European Union measures for the control of avian influenza

International Conference
Avian influenza and Poultry trade, Baltimore, Maryland, 22-24 June 2015

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Health and Consumers

EU legislation on Animal Health

Fully harmonised

- Disease control
- Trade & Imports
- Identification and traceability

Role of the European Commission

- Drafting of Legislation
- Information gathering - dispatch
- Standing Committees
- Crisis management
- Auditing

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HPAI in the EU

A quick view of epidemiological situation

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
Highly pathogenic Avian influenza in poultry, captive birds and wild birds
From 1 January 2014 to 16 June 2015
Poultry
Captive birds
Wild birds
EESTI
LATVIJA
LIETUVA
DANMARK
UNITED KINGDOM
IRELAND
NEDERLAND
POLSKA
DEUTSCHLAND
BELGIQUE / BELGIE
LUXEMBOURG (GRAND-DUCHE)
CESKA REPUBLIKA
SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
OESTERREICH
MAGYARORSZAG
SCHWEIZ / SUISSE / SVIZZERA
LIECHTENSTEIN
FRANCE
ROMANIA
SLOVENIJA
HRVATSKA
BALGARIJA
ITALIA
PORTUGAL
ESPANA
ELLADA
MALTA
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W
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S

HPAI outbreaks

05/11/2014 - 26/03/2015

Country	Affected region	HPAI subtype	Outbreak Type	Confirmation date	Flock size	Species / Production type	
Germany	Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	H5N8	1	**05/11/2014**	30939	fattening turkeys	indoor
	Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, island of Ruegen	H5N8		21/11/2014	1	common teal	live bird
	Low er Saxony, Cloppenburg	H5N8	1	16/12/2014	17887	fattening turkeys	indoor
	Low er Saxony, Emsland	H5N8	1	20/12/2014	10102	fattening ducks	indoor
	Sachen-Anhalt, Anhalt-Bitterfeld	H5N8		20/12/2014	1	mallard	dead bird
	Rostock	H5N8	1	7/01/2015	496	zoo, w hite stork	dead bird
	Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania, Anklam	H5N8	1	20/01/2015	196	backyard	
	Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania, Anklam	H5N8	2	26/01/2015	36	backyard	
Nether -lands	Utrecht province, Hekendorp	H5N8	1	16/11/2014	150000	laying hens	indoor
	Zuid-Holland province, Ter Aar	H5N8	1	21/11/2014	43000	laying hens	indoor
	Overijssel province, Kamperveen	H5N8	1	21/11/2014	10000	broiler breeder	indoor
	Overijssel province, Kamperveen	H5N8	2	23/11/2014	14600	fattening ducks	indoor
	Zuid Holland province, Zoeterw oude	H5N8	1	30/11/2014	28000	laying hens	indoor
	Utrecht provice, Kamerik	H5N8		1/12/2014	2	Eurasian w idgeon	live bird
United Kingdom	East Riding of Yorkshire	H5N8	1	16/11/2014	6178	breeding ducks	indoor
Italy	Veneto, Rovigo	H5N8	1	15/12/2014	31985	fattening turkeys	indoor
Bulgaria	Burgas Region, Poda protected area	H5N1		26/01/2015	1	Dalmatian pelican	dead bird
	Burgas Region, Konstantinonvo	H5N1		2/02/2015	22	backyard	
	Burgas Region, Poda protected area	H5N1		6/02/2015	2	dove / *gull*	dead bird
Hungary	Békés County, Füzesgyarmat	H5N8	1	**24/02/2015**	21170	fattening ducks	indoors
Sweden	Stockholm, Djurgården island,	H5N8		Feb/March	2	mute sw an (cygnus olor)	dead bird
Romania	Tulcea/Constanta county - Danube delta	H5N1		26/03/2015	6+/64†/ 250	Dalmatian pelican	dead bird

HPAI - Notifications 2006-2015



HPAI notifications - 2006-2015

logarithmic scale



Notification of low pathogenic avian influenza (H5/H7) 2006-2015



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HPAI in the EU

A quick view of rules, measures and tools

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Avian influenza control legislation

Directive 2005/94/EC

Main Principles

- **Stamping-out Policy** of all poultry on infected farms
- **Zoning** 3km and 10km around outbreak farm
- **Movement controls**
- **Cleaning and disinfection**
- Since 2007 **control of low pathogenic avian influenza** by stamping out or by "controlled slaughter" *(**very rarely used**)* to avoid virus circulation and possible mutation to HPAI

Flexibility based on risk assessment

More stringent measures

- **"standstill"**

  on the whole territory for movements of poultry, poultry products and vehicles of poultry sector

  - may also be extended to mammalian species
  - not more than **72**hrs

- **"temporary control zone"** can be established around a holding under AI suspicion e.g. relevant in densely populated poultry areas
- **" pre-emptive killing "** of flocks upon suspicion, of flocks in direct and indirect contact (vehicles, staff, fomites) without awaiting sampling/diagnosis

