Goals of a CSF Response
There are three goals of a CSF response: to (1) detect, control, and contain CSF in domestic swine as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate CSF using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy, and to protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected swine and non-contaminated pork products.

Achieving these goals will allow individual swine facilities, States, Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They will also allow the United States to regain CSF-free status without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

Response Strategies
There are four accepted strategies for the control and eradication of CSF in domestic swine following the detection of an outbreak. These strategies are as follows:
- Stamping-out
- Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill
- Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter
- Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live.

Factors Influencing CSF Response Strategies
Many factors will be considered when determining whether a particular response strategy would be appropriate and advantageous in responding to a CSF outbreak. No factor will independently dictate a response strategy, or a decision to employ emergency vaccination; there are many factors that will influence the decision of whether and how to vaccinate. Such factors will include:
- resources available to implement response strategies,
- population density of susceptible animals,
- origin and location of outbreak,
- distribution and spread of outbreak,
- disruptions to interstate commerce,
- disruptions to international trade,
- acceptance of response strategy or strategies,
- assessments of control strategies, and
- CSF vaccine availability.

Three Epidemiological Principles of Response
There are three key epidemiological principles that will form the foundation of any CSF response effort.
1. Prevent contact between CSF virus and susceptible swine.
2. Stop the production of CSF virus in infected or exposed swine.
3. Increase the disease resistance of susceptible swine to the CSF virus or reduce the shedding of CSF virus in infected or exposed swine.

CSF Emergency Vaccination: Will We Use Vaccine?
As described in the CSF Response Plan, the use of emergency vaccination strategies may be considered in a CSF outbreak. An emergency vaccination strategy or strategies can help to achieve the goals of a CSF response effort, based on the three epidemiological principles of response listed above. There are two types of CSF vaccine: a modified live virus vaccine and a killed virus marker vaccine. The modified live vaccine has been successfully used in countries where CSF is endemic, as well as in feral swine. The killed virus marker vaccine enables the differentiation of infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA). There are many challenges to successfully employing a CSF emergency vaccination strategy, but there may also be many benefits. A CSF response may use one or more strategies to control, contain, and ultimately eradicate CSF in domestic livestock. The use of emergency vaccination will be determined by the Unified Command Incident Commander, the State Animal Health Official(s), and the Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator (U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer).
The four response strategies mentioned on the previous page don’t always mean the same thing to all stakeholders. To avoid miscommunication, here are the definitions and descriptions of the response strategies that are used in the CSF Response Plan (2013).

**Stamping-Out**
Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals.

*This has been a commonly used approach in past CSF outbreaks occurring in countries that were previously free of CSF. This strategy is most appropriate if the outbreak is contained to a jurisdictional area or a region in which CSF can be readily contained and further dissemination of the virus is unlikely.*

**Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Kill**
Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals. Depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals may be delayed until logistically feasible, as determined by Incident Command and the VS Deputy Administrator (U.S. CVO).

*This is a suppressive emergency vaccination strategy, where the goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals by using emergency vaccination and depopulating and disposing of vaccines at a later date. This is the targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals.*

**Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter**
Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with slaughter and processing of vaccinated animals, if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.

*This is a suppressive emergency vaccination strategy, where the goal is to suppress virus replication in high-risk susceptible animals by using emergency vaccination and then slaughtering vaccines at a later date. This is the targeted vaccination of high-risk susceptible animals.*

**Stamping-Out Modified with Emergency Vaccination to Live**
Depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent depopulation of vaccinated animals. Vaccinated animals intended for breeding, slaughter, or other purposes live out their useful lives.

*This is a protective emergency vaccination strategy, where the goal is to protect susceptible animals from infection using emergency vaccination with the deliberate intent to maintain vaccines for the duration of their usefulness. This is the targeted vaccination of non-infected animals, and may include the vaccination of valuable genetic stock, long-lived production animals, or areas with a high-population density.*

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**Feral Swine**
For purposes of international trade, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) defines CSF as an infection of domestic pigs (Article 15.2.1, *Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2012*). Additionally, “a Member should not impose trade bans in response to a notification of infection with classical swine fever in wild pigs” (see Article 15.2.1 for further clarification). However, where wild pigs represent a reservoir and a potential transmission risk to domestic swine, surveillance, biosecurity, and other measures may be necessary components in proving disease-freedom.

**Map of Feral Swine Distribution**

Source: SCWDS, National Feral Swine Mapping System.

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**What Else Will Occur During a CSF Response?**
Critical activities and tools must be implemented to execute and support any response strategy. These activities and tools must support a science- and risk-based approach that protects public health, animal health, and stabilizes animal agriculture and the economy. Some of the critical activities that will be employed include:

- Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls
- Rapid diagnostics and reporting
- Epidemiological investigation and tracing
- Increased surveillance
- Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal products
- Biosecurity measures
- Cleaning and disinfection measures
- Effective and appropriate disposal procedures
- Mass depopulation and euthanasia (as the response strategy indicates)
- Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates).

**Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign**
Regardless of the response strategy or strategies selected, a public awareness campaign will be coordinated. This will support the response strategy by widely disseminating key communication messages and engaging and leveraging Federal, State, Tribal, local, and stakeholder relationships to provide unified public messages for all audiences;

- addressing the issues and concerns relating to food safety, public health, the environment, and animal welfare; and
- addressing issues and concerns related to interstate commerce, continuity of business, and international trade.