident.

◆ The Secretary of Agriculture may declare an emergency or extraordinary emergency as appropriate to the FAD agent and scale of outbreak; for HPAI and FMD, the planning assumption is that the Secretary of Agriculture can declare an emergency or extraordinary emergency.

◆ Funding is requested to indemnify livestock and poultry owners, as necessary and to the extent possible given funding limitations, and cover additional outbreak response costs for USDA; depending on the size of the request, the CCC or APHIS CF are typical sources of funding for FAD response.

◆ As part of the initial response to an outbreak, as the situation requires, USDA, State, and/or Tribal authorities immediately quarantine the relevant regions or zones, restrict specific movements, depopulate affected

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[4] More information on the emergency disaster designation and declaration process is available at https://www.fema.gov/disaster-declaration-process.

animals as determined necessary, dispose of carcasses, disinfect property, and increase surveillance in the area to ensure that the FAD has not spread.

◆ USDA works with State and/or Tribal authorities, as the situation requires, to lift the quarantine when the region or zone is free of the FAD agent.

◆ USDA, in collaboration with HHS and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), conveys messages regarding the safety of the food and feed supply.

◆ Other agencies may be available for supporting activities as requested by USDA under the Economy Act or other mechanisms; because of the specific expertise required to effectively respond to FAD incidents, support from other agencies may be for activities like communication or security and should not be assumed.

◆ USDA coordinates with the EPA and follows relevant regulations in determining and conducting the most appropriate method of carcass disposal and cleaning and disinfection activities.

◆ U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) performs enhanced surveillance in the wild animals it tracks, when needed, after the detection of the disease agent in the domestic animal population; USDA collaborates with DOI and State and local agencies in enhanced wild animal surveillance as appropriate.

3.3.3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DHS roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

◆ Inspects people and cargo (including animals and animal products) at ports of entry per appropriate regulations. Implements any changes to regulations at ports of entry when determined necessary by a regulatory agency (e.g., USDA, DOI, HHS).

◆ Enforces the quarantine of people arriving at ports of entry, as ordered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

◆ Acquires, integrates, and reports interagency biosurveillance information to the National Biosurveillance Integration System to facilitate interagency biosurveillance situational awareness and to facilitate response activities.

◆ Monitors the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources on an ongoing basis and provides a coordinating vehicle to share

information/create sharing entities (e.g., National Infrastructure Coordinating Center [NICC]).

◆ In the event of a request from an agency with primary jurisdiction, uses the ESFs as the mechanism for coordinating required support from other agencies. May designate a Federal Resource Coordinator to perform this resource coordination function (rather than a Federal Coordinating Officer as under a Stafford Act declaration).

◆ In the event of a request from an agency with primary jurisdiction, establishes and manages a common operating picture through the NOC, which establishes and maintains real-time communications links to other Federal Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at the National level, as well as appropriate State, Tribal, local, regional, and non-governmental EOCs and relevant elements of the private sector.

◆ May establish a National JIC to review public messages.

◆ When deemed necessary, activates structures within the NRF that are necessary for FFS.

◆ Provides logistics support, as appropriate or requested.

◆ DHS (including FEMA, and U.S. Coast Guard [USCG]) performs the primary role in ESFs #2, #5–7, #9, #10, and #15; coordination roles in ESFs #2, #4–7, #9, and #15; and plays support roles in all other ESFs.

3.3.4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The DHS planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

◆ If the President of the United States declares a Federal disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests that the Secretary of Homeland Security, then

➤ DHS becomes responsible for the coordination of Federal resources.

➤ DHS has a significantly greater role in the response.

➤ The Secretary of Homeland Security implements some or all of the applicable broad coordinating structures and processes contained within the NRF as required by the incident.

➤ USDA maintains lead of overall incident management in an FAD response.

◆ Without a Presidential declaration of disaster, USDA may request assistance from DHS through FFS. Pursuant to paragraph 16 of HSPD-5, the NRF shall be used as the overarching framework for all other Federal incident management and emergency operations plans developed under these and other authorities, as well as memoranda of understanding among various Federal agencies. These incident management and emergency operations plans shall be considered as either integrated components of the NRF or as supporting operational plans or annexes, as appropriate.

◆ The Secretary of Homeland Security can also provide assistance by activating specific NRF structures and elements (e.g., ESFs), without overall coordination, upon request.

◆ All sectors are required to maintain essential and critical services.

3.3.5 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The HHS roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

◆ Serves as the LFA (primary and coordination roles) for coordinating and integrating Federal efforts to provide public health and medical assistance. For example, in the event of a zoonotic disease outbreak where the agent causes disease in humans, the CDC may conduct epidemiological investigations as necessary to assess the risk of human infection and illness among persons exposed to the disease agent, provide occupational health guidance, conduct surveillance for human infections in appropriate populations, conduct viral laboratory analyses, and engage in communication activities.

◆ Ensures, through the FDA, the safety of the food supply (except for meat, poultry, and processed egg products regulated by USDA). FDA, in collaboration with USDA, provides the food industry and the public with information and guidance on the influenza virus and the safety of the food supply.

◆ The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response develops policy on pandemic preparedness, deploys staff in emergency situations, and supervises the deployment of medical countermeasures.

◆ Formulates recommendations and guidance on using antiviral prophylaxis for personnel involved in responding to the outbreak and works with USDA and the Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on PPE.

◆ Provides guidance to State, Tribal, and local public health agencies regarding diagnosing and managing potential human infections caused by zoonotic diseases.

◆ Performs epidemiological investigations of human cases and case clusters.

◆ Operates quarantine stations for international travelers arriving at designated U.S. ports of entry.

◆ Performs outreach to HHS stakeholders—especially National/State/Tribal/ local healthcare partners, health authorities in other countries, the World Health Organization, and business groups.

◆ Provides technical assistance to, and collaborates with, the HHS/FDA-regulated food and animal health industries regarding zoonotic disease preparedness.

◆ Conducts research to investigate the presence and survival of specific disease agents in certain foods, like AI.

◆ Conveys messages to consumers regarding the safety of foods regulated by HHS/FDA.

◆ Assists in communicating actions the government is taking and releases information to the public through various media outlets.

◆ Expands U.S. border disease surveillance activities, including Canada and Mexico.

◆ Performs the primary and coordination role in ESF #8, and plays support roles in ESFs #3, #5–#7, #9–11, and #15.

3.3.6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The HHS planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

◆ HHS leads the assessment of human health risk for animal diseases with zoonotic potential.

◆ HHS/FDA leads matters concerning FDA-regulated food and feed products and the regulated food, feed, and animal health industries.

◆ HHS works to ensure that sensitive and comprehensive laboratory, epidemiologic, and clinical systems are in place to reliably detect and monitor the occurrence of diseases with zoonotic potential.

3.3.7   U.S. Department of Interior Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DOI roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

◆ Manages and protects certain wildlife under various laws and treaties, and protects public health on an estimated 600 million acres of Federal land across the country. Coordinates the Federal government's surveillance of wild migratory birds for diseases of concern, including HPAI; coordinates Federal surveillance with related surveillance activities of State fish and wildlife agencies, and provides leadership and support in the area of wildlife disease research and diagnostics to Federal and State natural resource agencies.

◆ The National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC) of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) works with department bureaus, as well as State, Tribal, and other Federal entities, on wildlife disease investigations, providing the best available science and technical support for issues related to wildlife health and disease. NWHC is an WOAH Collaborating Center for Research and Diagnosis of Emerging and Existing Pathogens of Wildlife. NWHC includes a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) diagnostic and research laboratory that provides analytical support to the targeted surveillance of migratory birds and conducts scientific investigations of wildlife morbidity and mortality events to identify causative agents of wildlife disease. In the event of a zoonotic outbreak in the wild animals DOI manages, it works with Federal and State natural resource, animal health, and public health agencies to support timely and effective response.

◆ The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) permits the inspection of wildlife and wildlife products in trade into and out of the United States. The USFWS partners with USDA to publicize wildlife management activities, including across jurisdictional borders, and if required, utilizes its own permitting authorities to restrict the import or export of the wild animals it manages.

