

Emergency Preparedness Summary

FMD Vaccine

APHIS has publicly stated in the “FMD Response Plan: The Red Book” that all response strategies—including those with emergency vaccination—would be considered in a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak. This is a significant and necessary change in FMD response policy based on the magnitude and speed of animal agriculture in the United States. For many reasons (including public acceptance, depopulation capacities, and disposal capabilities) stamping-out is no longer a viable option as an exclusive response strategy for anything beyond a very small, focal outbreak.

The North American Foot and Mouth Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB) was developed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1982 as a capability to conduct a small vaccination to kill campaign. APHIS’ move to a broader FMD response strategy stance raises questions about whether the NAFMDVB is adequate to support a broader response strategy, among them:

- How should APHIS and its stakeholders modernize FMD vaccine capabilities?
- What should be the minimum quantities of vaccine available, and minimum time to delivery, to provide effective response?
- Can there be cost sharing or public private partnerships to modernize FMD vaccine capabilities?

Continuity of Business

Quarantine and movement control are essential to stop the spread of an animal disease. However, these activities are also likely to significantly disrupt typical business operations involving intrastate and interstate trade as well as international commerce. In some cases, quarantines and movement controls can cause more economic damage than the disease outbreak itself.

Recently, much work has focused on continuity of business, also known as managed movement. Plans such as the Secure Food Supply Plans are designed to manage the movement of non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products from non-infected premises in a foreign animal disease outbreak. This managed movement helps animal agriculture maintain or return to normal business while minimizing the risk of disease spread through careful permitting, detailed biosecurity, and other guidance. This science and risk-based approach therefore minimizes the unintended negative effects of the disease on producers not directly affected by the outbreak.

Continuity of business planning is a complex and multidisciplinary effort. The Secure Food Supply Plans are developed through a public-private-academic partnership, which includes Veterinary Services, industry, and academic centers. Many plans offer specific guidance on permitting, but there is not a clear path to implementation, or ensuring that these plans can be executed in a disease outbreak. This leads to the following questions:

- How should these plans be evaluated before an outbreak?
- How should these plans be “accepted” or adopted by States before an outbreak?
- Should plans be implemented by Memorandums of Understanding between States? Through rulemaking? Or should other processes be used?