Some derogations from culling

quarantine and testing for endangered species, zoos birds…

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Disease control tools

- **Contingency plans** of Member States
- **Simulation exercises**
- **EU co-financing** of:
  - ***Compensation*** paid to farmers of animals killed, C&D, feed, equipment
  - ***Surveillance*** according to EU-guidelines
  - ***Emergency Vaccination*** under approved programmes
- **Veterinary Emergency Team** (CVET) missions to Member States and neighbouring third countries with a disease or at risk
- **Better Training For Safer Food** (BTSF) trainings

Additional tools:
Network of EU and national AI laboratories

EU AI Reference Laboratory – Weybridge, UK, arranges for:

- Annual meetings of all 28 Member States' national reference laboratories and other invited countries and experts
- Ring tests for virus typing, serology and PCR
- Confirmatory diagnosis and support to Member States
- Virus characterisation, phylogeny
- Ongoing review of antigens for ability to detect new strains
- H5N8 – rapid update of antigens for surveillance
- International networking - OFFLU

Additional tools: Biosecurity

- First line of defence against AI virus introduction in poultry flocks
- Solid scientific evidence about the real efficacy of these measures is often lacking or is not quantified
- Compulsory confinement
- Poultry with open air access and indoor farms affected (HPAI H5N8 mainly detected in indoor farms)
- Need for protection against direct and indirect virus introduction

Additional tools: Surveillance in poultry

Objective: detect circulating AI virus:

Scope:

LPAI in gallinaceous birds: chickens, turkeys, guinea fowl, pheasants, partridges, quails and ratites thereby complementing other existing early detection systems

LPAI and HPAI in domestic waterfowl: ducks, geese and mallards for re-stocking game

Strategy: targeted surveillance towards risk factors:

- proximity to wet areas (migratory wild water birds gather)
- Poultry in free range
- Poultry holdings with f more than one poultry species
- High density of poultry holdings
- Intensity of trade

Additional tool: Surveillance in wild birds

Objective: timely detection of HPAI H5N1 to protect poultry holdings

Scope:

"target species" are a selection of 50 bird species being more likely to be infected with HPAI HAN1 - migratory aquatic birds and those previously found positive such as birds of prey

Strategy: risk-based surveillance

- laboratory testing of moribund or birds found dead - focusing on water birds
- Increased surveillance close to areas with a high density of poultry holdings

Additional tool:
Vaccination against AI

- ***Emergency and preventive vaccination***
  - Primarily Member States' decision
  - Commission needs to approve the vaccination plan
  - coupled with surveillance and control of movements
- ***Member States do not see advantages in using emergency vaccination with currently available vaccines***
  - onset of immunity too slow
  - cumbersome, costly application
  - trade implications although internationally recognised measure
- ***Currently very little use of preventive vaccination in poultry and zoo birds***

HPAI in the EU

Examples of application of rules and measures

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Additional measures for HPAI H5N1 in Romania

movement restrictions for wild feathered game, by-products e.g. game trophies, manure products, untreated feathers, pet food, prohibition of bird gatherings and shows



High Risk Area includes 3/10km areas

Low Risk Area *- surrounding buffer zone*

Additional measures: HPAI H5N1 in wild birds UK

Zoning around wild bird findings
Movement restrictions for live poultry/products
Prohibition of hunting &game bird release



Clinical & laboratory investigations <u>in poultry farms</u> to detect possible virus introduction & prevent spread

HPAI in the EU

Two essential aspects:

- **EU scientific advice**
- **EU financing**

Science-based animal health legislation

European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)

- EFSA is assessing modes of virus entry into EU poultry farms for review of biosecurity measures and surveillance tools (2015)
- HPAI H5N8 epidemiological situation and spread (2014)
- Animal health and welfare aspects of AI and risk for introduction into EU poultry (2008)
- Vaccination against AI in domestic, captive and zoo birds (2007)
- Animal health and welfare risks associated with import of birds other than poultry (wild caught) into the EU (2006)
- Possible role of migratory birds in HPAI spread (2006)
- Animal health and welfare aspects of AI (2005)
- **http://www.efsa.europa.eu**

EU financial support to Member States (€)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
For eradication/control	€1.273.505	€6.724.197	€1.385.521	€1.222.014	€3.694.896
For surveillance programmes	€4.007.452	€2.579.494	€1.780.914	€1.816.041	€2.555.000

HPAI in the EU

Conclusions

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Some conclusions on avian influenza (1)

- Response to AI outbreaks in Member States works well
- Robust emergency procedures and contingency plans in place
- AI disease control measures are generally well accepted
- Good balance between prescription and flexibility for Member States

Some conclusions on avian influenza (2)

- Measures in line with OIE requirements
- No major shift in rules foreseen in the most recently reviewed veterinary legislation
- Fine-tuning of existing measures based on scientific advice

European Commission

Thank you for your attention!!

http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/index_en.htm

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