➤ USFWS regulates wildlife trade and trafficking, including its related enforcement expertise, and positions its wildlife inspectors and special agents to assist in detecting and detaining wildlife imports or exports that may violate bans imposed by other Federal agencies, and in intercepting smuggled animals or animals being moved illegally from State to State.

➤ As part of its import and export monitoring activities, USFWS also maintains an extensive database that documents wildlife trade transactions. These records provide a basis for identifying companies and individuals involved in importing animals or animal products and tracing the entry and disposition of specific shipments.

◆ DOI performs the primary role in ESFs #9 and #11, and plays support roles in ESFs #1–5, #7–13, and #15.

3.3.8 U.S. Department of Interior Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

DOI is the executive agent for U.S. treaty obligations under several migratory bird treaties and other authorities. DOI regulatory responsibilities associated with migratory birds remain in effect throughout all phases of an avian disease. The planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

◆ DOI is the lead agency for all wild bird surveillance, and is the primary Federal department responsible for addressing diseases of concern, including HPAI, in wild birds.

◆ If HPAI or another FAD is detected in wild free-ranging birds, DOI works with USDA to determine the timing and content of all public messages related to the incident.

◆ DOI is responsible for endangered species in the United States.

◆ DOI provides guidance to ensure that all personnel involved in response to a disease of concern in wildlife have appropriate PPE and that all proper biosafety precautions are taken for personnel handling wild animals and disease agents.

◆ DOI coordinates enhanced surveillance efforts among Federal, State, and Tribal agencies and other cooperators following a detection of an FAD. DOI cooperates with Federal, State, and Tribal agencies in response to wildlife disease events, offering full field investigations and diagnostic services.

◆ DOI supplies training as requested to State and Tribal entities in sampling strategies and techniques and works with them in communication on safely handling wildlife and disease agents, as well as information on meat consumption.

3.3.9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

EPA's roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

◆ Exercises sector-specific jurisdiction over drinking water and water treatment infrastructure.

- Determines whether local water is suitable for use; assesses wastewater and solid waste facilities; provides biosurveillance, warning, and detection.

- Provides investigation and intelligence support.

- Provides technical assistance and environmental information for assessing the public health and medical aspects of situations involving hazardous materials.

- Assists in identifying alternate water supplies for critical care facilities.

- Provides technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and support for decontamination and disposal issues, including on-site response personnel or other employees as requested.

- Approves suitable disinfectant pesticides and evaluates new requests from industry and governmental agencies regarding registration of disinfectants and questions regarding their approved uses.

- Promulgates regulations that implement environmental laws enacted by Congress, including regulations related to decontamination and disposal, and licensing the use of pesticides.

- Establishes minimum National standards for solid waste disposal that protect human health and the environment. Implementation—including permitting, monitoring, and enforcement of these standards—rests primarily with State and local governments. State and local governments implement their own programs, but must meet minimum Federal regulatory requirements. Similarly, EPA expects that decontamination is conducted by farmers and owners with assistance and guidance from local and State authorities, and other Federal departments involved, as appropriate, consistent with their traditional missions.

- EPA performs the primary and coordination role for ESF #10; and support role in ESFs #3–#5, #8, #11, #12, and #15.

3.3.10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The EPA planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- EPA plays a support role to DOI and USDA animal disease control or eradication efforts.

- EPA supports USDA in its efforts to promptly respond to an FAD outbreak.

◆ EPA supports DOI in its efforts to promptly respond to an outbreak in the wild animal populations it manages.

◆ Upon the request of USDA or DOI, EPA provides advice, including guidance on applicable environmental statutes and technical considerations, on a range of options available for the disposal of animals and the use of disinfectants to inactivate FAD agents on environmental surfaces and fomites.

◆ EPA encourages State counterparts, who have authority to implement municipal solid waste management programs, to identify potential management options in their States and resolve any issues associated with the potential use of those facilities, such as concerns raised by the industries regarding their willingness to accept animal carcasses.

3.3.11 U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DOL/OHSA roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

◆ DOL/OSHA is the coordinating agency for the NRF Worker Safety and Health Support Annex and coordinates the safety and health of workers by achieving the following:

➤ Responds to requests for assistance from Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies and the private sector that are requesting worker safety and health support.

➤ Provides pertinent occupational hazard information and guidance regarding appropriate workplace precautions to the affected employers and employees.

➤ Coordinates activities with State occupational safety and health agencies (for example, OSHA State plans and consultation programs) as they relate to potential zoonotic diseases.

➤ Provides appropriate compliance assistance to affected employers.

➤ Monitors employer compliance with precautions required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act and OSHA safety and health standards.

➤ Conducts investigations in response to employee fatalities, catastrophes, and complaints.

- OSHA may perform these functions directly or in coordination with its Federal cooperating agencies.

- Plays support roles in ESFs #3, #5–#12, #14, and #15.

3.3.12 U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The DOL/OHSA planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- DOL/OSHA supports Federal departments involved in control and eradication efforts involving animals by coordinating worker safety and health support under the NRF.

- OSHA may perform these functions directly or in coordination with its Federal cooperating agencies and State partner agencies.

- Generally, DOL/OSHA's role in Federal efforts to counteract potential zoonotic diseases is directed toward assuring the safety and health of workers.

3.3.13 U.S. Department of Justice Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- The FBI coordinates the Federal investigation of criminal activities, if bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism are suspected, through the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

- ATF may help enforce local regulation upon exhaustion of support and resources from local, State, and Tribal, law enforcement departments and agencies.

- The DOJ performs the primary and coordination role for ESF #13 and provides support roles for ESFs #1, #5, #6, #8–13, and #15.

3.3.14 U.S. Department of Justice Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

- The DOJ/FBI is the Federal agency responsible for investigating cases of bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism. If animals, livestock, or poultry are suspected targets of a terrorist attack, or if any evidence suggests an FAD

may have been or could be intentionally introduced, USDA notifies the FBI.

◆ If a terrorist act is suspected in connection with an FAD outbreak, the USDA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) notifies the Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit of the FBI. The USDA OIG, other appropriate Federal law enforcement agencies, and the FBI conduct a joint criminal investigation.

3.3.15 U.S. Department of Defense Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

◆ Serves as supporting agency to USDA for animal disease preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

◆ Outlined in the DoD-USDA Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Response to Animal Diseases, February 2016, the USDA can request services from the DoD VS under the Economy Act. This includes but is not limited to assigning a DoD Veterinary Liaison Officer, DoD VS Defense Support of Civil Authorities Coordinator, and other appropriate collaborative personnel for the purposes of coordinating Requests for Assistance, such as epidemiology, surveillance, and tracing, laboratory diagnostics, transportation and logistic support, debris removal and disposal, and decontamination and disinfection.

◆ Performs the primary agency role for ESF #9 and plays support roles for ESF #1–15.

3.3.16 U.S. Department of Defense Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

◆ In an FAD outbreak, DoD could provide a myriad of veterinary services through the Army, as executive agent for DoD VS, providing veterinary services to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, USCG, and other Federal agencies as directed. VS responsibility is delegated to the Army Surgeon General and executed by Army VS units and personnel.

◆ In a large-scale outbreak, DoD could provide an installation in the vicinity of the outbreak to serve as a Federal logistical staging area/mobilization center, public affairs and communication support, personnel for depopulation and disposal activities, and facility and/or vehicle decontamination.

- In an FAD outbreak, DoD VS units could provide increased surveillance; risk communications; food safety; training; laboratory diagnostics; field operations support that could include eradication of disease, identification of affected animals, quarantine implementation, euthanasia, carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, biosecurity, strategic vaccination and/or treatments, wildlife management, and vector control; and SME activities for DoD installations.

3.3.17 U.S. Department of State Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The Department of State roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Facilitates a coordinated response between other countries when animal and/or plant disease outbreaks represent a transboundary threat.

- Plays support roles in ESFs #1–5 and #8–15.

