



Gathering scientific evidence to assess possible consequences of PED re-emergence or PDCoV detection in Europe

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EFSA'S ROLE IN EU RISK ANALYSIS



 **European Commission**


 **European Parliament**

 **Member States**

 **EFSA ("self tasking")**




Question?




Risk Assessment



Opinion










Risk Management

Risk Communication







Consumers

Media

Industry

Professionals

...BUT NOT TO

- develop food safety policies and legislation
- adopt regulations, authorize marketing of new products
- enforce food safety legislation
- take charge of food safety/ quality controls, labeling or other such issues, like inspections and traceability







INDEPENDENCE...

- From risk managers (EU Commission, Member States)
- From private interests

Guaranteed through a comprehensive policy covering all actors and working processes:

- Organisational governance: different roles of Management Board, Advisory Forum, Panels and staff
- Governance of scientific processes: mandates, selection of experts, data and literature review, collegial decision making, transparency
- Declaration of Interests

PROVIDE SCIENTIFIC ADVICE FROM FIELD TO FORK





EFSA MANDATE ON PED AND PDCOV

Given the spread of PEDV and detection of porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV) in the Americas,

the European Commission requested EFSA to issue a scientific opinion


in order to better determine the extent of PEDV and PDCoV infections worldwide and be prepared to face the possible re-emergence of PED in Europe.





TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) OF THE MANDATE (1/2)

1. The current **epidemiological situation** in North America and Asia and elsewhere in the world as regard PED and the new porcine Deltacoronavirus
2. **Characterization** of the new porcine **Deltacoronavirus** as an **emerging disease**, especially as regards the severity of the disease induced
3. **Possible differences** between the European classical PED **Alphacoronavirus strains** and the ones currently circulating in the rest of the world, in particular in the Americas, and possible existence of cross protecting immunity.





TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) OF THE MANDATE (2/2)

4. **Impact** of the different PED Alphacoronavirus strains and of the new porcine Deltacoronavirus in pigs in different immunological scenarios.
5. Risk assessment of **potential entry routes** of PED and the new porcine Delta-coronavirus in the EU, ranking them on the basis of the level of risk with a view to enhance risk mitigation, prevention and preparedness.





APPROACH TOR1, TOR3 AND TOR4

- Focus on last 10 years
- Gathering info: extensive search scientific literature and internet, consultation of EU Member States
- Descriptive analysis of the results for TOR1 (epidemiological overview) TOR3 (differences between strains) and TOR4 (impact)
→ both for PEDV and PDCoV




APPROACH TOR2

- Characterization of PDCoV as an emerging disease (TOR2), especially as regards the severity of the disease induced

OIE defines an emerging disease as a new occurrence of a disease, infection or infestation in an animal, causing a significant impact on animal or public health resulting from (1) a change of a known pathogenic agent or its spread to a new geographic area or species; or (2) a previously unrecognized pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time.

An emerging disease as defined should be notified to OIE when it has been detected in a country, a zone or compartment.

→ check OIE definition in European context





APPROACH TOR5 (1/2)

- Risk assessment of potential entry routes of PEDV and PDCoV in the EU (TOR5)

Considered matrices: live pigs, faeces, slurry, semen, embryo, whole blood, spray-dried porcine blood and plasma, other porcine-derived components (including red blood cells, hydrolyzed proteins, fat, gelatin, collagen and swill) and air

Describe per matrix, the available scientific evidence on the detection of PEDV RNA and infectious virus, on survival of the virus in the matrix and whether a role has been reported in transmission of PEDV

Similar for **PDCoV**





APPROACH TOR5 (2/2)

Three steps of the risk assessment performed by **ANSES**:

- (i) the probability that a given matrix will be a source of virus
- (ii) the probability of contact between pigs and the matrix
- (iii) and information on the existence of imports of that matrix into France from an infected country

EFSA: only description of step (i), no probability scoring

Different approaches used by EFSA and ANSES makes direct comparison of outputs difficult



CURRENT STAGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC OPINION

Receipt of request



Draft assessment
by Working Group


Current stage of the opinion

Finalization assessment
and
adoption by Panel



Publication by end Oct 2014

Communication





Any questions?