

This document compares and contrasts the FMD policies and strategies of the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.), particularly as relating to quarantines, movement controls, vaccination, and other key factors for each country. The information contained in this ready reference guide is found in the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) *FMD Response Plan* and the Foot and Mouth Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain (2011).

2001 FMD Outbreak in the United Kingdom

The 2001 FMD outbreak in the U.K. triggered widespread institutional and policy changes. The social, political, and economic impact of the FMD outbreak led to official inquiries, which identified significant factors that contributed to the extended and high cost response and eradication effort. A new ministry resulted, the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, and an entirely new contingency plan for responding to exotic diseases was written. This ready reference guide reflects the new, post-2001 paradigm in the United Kingdom. For more information on the lessons-learned from the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom, please see the 2002 publication *Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to Be Learned Inquiry Report*.

Overview of U.S. Strategy

Goals of a U.S. FMD Response

- ◆ Detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible.
- ◆ Eradicate FMD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy, and protect public health and the environment.
- ◆ Provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products.



Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States, Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They will also allow the United States to regain FMD-free status without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

Overview of U.K. Strategy

Goals of a U.K. FMD Response

- ◆ Cause the least possible disruption to the food, farming, and tourism industries, to visitors to the countryside, and to rural communities and the wider economy.
- ◆ Minimize the number of animals which need to be slaughtered.
- ◆ Minimize the damage to the environment and protect public health.
- ◆ Minimize the burden on taxpayers and the public at large.



Comparison of FMD Preparedness

Category	United States	United Kingdom
Strategy	Will consider using a vaccination to live, vaccination to kill, or vaccination to slaughter strategy.	Will consider using a vaccination to live strategy.
National Supply	Not applicable.	Policy changed in November 2011 when the European Commission expanded the European Union (EU) FMD vaccine bank; a national supply is no longer maintained.
Shared Vaccine Bank Supply	The North American FMD Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB) is shared with the United States, Canada, and Mexico as partners. The NAFMDVB has vaccine antigen concentrate which it would then ship to a manufacturer abroad to finish FMD vaccine.	EU FMD Vaccine Bank holds a wide range of antigens for emergency use.
Vaccine Delivery	Specific plans need to be developed.	Has arrangements with external contractor to implement an emergency vaccination program. The contractor has trained a first response team made up of sufficient lay vaccinators and support staff for 50 teams and recruited 25 vets to support them. The contractor can ramp-up this level of response to meet any reasonable disease scenario within 4-5 days of notification. This is a Great Britain-wide contract and the contractor will, at all times, be working under the control and direction of the State Veterinary Service.

Where should I go for more information on U.S. FMD response planning?

<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep>



Comparison of FMD Preparedness

Approach	United States	United Kingdom
FMD Planning	State and Federal response planning through policy guidance.	Law and regulation (planning cycle, exercises, vaccination policy, and movement control).
FMD Investigations (Prior to Outbreak)	FMD diagnostic samples taken routinely for surveillance and foreign animal disease investigations.	If diagnostic samples taken for suspicion of FMD, small quarantine zone (3–10 km per EU rules) is established.
FMD Exercises	State and Federal exercises as desired, including with Department of Homeland Security funding and under Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Guidance.	Mandated by regulation, per year, and type of exercise. EU directive requires plans to be exercised twice in a 5-year period.
Vaccination	Policy indicates that vaccination may be used, based on the consideration of many factors.	If not used, government must provide written justification.
Quarantine and Movement Control	Quarantine and movement controls based on zone designations and premises designations.	Long-term movement restrictions based on zone designations. However, general stop movement orders for susceptible animal species instituted in Great Britain as soon as FMD is confirmed and last for 5–9 days, maybe longer.
Permitting and Movement	Permits are granted by the Incident Command to allow authorized movement from non-infected premises within or out of the Control Area. Permits need to be accepted by other State and Tribal jurisdictions.	Licenses are granted by the Secretary of State to allow authorized movement from uninfected premises.
Zoning	Zones (Control Area) established to control disease spread.	Zones established to control disease spread. However, general stop movement orders for susceptible animal species instituted in Great Britain as soon as FMD is confirmed and last for 5–9 days, maybe longer.
Traceability	Unless specifically exempted, livestock moved interstate must be officially identified and accompanied by an interstate certificate of veterinary inspection or other documentation, such as owner-shipper statements or brand certificates. These regulations encourage the use of low-cost technology and specifies approved forms of official identification for each species, such as metal ear-tags for cattle. However, recognizing the importance and prevalence of other identifications in certain regions, shipping and receiving States and Tribes are permitted to agree upon alternative forms of identification such as brands or tattoos. (http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/12/pdf/traceability_final_rule.pdf).	In the aftermath of the 2001 outbreak of FMD, the United Kingdom introduced standing restrictions on the movements of livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs). Whenever cattle, sheep, goats, or pigs are moved onto a farm, no cattle, sheep, or goats may move off for a period of six days. Pigs have to remain under standstill for 6 days where cattle, sheep, and goats have been moved on to a holding. Where pigs have moved on to a farm, existing pigs must remain under standstill for 20 days. This is a disease damping measure designed to slow down the rate of spread of undetected disease and thus reduce the size (and hence cost) of disease outbreaks. Movements of animals are monitored through the Animal Movement Licensing System which is managed by the British Cattle Movement Service. The Disease Control (England) Order 2003 (as amended) is the domestic legislation setting out the law behind this policy regime. (https://www.gov.uk/browse/business/farming/livestock).
Authority	Law, policy, and regulations vary across Federal, State, and Tribal authorities and local agencies. Response starts with local and State/Tribal authority and the Incident Command System, however, the Federal government has the authority to participate in, fund, and oversee response activities based on type of emergency declaration.	Each devolved administration (Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland) has individual laws, however the U.K. has the authority to administer response activities. All response activities must also comply with EU directives.