3.3.18 Additional Resources

More information on roles and responsibilities during an incident can be found in the following resources:

- ICS Resource Center (http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm)

- *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide.*

3.4 USDA APHIS TIERED RESPONSE TO FAD INCIDENTS

Consistent with the NRF, USDA APHIS uses a tiered response to FAD incidents. The support, resources, and coordination required to successfully respond to an FAD incident is flexible and scalable. As stated in the NRF,

> Most incidents begin and end locally and are managed and executed at the local or tribal level. Incidents require a unified response from local agencies, the private sector, tribes, and NGOs. Some may require additional support from neighboring jurisdictions or state governments. A smaller number of incidents require federal support. Incidents that occur within or along the borders of federally managed lands and state, tribal, and territorial lands require unity of effort among federal, state, tribal, or territorial governments at the local level. National response processes are structured to provide tiered

levels of support when additional resources or capabilities are needed. [5]All FAD incident response activities begin and end locally. As suggested in the NRF, organizational structures used to respond to an FAD incident—like a National Incident Management Team (NIMT), Incident Coordination Group (ICG), or MAC Group can be "partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident."[6] This ensures that the level of response is consistent and appropriate with the scale of the incident.

FAD incidents can range from small incursions—like the detection of a screwworm in an imported dog, or an equine piroplasmosis outbreak—to much larger events, like the HPAI 2014–2015 outbreak. An FMD outbreak in livestock would be a very significant FAD incident requiring rapid scale-up of organizational structures, coordination, and resources. Smaller incidents are handled by State, Tribal, and local resources; larger events require full mobilization of VS and resource and coordination from APHIS. Depending on the incident, resources or coordination may also be requested from USDA by the APHIS Administrator. USDA is the LFA in any FAD incident.

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[5] Footnote from the NRF (2019): "Certain incidents such as a pandemic or cyber event may not be limited to a specific geographic area and may be managed at the local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, or Federal level depending on the nature of the incident."

[6] FEMA. (2019). NRF. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF INCIDENT COORDINATION

4.1.1 Multiagency Coordination

MAC allows all levels and disciplines of government to work together more efficiently and effectively. MAC occurs on a regular and routine basis as personnel from different agencies interact. In an incident, as specified in NIMS, the primary function of MAC is to "coordinate activities above the field level and to prioritize the incident demands for critical or competing resources."[4] A MAC Group does not command activities in the field. In the event of an animal health incident, an APHIS MAC Group is formed if the response requires more support from APHIS. The APHIS MAC Group provides support, coordination, and assistance with policy-level decisions to the ICS structure managing an incident. In large incidents, a USDA MAC Group may also be necessary for higher level coordination and support.

For example, in the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, both a USDA MAC Group and APHIS MAC Group were formed due to the size, scope, and impact of the incident. Typically, a USDA MAC Group elevates issues to the Secretary of Agriculture; an APHIS MAC Group elevates issues to the APHIS Administrator. In a smaller incident, an APHIS MAC Group may take the lead for MAC activities, while a USDA MAC Group is not activated but may be on alert if further resources or coordination become required. The *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide* provides further information on the responsibilities of the APHIS MAC Group.

Figure 4-1 shows how these groups are structured, based on recent experiences (including the 2014–2015 HPAI outbreak) and multiagency exercises. Because every animal health incident is different, future coordination structures may vary. Additionally these structures may differ in the event the President issues a declaration of emergency, or if, as requested by the Secretary of Agriculture, DHS assumes responsibility for all resource coordination in an incident.

4.1.2 Whole Community Coordination

The "whole community" with which USDA coordinates and collaborates with in FAD incidents can be large—please see *A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0)* for additional stakeholders that may not be included in Figure 4-1. USDA off-scene incident coordination works with stakeholders in any incident, incorporating them into incident organizational structures as appropriate and ensuring a coordinated response effort.

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[4] FEMA. 2008. *NIMS Frequently Asked Questions.* Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nimsfaqs.pdf.

Figure 4-1. Off-Scene USDA APHIS Policy and Incident Coordination Structures for an FAD Incident

Note: Ops = operations, NASAHO = National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials, NASDA = National Association of State Departments of Agriculture.

4.1.3 Transition from On-Scene Multiagency Coordination to Off-Scene Multiagency Coordination

Figure 4-2 illustrates an overview of the MAC system. The figure shows that at the start of the incident, there is typically an on-scene co-Incident Commander (typically a SAHO, or designee and an APHIS VS Assistant Director, or designee) or a Unified State-Federal IC. This co-Incident Commander or Unified IC is supported by a Liaison Officer who works directly with an off-scene APHIS ICG to conduct any necessary MAC activities. At the start of an incident, this APHIS ICG may be only a handful of people.

As the incident grows and transitions, MAC activities move off-scene. The ICG, which is likely to have expanded, provides necessary MAC support for the on-scene Unified IC. When and if MAC Group(s) are activated, they assume MAC duties, as dictated by the size, scope, and requirements of the incident. MAC activities are further supported by off-scene EOC at all levels of government.

Figure 4-2. Multiagency Coordination System[5]

4.2 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

4.2.1 Overview

Figure 4-3 illustrates the APHIS incident management structure that is used in FAD incidents. It details the relationship between the APHIS Administrator, APHIS MAC Group, the APHIS ICG, and the APHIS VS NIMT in an incident. This structure has evolved and most recently was revised to incorporate lessons learned from recent HPAI outbreaks. This figure is an example; it may be modified or scaled based on the needs of any particular disease incident.

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[5] Figure adapted from: FEMA, 2008. *NIMS*. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

Figure 4-3. APHIS Incident Management Structures: Off-Scene and On-Scene

The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing APHIS policy during an FAD outbreak. The APHIS Administrator is supported by the AMT. Depending on the size and scope of the incident, the Administrator and AMT may establish an APHIS-level MAC Group, particularly for resource coordination. Many incident management functions may be delegated to the VS Deputy Administrator, who is the Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States. The VS Deputy Administrator is supported by the VSET to coordinate policy. Along with the ICG, this organizational structure handles requests for resources, coordination, and policy from the VS NIMTs operating in the field.

In addition to policy and incident coordination, the APHIS Administrator, AMT, VS Deputy Administrator, and VSET communicate, collaborate, and coordinate with relevant industry associations, the NASAHOs and NASDA, public health agencies (Federal and State), and other partners, as illustrated in Figure 4-1.

4.2.2   APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group

An APHIS MAC Group may be established to provide immediate leadership and authority for resolving issues during the emergency, particularly related to resource coordination. An APHIS MAC Group may be activated when one or more of the following conditions take place:

◆   complex incidents that overwhelm local and regional assets;

◆   incidents that require more than just VS support;

◆   overlapping USDA agency jurisdictions;

- an incident that crosses international borders; or

- the existence of or potential for a high level of National political and media interest.

The APHIS MAC Group may also formulate APHIS-level policy and develop APHIS processes for future incidents. The APHIS MAC Group does not typically direct the ICG, but instead provides strategic coordination for APHIS-wide issues and decisions. This group typically consists of senior-level representatives and may include SMEs from across APHIS. Members must have the authority to make decisions on behalf of their office or program unit; additional members can be added as needed throughout the response effort. The APHIS MAC may include the following members:

- Chair: Office of the Administrator (OA)

- VS

- Marketing and Regulatory Program Business Services

- LPA

- Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ)

- Animal Care

- Wildlife Services (WS)

- Policy and Program Development (PPD)

- APHIS Chief Information Officer

- Emergency Management and Safety and Security Division (EMSSD)

- Other representatives and SMEs as needed.

The APHIS MAC Group provides a forum to discuss actions that need to be taken to ensure that an adequate number of resources are available to meet anticipated needs. It offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate resources during an animal health incident; specific responsibilities may vary from incident to incident, but includes prioritizing, acquisitioning, and allocating resources. The APHIS MAC Group also identifies and resolves conflicting issues.

4.2.3   APHIS Incident Coordination Group

The APHIS ICG is led by an Incident Coordinator and a Deputy Incident Coordinator. In any incident, it is immediately established to oversee the functions and response activities associated with the incident. The ICG is a

flexible and scalable structure, which reflects the size and the scope of the incident. It works and communicates closely with personnel in the field, in one or more NIMTs. The ICG also coordinates with the APHIS MAC Group; if established, a USDA MAC Group may also request information or provide guidance for the APHIS ICG.

Key responsibilities performed by the APHIS ICG may include the following:

- ◆ assisting in development of response policy,

- ◆ providing guidelines to ensure responder and public health and safety,

- ◆ supporting and coordinating NIMT(s) and the Unified IC(s),

- ◆ developing protocols for response activities,

- ◆ coordinating routine communication,

- ◆ coordinating resources,

- ◆ supporting contracting activities,

- ◆ facilitating deployment of required resources,

- ◆ processing indemnity payments,

- ◆ assisting in establishing epidemiological priorities and designing investigations,

- ◆ assisting in developing incident objectives and approving response strategies for emergency vaccination as needed,

- ◆ assisting in integrating response organizations into the ICS,

- ◆ providing information for use in media and stakeholder briefings,

- ◆ providing internal and external national-level reports and maps,

- ◆ performing stakeholder coordination activities,

- ◆ providing budget requests and projections as needed, and

- ◆ assessing response progress and strategies.

Figure 4-4 illustrates an example organizational chart for an APHIS ICG. This ICG is flexible and scalable, and is likely to change based on the scope and type of the incident.

Figure 4-4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure (for an FAD Incident)

Note: GIS = geographic information system, EMRS = Emergency Management Response System, FAD PReP = Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan, NAHLN = National Animal Health Laboratory Network, 3D = depopulation, decontamination, and disposal, VERRC = Voluntary Emergency Ready Response Corps

4.3 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR A SINGLE INCIDENT

At the start of any FAD outbreak, the SAHO, or designee, and Assistant Director (AD) or designee, initially serve as the co-Incident Commanders. In some cases, the SAHO and AD may be supported by a VS District Strike Teams, or VS District Personnel, or similar organizational structure of local personnel that are prepared to support the initial response to the incident. The AD and SAHO may be relieved by an NIMT if an NIMT is requested by the State and authority is subsequently delegated. Figure 4-3 is an example of an APHIS organization chart for a single incident.

The Incident Command Post (ICP) is a physical location that administers the on-scene IC and the other main incident management functions. A MAC Group does not direct IC activities in the field and is often located some distance from the incident site(s). At times, the APHIS MAC Group and APHIS ICG may be located in the same place. An EOC is an off-scene physical location that supports the on-scene response by providing external coordination, communication pathways, and may secure additional resources. Both State and Federal EOCs may be activated. MAC Group(s) and/or the ICG often operate from an off-scene EOC: typically, the APHIS EOC is activated for ICG usage, but also holds MAC Group meetings and supports MAC functions.

4.4 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS

When more than one incident occurs at the same time, more than one IC may be established. In the event of a large and geographically widespread incident, an Area Command (AC) may also be established for coordination. An AC is an organization that oversees the management of multiple incidents handled individually by separate ICs or to oversee the management of a very large or rapidly evolving incident where multiple NIMTs are deployed simultaneously. In some cases, the ICG plays the role of an AC in an FAD incident, overseeing multiple NIMTs and ICPs and maintaining consistency and coordination across the incident. In either case, clear command and control is required. An AC does not perform MAC functions; a MAC Group or element of the ICG performs MAC for an AC.

As stated, if the emergency response becomes too large for an APHIS MAC Group to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate incident with numerous response activities—a USDA MAC Group will be established. In some incidents, other MAC Groups may be required (e.g., if the President issues a declaration of emergency). These off-scene MAC Groups coordinate additional resources and make decisions regarding the prioritization of incidents and the sharing and use of critical resources.

Figure 4-5 is an example of the command structure when multiple incidents are involved.

Figure 4-5. APHIS Incident Management Assuming Multiple Incidents and a Unified Area Command

4.5 APHIS VS National Incident Management Teams

Upon detection and confirmation of an FAD incident, the SAHO or AD establishes an ICP. If requested by the State, an APHIS VS NIMT will be deployed, headed by an Incident Commander, to lead a Unified State-Federal IC which incorporates State and Federal personnel into a single organizational structure. All or only part of an NIMT can be deployed, based on the requirements of the incident. Sometimes only key NIMT personnel are deployed if a full NIMT is not required; this is called a "Short Team." Short Teams may also be deployed when there are not sufficient personnel to have full NIMTs at every incident site.

Figure 4-6 depicts the organization of an APHIS VS NIMT Short Team for managing an incident.

Figure 4-6. Current APHIS VS National Incident Management Team—Short Team Configuration

An NIMT includes an Incident Commander, Deputy Incident Commander, and staff for communication/public information, safety, liaison activities, and situational awareness (intelligence officer); all of these positions are considered Command Staff. The Section Chiefs of the Incident Commander's line organization sections (Planning, Logistics, Operations, Finance/Administration) are considered the Incident Commander's General Staff. These four line organizations perform all of the efforts required to identify, contain, eradicate, recover, and return the situation to normal business practices. Within each of these sections is the capability to accomplish all of the tasks necessary to ensure a successful outcome to an FAD incident. Customarily, per NIMS, these line organizations include the following sections: Planning, Logistics, Operations, Finance/Administration, though additional sections may be considered.

In addition to the command and general staff (pictured in Figure 4-6), a Short Team may include limited additional personnel. Deputy Section Chiefs are often also deployed. For example, to manage situational awareness, a Situation Unit Leader may be deployed to the Planning Section. EMRS2 Specialists may be deployed if needed to support entering data into EMRS2. Other sections may decide to fill a specific Group Supervisor position (such as appraisal or disposal). The specific positions filled will depend on the size, scope, and type of the incident.

Table 4-1 lists commonly filled positions for an APHIS VS NIMT Short Team, based on the positions available in ROSS for ordering.[6] These positions in ROSS may be used to fill other positions in the NIMT organizational chart.

Table 4-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions Available in Resource Ordering and Status System

APHIS VS NIMT Short Team	ICS Position Category
Incident Commander	Command Staff
Deputy Incident Commander	Command Staff
Operations Section Chief	General Staff
Deputy Operations Section	General Staff
Planning Section Chief	General Staff
Deputy Planning Section	General Staff
Logistics Section Chief	General Staff
Deputy Logistics Section	General Staff
Finance Section Chief	General Staff
Deputy Finance Section	General Staff
Safety Officer	Command Staff
Safety Coordinator	Command Staff
Public Information Officer	Command Staff
Liaison Officer	Command Staff
Example: EMRS2 Specialist	General Staff
Example: Epidemiologist	General Staff

When an outbreak occurs that is complex or large scale, a full NIMT is likely to be deployed. The full or long team consists of additional team members beyond those in the initial Short Team configuration. Figure 4-7 shows an example long team configuration that is the current structure of the standing VS NIMTs (as of August 2016); however, the exact makeup of the long teams will depend on the type of disease and magnitude of spread: changes may be made in an outbreak.

There are currently five standing VS NIMT Teams: Red, Green, Gold, Blue, and Indigo. Table 4-2 is an expansion of Table 4-1 and lists additional positions that can be ordered for a full NIMT (all General Staff, see Table 4-1 for Command Staff). Table 4-2 is based on the positions available in ROSS for ordering.[7] These positions may not match exactly with the position titles in Figure 4-7; positions in

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[6] The positions available in ROSS for ordering may be changed in the future based on recommendations from APHIS programs; however, these positions will always be consistent with general ICS concepts.

[7] The positions available in ROSS for ordering may be changed in the future based on recommendations from APHIS programs; however, these positions will always be consistent with general ICS concepts.

ROSS may be used to fill other positions in the NIMT organizational chart. Again, Figure 4-7 is the current structure of the VS NIMTs.

Table 4-2. List of Long Team Configuration Positions Available in Resource Ordering and Status System

Section/Group or Unit (in Alphabetical Order by Section)	APHIS VS Long NIMT Configuration
See Table 4-1	For Command Staff and Section Chiefs
Operations	Branch Director
	NIMT Assistant—Operations
	Case Manager
	Site Manager
Operations/Appraisal	Group Supervisor
	Strike Team Leader
	Specialist
Operations/Biosecurity and Disease	Group Supervisor
	Task Force Leader
	Strike Team Leader
	Prevention Technician
	Security Specialist
Operations/Cleaning and Disinfection	Group Supervisor
	Task Force Leader
	Strike Team Leader
	Team Leader
	Technician
Operations/Composting	Subject Matter Expert
	Composting Technician
Operations/Diagnosis and Inspection	Group Supervisor
	Task Force Leader
	Strike Team Leader
	Technician
Operations/Disease Surveillance	Branch Director
	Epidemiologist
Operations/Disease Survey	Group Supervisor
	Task Force Leader
	Strike Team Leader
Operations/Disposal	Group Supervisor
	Strike Team Leader
	Technician
Operations/Euthanasia & Disposal	Group Supervisor
	Strike Team Leader
	Team Leader
	Team Technician

Section/Group or Unit (in Alphabetical Order by Section)	APHIS VS Long NIMT Configuration
Operations/Mortality	Group Supervisor
	Task Force Leader
	Strike Team Leader
	Technician
Operations/Vaccination	Group Supervisor
	Taskforce Leader
	Strike Team Leader
	Technician
Planning	Resource Unit Leader
	Situation Unit Leader
	NIMT Assistant—Plans
Planning/Documentation	Unit Leader
	EMRS2 Manager/Training Specialist
	EMRS2 Data Entry Specialist
	Administrative Assistant
	Computer Data Entry Recorder
Planning/Disease Reporting	Group Supervisor
	Vaccination Group Supervisor
	Risk Assessment Team Leader
	GIS Specialist
Planning/Orientation	Specialist
	Status Check-in Recorder
	Demobilization Unit Leader
Logistics	NIMT Assistant—Logistics
	IT Assistant
Logistics/Supply Unit	Leader
	Assistant
	Equipment Assistant
Logistics/Ground Support	Unit Leader
Logistics/Facilities	Unit Leader
Finance	Chief
	NIMT Assistant—Finance
	Procurement Unit Leader
	Warranted Purchase Card Holder
	Time Unit Leader
	Claims Specialist
	Cost Unit Leader
	Cooperative Agreement Specialist
	Contracting Officer Representative
	Contracting Officer Technical Representative
	Contracting Officer

Figure 4-7. Example APHIS VS National Incident Management Team—Long Team Configuration

Note: EPI = epidemiologist, PIO = Public Information Officer.

4.6 RESPONSE RESOURCES

The NIMT, ICG, and APHIS MAC Group use a number of systems to aid in staffing and resourcing during an event, such as the Emergency Qualification System (EQS) and the ROSS, which are discussed below.

4.6.1 APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide

The *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide* contains important information on staffing and resource identification. This document provides APHIS-level guidance, information, and policy for mobilizing APHIS personnel for emergency events. Additional VS documentation on ICG processes and procedures is under development.

4.6.2 APHIS Emergency Qualification System

The APHIS EQS is used to store the skills and qualifications of APHIS personnel. It tracks both training and certifications and is customizable to APHIS program needs. Training documentation flows into EQS from AgLearn for APHIS employees. If the temporary hires do not have access to AgLearn, their training documentation can be manually entered or imported through an Excel spreadsheet.

4.6.3 APHIS Resource Ordering and Status System

APHIS ROSS allows APHIS to identify, track, and mobilize the personnel resources needed to support emergency response. It provides a database of qualified emergency response personnel. The database can be searched by approved APHIS personnel according to personnel training levels and subject of expertise, such as procurement, epidemiology, or public information. Being able to quickly identify and dispatch appropriate personnel and supplies is a key component of emergency response, and ROSS facilitates that process. ROSS initiatives include the following:

- ◆ developing the *APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog,*

- ◆ integrating ROSS into APHIS emergency management practices, and

- ◆ training and sustaining an APHIS dispatch community.

Typically, multiple ROSS Dispatchers are required to respond to personnel orders in an outbreak and are part of the ICG in the Logistics Section. The Incident Commander or designee completes an Incident Request Form or a Resource Order Form and sends it to the APHIS Dispatch inbox, where a Dispatcher will respond. Information required includes location of deployment, specific dates, and length of deployment if available. Working conditions, expected hours, and any

Chapter 5
Communication Strategy

5.1 COMMUNICATION

APHIS established internal and external communication processes to ensure an effective and efficient response in controlling and eradicating an outbreak of an FAD. These processes are intended to foster transparent messages that reduce the prospects for panic or adverse public reaction and help to mitigate the economic impact of the outbreak.

Internal communication between government authorities is critical for informed and timely decisions. Integrated communication processes across all levels of the incident, and between operational and coordination units, enable a common awareness of the incident to achieve response objectives. Equipment, systems, protocols, and expertise are needed to achieve this integration. Procedures and protocols governing communication must be established well in advance of an outbreak.

External communication during an FAD outbreak is designed to ensure that the public, media, and international community are kept fully informed to calm anxiety, instill confidence, and ensure compliance with emergency directives. Effective communication can help to restore consumer confidence in the safety of animal products. The objective is to share accurate and timely information with the general public, the news media, and the international community.

Additional communication information can be found in the following documents:

♦ *LPA Emergency Response and Communication Guide*

♦ *A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0).*

To subscribe to the APHIS stakeholder registry and receive stakeholder notices, please go to: https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDAAPHIS/subscriber/new. After subscribing, all users can select what type of notices, on what subjects, they would like to receive.

5.1.1 Communicating Internally

Communication processes during an event are designed to keep communication flowing throughout the ICS, including from the field to headquarters, as well as across the organization. Consistent and clear communications provide an opportunity to address minor issues or resolve major problems and may include

- ◆ all-staff briefing sessions,

- ◆ daily meetings within units,

- ◆ daily internal mini-memos or situation reports, and

- ◆ conference calls (especially for coordination between Incident Commanders, on-site and off-site officials, and producer organizations/other stakeholder associations).

APHIS uses EMRS2 as its system of record for all animal health incidents. EMRS2 can adapt to complexity and rapid changes in the course of disease progression during an outbreak. An effective information management system, like EMRS2, should be used consistently over the course of the outbreak, so that information reported is accurate and timely.

During an emergency, APHIS LPA staff leads and coordinates response communication efforts through the ICS. This staff supports USDA Office of Communications (OC), other Federal and State agencies, and cooperators in responding to an animal disease outbreak and animal agriculture emergencies caused by natural disasters.

5.1.2 Communicating Externally

An outbreak of an FAD in the United States will be of major concern to producers (affected and unaffected) and the public. In the initial phase of an emergency, misinformation and rumors can cause panic among people who have little or no control over unfolding events. Individuals and entire communities may worry that their livelihoods and even health and safety are at risk.

LPA staff serves as the primary liaison with the news media and Congressional requests. LPA works with the appropriate APHIS staff members to gather information needed to develop materials and communicate effectively with stakeholders, the public, and the media. LPA also oversees public affairs support for FAD incidents, which may be provided on-site by PIOs or remotely by LPA Public Affairs Specialists.

5.2 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION GOALS

Communication goals during an emergency include the following.

◆ Manage public outreach and external communication during a crisis; brief the media, public, industry, Congress, trading partners, and others on the status of the incident and actions being taken.

◆ Open direct lines of communication with public affairs counterparts in Federal and State governments and industry to exchange information and encourage them to be advocates on APHIS' behalf and utilize agency messages.

◆ Successfully communicate APHIS' messages to affected parties through appropriate media channels, and monitor media coverage, responding to inaccuracies where appropriate.

◆ Assure stakeholders, consumers, and the general public that USDA is working on concerns and cooperating with other local, State, and Federal agencies as required by the incident.

◆ Effectively manage communication between LPA representatives at headquarters and PIOs in the field to ensure the consistent and timely delivery of information.

◆ Successfully communicate APHIS' messages to Congress through key committees and congressional staff, providing continuous updates as the situation progresses and comes to a resolution.

◆ Coordinate with program leaders to ensure that accurate and appropriate information is shared with all APHIS audiences.

◆ Prepare designated program leaders and experts to act as spokespeople to deliver APHIS' messages.

◆ Create outreach materials that deliver APHIS' messages and information to affected and interested stakeholders.

5.3 TARGET AUDIENCES

The following list highlights the key audiences that APHIS targets in an emergency. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive. Rather, the goal is to identify critical audiences for sharing information.

◆ *Governments*. Federal as well as State, local, and Tribal governments/ agencies that would coordinate with APHIS in an emergency. This also refers to elected leaders at the National, State, and local levels.

◆ *Industry stakeholders*. Agricultural/commodity groups that have a vested interest in APHIS' response efforts.

◆ *APHIS employees*. Employees of the Agency should be communicated with directly, early, and often, not only to keep them apprised of the work done by APHIS but also to equip them with accurate information to share with others.

◆ *General affected public*. In large-scale emergencies, such as an outbreak of FMD or HIPA, the general public is likely to seek information about APHIS' response efforts. Many APHIS emergencies, however, generate interest only among members of the public directly affected by emergency response activities.

◆ *Trading partners*. This category includes all current and potential trading partners for the United States. VS makes initial notifications to these trading partners and works with them to provide relevant updates. LPA works with other APHIS and USDA staffs to ensure that key messages and talking points are provided to personnel stationed at international posts.

◆ *Financial boards and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*. In a large-scale emergency, many trading partners may impose trade restrictions greatly affecting U.S. markets. LPA and/or the USDA OC representatives communicate with these audiences through timely dissemination of information and may arrange to accompany the APHIS Administrator to present to financial boards and trading partners on APHIS' emergency response capabilities, in order to assure them that APHIS is committed to responding to the emergency and returning to normal trading activities.

◆ *Interagency partners*. In emergency situations, APHIS may work with other agencies, such as the DHS, the CDC, the FDA, and so on.

◆ *Media*. This category includes print, radio, and television reporters at the international, National, and local level, as well as social media. During an emergency, the media contacts APHIS seeking information about program activities. APHIS also uses the media to distribute information to interested audiences that may otherwise be difficult to reach.

◆ *Congress*. This audience includes staff of the House Committee on Agriculture and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, among other Congressional Committees that may have an interest in the incident. When appropriate, LPA may extend its outreach to House and Senate leadership. LPA also communicates with congressional staff representing affected States, when appropriate.

5.4 APHIS' RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES

In the event of an animal or plant pest disease emergency, LPA provides external communication support throughout three distinct phases of an incident: the initial response, ongoing response as the situation develops, and post-incident response.

Effective communication—both internally (VS/APHIS) and externally (LPA)—in each of these phases is essential to the success of an emergency response.

5.4.1 Internal Communication Tools Used During a Response

For incident management, APHIS' primary objective is to have integrated communications processes that promote and facilitate the dissemination of information rapidly, efficiently, and accurately. Informed and timely decisions by both the Unified IC and ICG lead to success in coordinating response activities and ultimately accomplishing objectives.

When communicating internally, the Unified IC and ICG use the following:

- *APHIS EMRS2*. EMRS2 is the USDA APHIS system of record for animal disease incidents. EMRS2 can generate automatic e-mail notices to select personnel for different activities within the system. EMRS2 provides common information for responders and the ICG, for internal and external reporting, and can be used for any animal health incident or FAD outbreak, regardless of size or complexity.

- *SharePoint*. SharePoint is used so that there is a secure, shared workspace for the Unified IC and ICG to communicate, share information and resources, and manage documents and tasks.

- *Web-based Communication Technologies*. Videoconferencing platforms (e.g., Zoom, MS Teams, Adobe Connect) enable all personnel to discuss critical activities from different sites simultaneously, from a MAC Group at the USDA or APHIS level, to the ICG, to the NIMT in the field.

- *Conference calls*. Like videoconferences, conference calling allows the Unified IC to bring many incident personnel together at the same time. Much incident communication takes place via conference calls.

- *E-mail and smart phones*. Unified IC uses these communication channels extensively for disseminating information quickly and effectively during an incident.

- *Daily staff meetings*. IC holds meetings several times during the day, and they are frequently used in conjunction with videoconferences and

conference calls. Staff meetings take place at a minimum during shift changes and before beginning the day.

◆ *Situation reports and/or status reports.* These reports summarize the facts and details of the incident. They are produced and distributed daily or as required; different reports are typically required for different audiences, which may include the Secretary of Agriculture.

5.4.2   Communication During the Initial Response

During the first 24 to 72 hours of an emergency, LPA takes numerous steps or actions, many of which occur simultaneously. For example, at the same time internal notifications are occurring, LPA works on drafting materials for public release.

5.4.2.1   NOTIFICATIONS

The timing for notifying target audiences about animal or plant pest disease emergency situations, while extremely important, cannot be systematically or consistently predetermined. The details surrounding each emergency are different and hard to predict. Moreover, because emergency situations are often market-sensitive, LPA cannot give audiences and stakeholders as much notice of a situation as everyone would like. However, it's important to note that USDA and APHIS strive to notify all their partners at the earliest possible opportunity.

When programs become aware of a potential emergency, they immediately notify OA and LPA, providing all current, available information. Once OA has briefed the Under Secretary's Office, LPA generally informs the Department's OC. Timing and how widely to release information publicly, as well as other key operational information and potential trade implications, are all discussed with the Office of the Secretary and Department officials. Various factors are considered, such as whether an announcement would cause export markets to close or trigger financial market impacts, and timing of a release may be adjusted to occur after markets close on a given day.

5.4.2.2   MEDIA ANNOUNCEMENT PREPARATION

Depending on the significance of the animal disease emergency, public notification of such a situation could occur via different means: by press conference, media briefing, press release, or stakeholder announcement. OC and LPA leadership will decide which option is appropriate, and then work together to draft and clear the announcement materials (announcement, talking points/key messages, scripts, etc.) and arrange the needed logistics.

5.4.2.3 PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SUPPORTING MATERIALS

LPA develops and clears additional supporting materials (fact sheets, question and answer documents, etc.). They also prepare to launch appropriate website updates as soon as the announcement is made.

5.4.3 Organization and Implementation of and Communications During an Incident

Effective and coordinated communication support after the initial announcement of an emergency situation is critical. Since information demands occur at various locations, LPA takes a strategic approach. PIO support is provided on the ground at the actual emergency project site and remotely. LPA also provides staffing at AEOC in Riverdale, MD, and for ICG and MAC Groups, which may be located at USDA's headquarters, as needed.

5.4.3.1 NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM LEVEL

Each VS NIMT has a PIO assigned to the team. This individual is a VS employee who has been trained by LPA to handle media inquiries. The PIO serves as the conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media or other organizations seeking information directly about the incident or event. The PIO works under the supervision of LPA's JIC.

This PIO is responsible for handling various communication activities, such as responding to local media inquiries, working with State and local counterparts, and coordinating information dissemination locally. PIOs serve as a media spokesperson where appropriate, but may also rely on others depending on the situation (State Veterinarians, Incident Commanders, etc.). They coordinate with LPA at headquarters to ensure that we deliver consistent messages and address emerging issues. LPA provides media coordination between multiple sites through its JIC. Working within the ICS requires quick coordination across various structures and handling communication activities daily.

The onsite PIO updates APHIS headquarters on the situation during routine calls and on an as-needed basis. When a team rotation occurs, the current PIO will brief the incoming PIO and get them up to speed.

5.4.3.2 NATIONAL INCIDENT COORDINATION GROUP AND APHIS MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION LEVEL

LPA also supports the National ICG with the main responsibility of responding to media calls made to headquarters and facilitating information sharing. One person may be assigned to work with the ICG on a rotational basis; other personnel may be stationed with an APHIS MAC Group or used as ad-hoc support to address the high volume of calls and requests that may occur.

LPA's JIC works with State, local, and industry as required by the incident. In some cases, the USDA OC may establish a JIC at the Department-level that consists of Department of other agency communicators. If an OC JIC is not established, LPA can share information with the other agencies through regular telephone briefings.

In a large event, a USDA MAC Group is committed to ensuring that agencies experiencing emergencies are fully supported and may assist LPA in recruiting additional specialists from other agencies to provide support for communication activities.

LPA coordinates National or highly controversial calls with OC. They also identify and prepare any national-level spokespersons, and provide support during national/controversial interviews.

LPA provides updates to State departments of agriculture through conference calls with the Communication Officers of State Departments of Agriculture and NASDA, which are arranged on an as-needed basis.

As issues emerge, LPA also coordinates with the Office of Congressional Relations to provide updates and follow-up briefings to key congressional staff. Additionally, key stakeholders are notified of developments in the situation via media and the APHIS website. If a significant development occurs, LPA and the involved programs may provide additional briefings to interested stakeholders to update them on the situation.

LPA may work with the States and industry to identify third-party spokespeople to help deliver public messages and provide outside perspectives. Generally, LPA turns to third-party spokespeople to talk to the media during ongoing emergency response efforts to help illustrate the importance of quick action to control and contain the disease. LPA also involves other public affairs contacts at other agencies in media response and in coordinating third-party spokespeople as necessary.

5.4.3.3 COMMUNICATION ACTIVITY TEMPO

APHIS and USDA have reputations for regularly and transparently communicating about ongoing animal emergencies. Media, industry, trading partners, and other stakeholders appreciate this practice and have come to rely on such an open dialogue. Following an announcement, LPA works with OC to determine the frequency of any follow up media briefings/events.

During the incident, LPA coordinates National or highly controversial calls regarding response activities and provides updates of any changes in media interest. LPA updates the website/webpage to reflect ongoing response activities, such as daily surveillance numbers, new outreach materials, announcements on new funding, and other important activities as required by the incident tempo. If

emergency funding is provided for a large-scale outreach campaign, LPA works with the program, the OC, the affected States, and other agencies to develop appropriate outreach materials. Throughout this phase of the emergency, regular updates and check-ins with the communicators and commissioners in affected States continue, and any new material is shared with them prior to providing it to the public.

Throughout the Agency's core emergency response effort, communication activities, like operational ones, continue until ICS comes to a close. This period of ongoing communication could last a matter of weeks or continue for months. It is critical during this phase of communication to maintain routine contact with various audiences.

5.4.4   Post-Incident Communication

Communication does not stop when emergency operations shut down. To ensure consistent messaging after on-site operations end, it is important to keep open the lines of communication between LPA and the States, other involved agencies, Tribal Nations, and stakeholders. This period of communication could last for many months to more than a year, and could include maintenance of an outreach campaign. Though interaction on the issue is less frequent, LPA ensures that any new information is provided to the public and the media on how operations are returning to normal. Providing timely information is crucial, as it can be helpful in restoring normalized trade and livestock or plant movement.

During the progress toward complete eradication and restoration of full trading, a number of milestones would be good opportunities to communicate with both the domestic and international audiences:

- ◆ completion of disinfection of formerly Infected Premises;

- ◆ lifting of quarantine(s) and CA(s);

- ◆ number of premises approved to restock;

- ◆ restoration of exports from areas of the United States designated as being pest- or disease-free; and

- ◆ closing of the incident.

These activities are reported through updates to the website, press releases as necessary, and stakeholder announcements. LPA also updates industry as necessary on ongoing communication activities through industry and professional communication groups, such as the Cross-Species Communications Working Group or United States Animal Health Association.

LPA continues to communicate updates to State departments of agriculture through monthly NASAHO and NASDA calls and work with the affected States

on any outreach materials that are produced. Additionally, LPA continues to coordinate to update key congressional staff as the situation comes to a resolution, providing follow-up briefings on any significant results, investigative findings, or future actions to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring.

5.4.5   Staying Ahead of Emergencies

LPA is always preparing for the next emergency through day-to-day work. LPA works proactively to build partnerships with the media, stakeholders, and Congress by responding quickly to requests for information and promoting agency and program initiatives. LPA has built strong relationships with agricultural reporters, as they are on the front lines of providing information to the public, not only concerning normal regulatory activity but also any emergency.

LPA works closely with NASDA by holding monthly conference calls, sharing information on program activities, and attending their annual meetings. This relationship serves as a medium for coordinating training and sharing information on State and Federal animal and plant health regulatory issues. Additionally, LPA's State Liaison is working jointly with APHIS programs to continue to build strong relationships with the States. The State Liaison helps facilitate information sharing between the States and APHIS, and this role is an integral part of getting emergency disease eradication and control information to the States quickly.

Appendix A
Key FAD PReP Documents

The FAD PReP is a comprehensive U.S. preparedness and response strategy for FAD threats, both zoonotic and non-zoonotic. Types of FAD PReP documents include the following:

- ◆ Strategic Plans (Concept of Operations)

- ◆ NAHEMS Guidelines

- ◆ Industry Manuals

- ◆ Disease Response Plans

- ◆ Disease Response Strategies

- ◆ SOPs for Critical Activities

- ◆ Continuity of Business Plans/Secure Food Supply Plans

- ◆ Ready Reference Guides.

This appendix lists some of these key documents for reference only; to see the most up-to-date list of documents available, please visit www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.

A. FAD PReP Strategic Plans (Concept of Operations)

- ◆ APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0)

- ◆ APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)

- ◆ Information Management and Incident Reporting (FAD PReP Manual 3-0) coming soon

- ◆ Foreign Animal Disease Investigation Manual (FAD PReP Manual 4-0)

- ◆ A Partial List of FAD Stakeholders (FAD PReP Manual 5-0)

- ◆ Permitted Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0)

B. NAHEMS Guidelines

Each NAHEMS Guidelines document also has accompanying educational materials, including presentations and handouts.

- Health and Safety

- PPE

- Biosecurity

- Quarantine and Movement Control

- Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

- Disposal

- Cleaning and Disinfection

- Vaccination for Contagious Diseases

  - Appendix A FMD

  - Appendix B Classical Swine Fever (CSF)

  - Appendix C HPAI

- Wildlife Management and Vector Control for FAD Response in Domestic Livestock

- Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing

- Continuity of Business.

C. Industry Manuals

- Dairy

- Swine

- Poultry

- Beef Feedlot

- Cow-Calf

D. DISEASE RESPONSE PLANS

◆ HPAI

◆ FMD

➤ Classification of Phases and types of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak and Response (draft 2013)

➤ FMD Response Plan: The Red Book (October 2020)

◆ CSF

◆ Newcastle Disease (ND)

◆ African Swine Fever (ASF)

➤ ASF Response: The Red Book (April 2020)

E. DISEASE STRATEGIES

◆ Japanese Encephalitis

◆ New World Screwworm (NWS) Myiasis

◆ Peste Des Petits Ruminants

◆ Rift Valley Fever

F. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

FAD PReP identifies 23 critical activities conducted during an FAD response. Many of these activities have associated SOPs. These SOPs are templates to provide a common picture or set of procedures for the following 23 activities and tools.

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology

2. Case Definitions and Laboratory Definitions

3. Surveillance

4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity, and Reporting)

5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing

6. Overview of Information Management

7. Communications

8. Health and Safety and PPE

9. Biosecurity

10. Quarantine and Movement Control

11. Continuity of Business

12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade

13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia

14. Disposal

15. Cleaning and Disinfection

16. Vaccination

17. Logistics

18. Overview of Wildlife and Management and Vector Control

19. Overview of Animal Welfare

20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools

21. Appraisal and Compensation

22. Overview of Finance

23. Overview of Incident Management.

G. CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS PLANNING/SECURE FOOD SUPPLY PLANS

◆ Secure Poultry Supply Plan (Broilers, Eggs, and Turkeys)

◆ Secure Milk Supply Plan

◆ Secure Pork Supply Plan

◆ Secure Beef Supply Plan

◆ Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Plan

H. READY REFERENCE GUIDES

In addition, there are a number of FAD PReP Ready Reference Guides that correspond to the above materials as well as other current topics. For example, there are Ready Reference Guides on the following topics (listed in alphabetical order by disease):

- ◆ FMD Response

  - ➤ Reported FMD in 2016

  - ➤ Etiology and Ecology

  - ➤ Communications

  - ➤ Overview of the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book Draft

  - ➤ Understanding Response Strategies

  - ➤ Overview of Emergency Vaccination

  - ➤ Overview of FMD Vaccination Issues

  - ➤ Common Operating Procedure

  - ➤ Overview of FMD Freedom and Vaccination

  - ➤ Comparing U.S. and United Kingdom FMD Response Planning

  - ➤ Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business

  - ➤ Surveillance

  - ➤ Overview of Diagnostics

  - ➤ Additional Information

- ◆ HPAI Response

  - ➤ Reported H5 HPAI in 2016

  - ➤ Etiology and Ecology

  - ➤ Overview of HPAI Response Plan: The Red Book Draft

  - ➤ HPAI Zones and Premises

  - ➤ Common Operating Picture

- Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business
- Overview of Diagnostics
- EMRS2 Customer Permit Gateway
- Additional Information

- ND Response
  - Overview of the ND Response Plan: The Red Book Draft
  - Etiology and Ecology

- CSF Response
  - Overview of the CSF Response Plan

- Generic FAD Response
  - Introduction to the FAD Preparedness and Response Plan
  - Introduction to the EMRS2
  - Understanding EMRS 2 Interface
  - FAD Framework: Roles and Coordination (Manual 1-0)
  - FAD Framework: Response Strategies (Manual 2-0)
  - Critical Activities and Tools during an FAD Response
  - Secure Food Supply Plans
  - Zones, Areas, and Premises in an FAD Outbreak
  - Movement Control in an FAD Outbreak
  - VS Guidance 12001.2: Procedures and Policy for the Investigation of Potential FAD/Emerging Disease Incidents (EDI).

- NWS
  - Maps & Timelines
  - Economic Impact
  - Sterile Insect Response

Appendix B
Glossary

Animal product	Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, skins, and any by-product containing any of those components that originated from an animal or bird.
Case	Any individual animal infected by an FAD, with or without clinical signs.
Emergency vaccination	A disease control strategy using the immunization of susceptible animals through the administration of a vaccine comprising antigens appropriate to the disease to be controlled.
Emerging disease (WOAH)	A previously unrecognized pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time and which has a significant impact on animal or public health.
Emerging disease (VS Guidance 12001)	Any terrestrial animal, aquatic animal, or zoonotic disease not yet known or characterized, or any known or characterized terrestrial animal or aquatic animal disease in the United States or its territories that changes or mutates in pathogenicity, communicability, or zoonotic potential to become a threat to terrestrial animals, aquatic animals, or humans.

Emerging disease (NLRAD)	VS defines an emerging animal disease as: ◆ any animal disease or infection not known to exist in the United States, including a new strain of a known disease occurring in any animal species, including wildlife; ◆ an emerging animal disease with zoonotic potential; ◆ unexpected and unexplained increase in morbidity or mortality of diseased animals; and ◆ evidence of a change in the epidemiology of a known animal disease such as increased pathogenicity, expanded host range, or clinical signs that do not fit the classical picture.
Etiology	The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.
Euthanasia	The humane destruction of an animal accomplished by a method that produces rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death with a minimum of pain or distress or a method that utilizes anesthesia produced by an agent that causes painless loss of consciousness and subsequent death.
Foreign animal disease (FAD)	A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. animal population.
Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)	Documents used to identify overall strategies, veterinary functions, organization, and countermeasures necessary to contain and control an FAD outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and countermeasures with emergency management systems and operations conducted in joint and Unified Command by Federal, State, Tribal, and local personnel.
Federal-to-Federal Support (FFS)	USDA may request FFS from other Federal departments and agencies. FFS refers to circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or other mechanism.

Fomites	Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one animal or person to another.
Incident Command System	A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach that ◆ allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure; ◆ enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private; and ◆ establishes common processes for planning and managing resources.
Mass depopulation	Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the animals as practicable, but where the circumstances and tasks facing those doing the depopulation are understood to be extenuating.
Memorandum/ Memoranda of understanding	A document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between parties. It expresses a scope of activities and expectations between parties, indicating an intended common line of action or communication. It does not indicate a financial commitment.
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)	NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two U.S. Department of Agriculture agencies and the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national network of State and University laboratories, which use common testing methods and software platforms to perform diagnostics and share information.
World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH)	Organization that collects and publishes information on animal diseases from 180 (2016) countries and develops standards for animal health.
Outbreak	The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is normally expected in a given population.

Personal protective equipment (PPE)	Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented to the fullest extent.
Premises	A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment.
Slaughter (WOAH)	Procedure which causes the death of an animal by bleeding.
Trace back	The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal products, possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and so on that have entered onto an Infected Premises.
Trace forward	The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, and so on that have left an IP. The premises that received the animals or goods should be investigated and kept under surveillance or quarantine.
Vector	An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent from an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or immediate surroundings.
Zoonotic	Any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from animals to humans.

Appendix C
Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
AC	Area Command
ACHP	Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
AEOC	APHIS Emergency Operations Center
AHPA	Animal Health Protection Act
AI	avian influenza
AMT	APHIS Management Team
APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
ARC	Army Reserve Command
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
BOEM	Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
BOP	Federal Bureau of Prisons
BPD	Bureau of the Public Debt
CA	Control Area
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CCC	Commodity Credit Corporation
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CF	contingency fund
CFR	*Code of Federal Regulations*
CNCS	Corporation for National and Community Service
CSF	classical swine fever
3D	depopulation, decontamination, and disposal
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency

DOC	Department of Commerce
DoD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOI	Department of Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
EMRS2	Emergency Management Response System 2.0
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPI	epidemiologist
EQS	Emergency Qualification System
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ETA	Employment and Training Administration
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAD	foreign animal disease
FAD PReP	Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan
FAS	Federal Acquisition Service
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FED LE	Federal Law Enforcement
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFS	Federal-to-Federal support
FMCSA	Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FMD	foot-and-mouth disease
FNS	Food and Nutrition Service
FSA	Farm Service Agency
FSIS	Food Safety and Inspection Service
GIS	geographic information system
GSA	General Services Administration

HENTF	Heritage Emergency National Task Force
HHS	Health and Human Services
HPAI	highly pathogenic avian influenza
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HUD	Housing and Urban Development
IC	Incident Command
ICG	Incident Coordination Group
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
IT	information technology
JIC	Joint Information Center
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LPA	Legislative and Public Affairs
MAC	Multiagency Coordination
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MSHA	Mine Safety and Health Administration
NADPRP	National Animal Disease and Preparedness Program
NAHEMS	National Animal Health Emergency Management System
NAHERC	National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps
NAHLN	National Animal Health Laboratory Network
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NARSC	National Animal Rescue and Sheltering Coalition
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASAAEP	National Alliance of State Animal and Agricultural Emergency Programs
NASAHO	National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials
NASDA	National Association of State Departments of Agriculture
NCIJTF	National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force
NCMEC	National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
ND	Newcastle disease
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	non-governmental organization

NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIMT	National Incident Management Team
NLRAD	National List of Reportable Animal Diseases
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOC	National Operations Center
NPIC	National Preparedness and Incident Coordination
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
NPPD/C&C	National Protection and Programs Directorate/Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
NPPD/IP	National Protection and Programs Directorate/Office of Infrastructure Protection
NPS	National Park Service
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRCS	Natural Resources Conservation Service
NDRF	National Disaster Recovery Framework
NRF	National Response Framework
NTAS	National Terrorism Advisory System
NTIA	National Telecommunications and Information Administration
NVOAD	National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
NWHC	National Wildlife Health Center
OA	Office of the Administrator
OC	Office of Communications
OEC	Office of Emergency Communications
OEPC	Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance
WOAH	World Organization for Animal Health
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OPS	operations
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OWCP	Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
PBS	Public Buildings Service
PHMSA	Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

PIO	Public Information Officer
PPE	personal protective equipment
RD	Rural Development
ROSS	Resource Ordering and Status System
SAHO	State Animal Health Official
SBA	Small Business Administration
SME	subject matter expert
SOP	standard operating procedure
SSA	Social Security Administration
SUPSALV	Navy Supervisor of Salvage
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TTB	Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S.C.	United States Code
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USBR	United States Bureau of Reclamation
USCG	U. S. Coast Guard
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFS	U.S. Forest Service
USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
USMS	U.S. Marshals Service
USPS	U.S. Postal Service
VA	Veterans Affairs
VERRC	Volunteer Emergency Ready Response Corps
VS	Veterinary Services
VSET	VS Executive Team

Appendix D
Selected References and Resources

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